PRT/KUNDUZ: INTEL CHIEF TRYING HARD, LACKS CAPABLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 005852 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, S/CT, SCA/PAB, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR AF SUBJECT: PRT/KUNDUZ: INTEL CHIEF TRYING HARD, LACKS CAPABLE STAFF Classified By: A/POL COUNSELOR MARTIN D. MURPHY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & ( d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Baghlan National Directorate for Security (NDS) Chief reports most of his employees and other GOA appointees in the districts are unqualified and untrained, have poor or no infrastructure, and cannot be removed by provincial authorities because they are appointed from Kabul, often on the basis of past "contributions" or connections to powerful people. It will be difficult to improve governance until the GOA trains and appoints capable people. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) According to Baghlan National Directorate of Security (NDS) Chief Mohammed Wali, many district NDS officials are illiterate former jihadi commanders, who are in their current position either because of connections, or because they have been in their positions so long that it is not possible either to train them or to get rid of them. ¶3. (C) Wali said that he lacks good job candidates who have solid backgrounds and are trainable. He lamented that whenever he wants to plan an operation, he has to give detailed instructions to his people in the field on exactly what to do, and even then, many of them cannot carry out the most basic instructions. If they were trained professionals, he stressed, they would know what to do. Due to poor roads and transportation, Wali said he often has to hire unqualified people who already live in the remote districts because no one else is willing or able to work there. NDS and other district officials often have no buildings to work out of, and no communications systems, which is a serious problem because their job is collecting and reporting information. Wali noted that while most people in Baghlan support the GOA, there would be no way to control the local population were they to rise up against the government. ¶4. (C) COMMENT: Wali is a well-educated intelligence professional who appears to be trying to do his job to the best of his ability under very difficult circumstances. The Hungarian PRT reports that he is a close collaborator with whom they enjoy daily interaction and a high level of cooperation. END COMMENT. ¶5. (C) Bio Notes: Mohammed Wali has been a professional intelligence officer for nearly 25 years, with a break during the Taliban period when he refused to join either the Taliban or the Northern Alliance and left intelligence work to go into private business in Mazar-e Sharif. He returned almost immediately after the Taliban were overthrown, and has been steadily working to re-energize an intelligence service that had been greatly reduced and sidelined. He worked on expanding the NDS into the provinces, then as head of a new NDS branch in Kabul, and finally after an institutional reorganization he served as deputy of Department 90, the counter-terrorism branch, for about a year and a half. He moved to Pul-e Khumri to take over as NDS Director for Baghlan Province in mid-2005. NEUMANN