FM SPANTA DISCUSSES JIRGAS WITH AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005716

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: FM SPANTA DISCUSSES JIRGAS WITH AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 193719

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (U) This cable contains action requests (see para 12).

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SUMMARY
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2. (C) FM Spanta has been seized with preparations for the
cross-border jirgas and his December 7 meeting with Pakistan
FM Kasuri. Afghanistan very much wants the jirgas to be
national in nature, but is willing to accept a Pakistan
delegation made up of Pashtuns only, provided it was made up
of all Pashtuns (secular and moderate),not just the tribal
radicals supporting extremists. The proposed timeframe is
now mid-January to mid-February. Spanta was concerned that
Pakistan might hold the jirgas hostage if its demand that the
GOA release Baloch militant Bugti was not met. He was
adamant he had no information on Bugti's whereabouts. The
jirgas are meant to be recommendations to the government, not
part of any legally-binding process, a point the Ambassador
suggested Spanta make clear to FM Kasuri. Spanta asked for
U.S. views on (1) international organizations serving as
observers; (2) whether the U.S. would help monitor (verify
performance) any agreements reached between the two
countries; and (3) help in vetting the delegation lists from
both sides. END SUMMARY


3. (C) On December 6, Ambassador Neumann met with FM Spanta
and conveyed the following messages: Washington remained
keenly interested in the jirgas, the U.S. was willing to help
in any way acceptable to both sides, and we were pleased the
two sides had begun to discuss the issue. Only after the two
sides have agreed or decided to disagree on certain issues
could third parties help effectively.

Jirga Must Represent All of Afghanistan, Can Compromise on
Pakistan Representation
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4. (C) Spanta was seized with the jirgas, "thinking about
them day and night". For the GOA, the jirgas must represent
all of Afghanistan. They were not going to be Pashtun
jirgas, he stressed. Spanta understood the difficulty
Pakistan faced in accepting the concept. For Afghanistan,
the jirgas were a political tradition, but it understands
that this is not the case in Pakistan. Spanta said that if
Pakistan continued to balk at national representation on its
side, the GOA was willing to accept having only Pashtuns from
the Pakistan side, but they would have to be fully
representative of all/all Pashtuns, particularly secular and
moderates. The GOA was concerned that Pakistan would include
only radical Pashtuns in its delegation, which would result
in a failed jirga. This would be the GOA's fallback
position; it would not be on the table immediately. The
Ambassador suggested that Spanta make very clear to Kasuri
Afghanistan's concerns about radical versus moderate
Pashtuns, as the phrase "all Pashtuns" might have a different
meaning in Pakistan.

Timing
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5. (C) The GOA will be pushing for a date around the first
or second week of January. Mid-February would be the latest,
Spanta indicated. One window might be February 8 or 9 to 15,
after the Joint Commission Monitoring Board in Berlin January

30.

Agenda
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6. (C) The GOA has consistently stressed it only wants the

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jirgas to focus on security and anti-terrorism in both
countries. Spanta reiterated that greater cooperation and
coordination in these two areas would be the centerpiece of
the jirga. The GOA does not plan on bringing up the Durand
Line and will resist Pakistan raising it during the jirgas.


Baloch Militant Brahamdagh Bugti as Spoiler
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7. (C) Spanta was concerned about comments he had heard from
COMISAF Richards that Musharaff had told him that Pakistan
would hold the jirgas hostage if the GOA did not release
Baloch militant Bugti who the GOP suspects is being given
haven in Afghanistan. Spanta asked the Ambassador how he
should respond if FM Kasuri demanded his release in exchange
for going ahead with the jirgas. Spanta emphasized he had no
information on Bugti. He only wanted to focus on the jirgas
and have constructive talks, he said. The Ambassador
suggested that Spanta propose to Kasuri that the issue to be
put on the agenda of the intel trilateral. The Ambassador
also repeated the demarche made previously to Karzai that our
position is that Bugti should be turned over to the GOP as a
terrorist.

U.S. Role and Outside Observers
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8. (C) Spanta described the GOA's desire to have the U.S.
role as not only observer but judge, if the two sides could
reach some common position. He noted that other countries
and organizations had requested to be obervers at the jirgas
and asked if this was acceptable to the U.S. The Ambassador
responded that we would have no objection to the
participation of anyone jointly desired by the two sides. He
would seek Washington guidance on whether the U.S. would be
willing to play a role in verifying compliance. He noted
further that, to respond, Washington will need more detail on
what this entailed.


9. (C) The Ambassador suggested that, to the extent the
Foreign Ministers can reach agreement on certain points, it
would be useful to publish a joint statement on whatever
points were agreed upon, as this would help take things off
the table.

Jirgas Are Recommendations, Not a Legal Process
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10. (C) The Ambassador observed that Pakistan was concerned
about whether the jirgas were a political appeal or would
result in legal agreement. Spanta's view was that the GOA
wanted to avoid any legal issues. He stressed that the
jirgas were "recommendations" or "thoughts" for the benefit
of the governments. It would be up to governments to take
their advice or not. Any legal process would need to go
through the Parliaments and governments. The Ambassador
suggested that Spanta make this point clear with Kasuri as it
would likely reassure the Pakistanis.

Can U.S. and International Community Approve Delegations
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11. (C) Spanta asked if the U.S. and the international
community would be willing to approve the jirga delegations
from both sides. The Ambassador said that he would seek
Washington guidance. The U.S. would almost always support
something agreed to by both sides, but whether we would play
a role in vetting the delegation lists (e.g., to eliminate
terrorists or drug lords) would require more discussion to
define that role. We might know that someone was a terrorist
and should be excluded or have a view that a particular
moderate should be included but many individuals would not be
known to us, and the Ambassador doubted we would be willing
to take a separate position in such cases. Spanta reiterated

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his earlier concern that Pakistan might stack the delegation
with radicals who would place objectionable items on the
agenda, e.g., a deadline for the departure of foreign troops
or proposal for a coalition government with the Taliban.
Some people in Afghanistan have an "open ear" for these
notions, he lamented.

Action Requests
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12. (C) To summarize, FM Spanta asked whether the U.S.:

a) together with others, would be willing to vet the
delegation lists from both countries.

b) would be willing to play a monitoring role for any
agreements signed by the two countries.

c) wished to express any view on other countries serving as
observers or helping organize the jirga.

NEUMANN