MUSA QALA ELDERS RETURN TO EMBASSY TO PROVIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005698 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR HARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF SUBJECT: MUSA QALA ELDERS RETURN TO EMBASSY TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES AND AND APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE REF: KABUL 5584 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Six representatives of the Musa Qala Local Authority (LA) returned to the Embassy (Ref) on November 30 to report on recent developments and appeal for support for development projects in the district. The elders reported on their meeting with President Karzai on November 29, saying they had answered his questions about murders in a neighboring village (which they attributed to a family feud) and impressed him with their report on the situation in Musa Qala. They highlighted that, since the Agreement, new district officials had replaced corrupt warlords, 20 locally-hired police were being trained by the Ministry of Interior, four schools had opened, a government-sponsored vaccination program had taken place in the district, and a representative of Afghanistan's Human Rights Commission had been welcomed in Musa Qala. They denied there were any foreign Taliban in the district, conceded there were local Taliban present (but denied Musa Qala was being used as a staging area),acknowledged that a local justice system was in operation, and admitted that only those who were willing to submit to the locally-established judicial system were welcome in the district. They underlined the Musa Qala Agreement had been a reaction to violence and corruption that was destroying their district. The spokesman for the delegation volunteered that the LA wanted to end poppy production but insisted eradication would not work. If the international community would build an irrigation dam which would allow for the production of other crops, the elders could guarantee there would be no more poppy production. Responding to an appeal for USG support and assistance, PolCounselor reiterated the Ambassador's view that there must be evidence that the Agreement would ensure there were no Taliban in Musa Qala and that the national government is accepted in the district. This must include authority expressed through security arrangements as well as acceptance of assistance through official channels. The Embassy could not support any arrangement that operates outside Afghanistan's constitution. As far as the U.S. is concerned, the jury is still out. The Embassy will continue to make the point that requiring too little from the LA in Musa Qala will set a precedent that will weaken the central government and undermine the war on the Taliban. In a separate meeting with Ambassador Neumann on December 5, President Karzai showed growing discomfort over the Musa Qala agreement as a result of recent fighting in the area. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Meeting with President Karzai: Hard Questions and Hard Sell -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Representatives of the Local Authority (LA) set up under the Musa Qala Agreement who had met with PolCounselor on November 9 (Ref) returned to Kabul to meet with President Karzai on November 29. In their meeting at the Embassy the following day, they reported Karzai had asked them to explain murders in a neighboring district -- and that they had assured the president the murders were "personal" not political. The LA had outlined steps they had taken to establish a local government and provide services in Musa Qala and appealed for support -- for offices for officials, for schools, and for weapons for the local police. The LA authority said they felt Karzai was happy with their explanations. -------------- Seeking to Reassure; Looking for Assistance -------------- KABUL 00005698 002 OF 004 ¶3. (SBU) The spokesman for the group, Haji Sha Agha, began the November 30 meeting with PolCounselor by outlining progress in establishing services in Musa Qala. A new district governor and police chief had been installed, four schools had been opened, 20 locally-hired police and commander were mid-way through a training program provided by the Ministry of Interior, and a government-sponsored vaccination program had reached all the children in the district. He claimed a journalist and a representative of the Afghan Human Rights Commission had visited Musa Qala, and insisted that ISAF forces had visited the district. Asked if the (British-led) PRT was providing any assistance, Agha said the commander had informed him that new projects would be provided. (Note: We understand the British are funding the rebuilding of three mosques and may fund a road project, possibly channeling money through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development but using local contractors. Reports suggest the LA is becoming more receptive to funds coming from international donors or ISAF, though they still insist that it be "Afghan delivered" even to the extent of insisting on exclusively local contractors. End Note) ¶4. (SBU) Agha (who had been a member of the loya jirga that wrote the Afghan constitution) underlined that the LA was not trying to operate under a separate legal framework. He said a local, shura (elder)-based justice