KHOST SECURITY AGREEMENT NOT LIKE MUSA QALA:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005734 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM,INL/FO STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016 TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO EAID PGOV AF SUBJECT: KHOST SECURITY AGREEMENT NOT LIKE MUSA QALA: AMBASSADOR NEUMANN'S NOVEMBER 25 MEETING WITH KHOST GOVERNOR JAMAL REF: A. KABUL 5604 ¶B. KABUL 5435 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann; reasons 1.4( b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Governor Jamal underlined that the November 23 Khost Security Resolution was "totally different" from the Musa Qala agreement, and that there was nothing in the resolution that would limit the operation of ISAF/Coalition forces or Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). He asked when USG-funded construction on the Khost-Gardez road would begin. The Ambassador explained that funding for the construction was available, but that some additional sub-contracting and surveying were required. Governor Jamal asked whether it would be possible for the USG to identify specific U.S. development funding that the Khost provincial government could co-manage with USG counterparts. He said that the Afghan Border Police (ABP) deployed in Khost faced significant equipment shortages, and concurred with the need to respect tribal/ethnic balance in ANAP recruitment. Governor Jamal expressed concern that some operations by Coalition Forces (CF) -- specifically, the apprehension of terrorist suspects -- were not properly coordinated with Afghan officials. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Ambassador Neumann met with Khost provincial Governor Arsala Jamal at the Governor,s compound in Khost City on November 25. MG Freakley (CJTF-76),MG Layfield (ISAF DCOM-Security),and Carl Rahmaan (D/USAID Mission Director) accompanied the Ambassador. Afghan Minister of Communications Engineer Amirzai Sangin also was present during lunch. -------------- Khost Security Resolution -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Governor Jamal about the Khost Security Resolution signed by provincial tribal elders and religious leaders on November 23 (reftel A). Jamal underlined that the resolution was "totally different" from the Musa Qala agreement, and that there was nothing in the resolution that would limit the operation of ISAF/Coalition forces or Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Ambassador encouraged Jamal to explain to the media why the Khost resolution was different than the Musa Qala agreement, observing that the Khost resolution draws the local people closer to the GOA in working to improve security, rather than creating more distance (as in the Musa Qala arrangement). The Governor indicated that he already was reaching out to the media on the issue, including the BBC. ¶4. (SBU) Governor Jamal thanked the Ambassador for his visit to Khost, saying that such visits are important for boosting the confidence of the people of the province in the face of the difficult security situation. He said that he had held a number of security-related jirgas, emphasizing that suicide bombings are contrary to Islam. Jamal suggested that these efforts had borne fruit, citing an example in which locals identified and surrounded a would-be suicide bomber who ended up detonating his bomb-laden vest (killing only himself), rather than surrender. The Governor also mentioned another recent case in which locals had alerted ANSF to someone who was seeking to plant a mine in a mosque. He added that province officials were doing quite well in locating IEDs prior to attacks. -------------- Khost-Gardez Road -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Governor Jamal asked when USG-funded construction on the Khost-Gardez road would begin, lamenting that "everywhere KABUL 00005734 002 OF 004 other provinces are getting roads -- we hope construction on this road will begin in 2007." The Ambassador explained that funding was available, but that some additional sub-contracting and surveying would be required before work could begin in 2007. Jamal said that, due to snow, it would not be possible to begin construction from the Gardez end of the road until late April; however, weather would present no barrier to beginning construction on the Khost end. At the Ambassador's quest, USAID agreed to provide monthly status reports on the road that could be conveyed to the people by the Khost government. -------------- Reconstruction/Development Funding -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In the context of discussing the Khost-Gardez road project, Governor Jamal said that he had been considering trying to support some smaller projects that would complement the construction of the road. He wondered whether it would be possible for the Provincial Development Council (PDC) to use Governor,s funds for such a purpose. The Ambassador commented that the idea was an interesting one, but that the GOA budget machinery might not be flexible enough to support such an effort. Deputy USAID Mission Director Rahmaan reported that the Ministry of Finance was planning pilot projects in three provinces aimed at increasing the GOA,s ability to extend such funding resources more effectively into the provinces, but that these pilot projects probably would not be funded in the current budget year. ¶7. (SBU) Continuing on the funding theme, Governor Jamal said that he had been thinking of establishing a special kind of Governor,s fund, similar to the CERP funds used by U.S. PRTs, that would allow him to support quick impact projects. He remarked that the people of Khost currently go directly to the PRT to request project support, which, he observed, does not increase the authority of the GOA. He asked whether it would be possible for the USG to identify specific U.S. funding that the Khost provincial government could co-manage with USG counterparts. Jamal emphasized that this would help to put an "Afghan face" on the projects while enhancing the image and the budget planning skills of the PDC. ¶8. (SBU) The Ambassador explained that much work was ongoing to try to make the GOA more responsive to PDC funding needs. He encouraged Jamal to contribute to defining a way forward, based on an Afghan model that would be sustainable. MG Freakley said that limitations on CERP fund authorities would not allow for the transfer of CERP fund control to the Khost government. However, the PRT could work in support of the Governor, coordinating closely on near-term priorities identified by the PDC. -------------- Governor Says ABP in Khost Lack Equipment -------------- ¶9. (S) Referring to notes, Governor Jamal said that the Afghan Border Police (ABP) deployed in Khost faced the following equipment shortages: -- 373 AK-47s -- 94 PK machine guns -- 74 RPGs -- 990 RPG rounds (out of 1,000 requested, only ten were received) -- 47 trucks (CSTC-A Comment: A solution is in sight. There is one inaccuracy in which CSTC-A only shows a shortage of 14 RPGs. CSTC-A expects that the shortages in AK-47s, RPGs, RPG ammunition and Light Tactical Vehicles will be partially addressed by the end of December. CSTC-A is starting to KABUL 00005734 003 OF 004 realize a tremendous influx of equipment due to the recently committed additional USG funds. Nationwide ANP equipment shortages will begin to be addressed in the immediate future and the following equipment will be provided in December to the 2nd ABP Brigade in Khost: 200 AK-47s, 5 RPGs, and 30 more trucks. Ammunition is constantly ordered and supplied, and shortages or surpluses vary from day to day. End CSTC-A Comment) ¶10. (S) Jamal said that he had written a letter to the MOI outlining these shortages, but that thus far there had been no response. He went on to mention that, three days before the Eid-al-Fitr holiday, nearly the entire ABP force in Khost deserted their posts. (Comment: The actual number of ABP desertions in Khost was somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 percent, and the majority subsequently returned; see also reftel B. End Comment) The Ambassador remarked that he had heard this was partially the result of a conflict between the Khost ABP Commander and the Commander,s Deputy. Jamal replied that the real problem was the equipment shortages, arguing that, "if I have a poorly-functioning AK-47 and only 60 bullets, I will not stay at my ABP post, no matter how good my commander is." (CSTC-A Comment: The 2nd ABP Brigade in Khost has over 400,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, with 50,000 more rounds scheduled to be delivered in December, and 112,000 rounds of pistol ammunition -- which is 150 percent of the authorized amount. End CSTC-A Comment) ¶11. (C) MG Freakley said he would get a full list of the equipment needs from the Provincial Coordination Committee (PCC) and would work on any problems. The Ambassador assured Jamal that no one was discriminating against Khost in the distribution of equipment, but that some shortages were inevitable. Jamal said that he did not feel that Khost was receiving unfair treatment, but emphasized the need for the equipment, arguing that Khost is a province with security challenges on a par with Kandahar and Uruzgan, given Khost,s location. -------------- ANAP Recruiting -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The Ambassador explained to Governor Jamal that the Afghan National Auxiliary Police program currently was being restricted to six provinces (Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, and Ghazni). The emphasis was on quality over quantity, with particular care to be given to ensuring that the ANAP are recruited locally and reflect the tribal/ethnic balance of the local area. This was to avoid creating a "hollow force" that would only exacerbate the security situation. Governor Jamal said that he was aware of these issues and that Khost province was conscious of the need for tribal balance as it conducted its ANAP recruitment. -------------- Coordination of CF Operations -------------- ¶13. (C) Governor Jamal expressed concern that some operations by Coalition Forces (CF) -- specifically, the apprehension of terrorist suspects -- were not properly coordinated with Afghan officials. While perhaps some operations would occur without the knowledge of Afghan officials, "not every operation should be that way." Jamal remarked that he does not mind "getting calls in the middle of the night" informing him of such operations, noting that it is easier for him to deal with press and public queries after an operation if he knows what happened. ¶14. (C) The Governor advocated involving Afghan officials, such as National Directorate of Security (NDS) personnel, in such operations, suggesting that they could work with the KABUL 00005734 004 OF 004 local people to smooth things over, turning "hard knocks" into "soft knocks". In this context, he referred to a recent incident in which he had been informed by Afghan officials that Coalition Forces had held NDS personnel at gunpoint to keep them away from the scene of an ongoing operation. NEUMANN