system was in operation in Musa Qala but volunteered that it does not write its own laws and "there are no prisoners in Musa Qala." There are clear rules (no bribery, no forced marriages, no corruption), and people are rewarded for turning in those who violate them. The shura considers all complaints and deals with them peacefully or can refer a case to the police chief. Asked what kinds of punishments might be invoked by the shura, Agha said they would be "appropriate." He underlined that elders' decisions cannot be contradicted or overruled -- "not even by the police chief." The result, he said, is a situation in stark contrast to before the Agreement -- where "there is no longer any corruption or injustice." ¶5. (SBU) Asked about the situation for women, Agha underlined that in traditional Afghan culture, women are protected by their families and usually do not leave the home. He stressed the importance of protecting women from forced marriages, asked for assistance for health services to address women's health issues, and said "someday" it might be possible to open schools for girls in Musa Qala. Agha dodged the "hypothetical" question if assistance for schools would be accepted if the condition were one school for girls being established. He responded that local tradition has never allowed women or girls to go out in public. Thus, for the time being, "tradition and custom won't allow it." (Note: The Ministry of Education confirms that there were no girls schools operating in Musa Qala before the Agreement, so the lack of girls schools operation at this point does not actually represent a step backward. The fact that public schools even for boys -- rather than only madrasses -- are opening is offered by some as evidence of the limits of Taliban influence. Others caution that it may be a calculated decision. End Note) -------------- -------------- One More Time: No to Taliban; Yes to Government Authority -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) PolCounselor assured the delegation the Ambassador was following the situation in Musa Qala very closely and reiterated the criteria being used in assessing whether it was consistent with the principles of the Afghan constitution. There could be no Taliban governing or influencing the governance of Musa Qala, and the local government would have to accept the presence of central government authority -- expressed as the presence of security forces and acceptance of assistance through normal government KABUL 00005698 003 OF 004 channels. It would be not enough for the LA to simply welcome visits by government authorities; government must be able to express its authority. The Ambassador had not said he rejects the agreement or that the U.S. would not be supportive. He will be monitoring the situation carefully to see if the standards have been met. ¶7. (SBU) While the delegation had assured us November 9 that there were no Taliban in Musa Qala, in this meeting they conceded there were some Taliban present -- from the local area. They are in several villages and they are armed, but they are sitting quietly and "we are in control." (Comment: The report of intense fighting between Danish ISAF forces and Taliban outside Musa Qala overnight on December 3 may belie this claim. The incident was reported 16 km outside of Musa Qala, so the LA authority may claim it was outside the exclusion zone. They may also defend the action as a result of ISAF having breached the Agreement by its actions. End Comment) Agha offered assurances that there are no longer any Arabs, Chechens, or Pakistanis in the district. Asked about reports that the Taliban are being given sanctuary in Musa Qala and using it as a staging area for activities elsewhere, Agha said "this is not true." He asserted such claims came from people from the previous administration who oppose the agreement, and insisted that "the Musa Qala Taliban are not moving out. If we find they do so, we will kill them on the spot." ¶8. (SBU) PolCounselor asked Agha what would happen if the people from Musa Qala who opposed the agreement wanted to return to the district. He answered that criminals -- corrupt officials who had hurt the people of the district -- would not be allowed to come back. If they had simply opposed the agreement but were willing to live under the new administration, they would be welcome. Agha stressed that the Local Authority is in favor of negotiation and talks. It wants to convince opponents and a wider audience that it is made up of human beings committed to having a local government that responds to the needs of the people rather than simply trying to line its own pockets. ¶9. (SBU) As he had done on November 9, Agha hedged on the question of the government's authority in the district. He noted that the Ministry of Interior and the Governor had approved individuals to serve as district governor and police chief and was providing training for 20 locally-hired auxiliary police and their commander as a unit. He asserted that "no one else has so many doubts," and challenged the U.S. to demonstrate the Local Authority and newly-established officials were less satisfactory than the "warlords and criminals that the international community had allowed to be in office" previously. He noted that Musa Qala was the only district in Helmand Province where school were being opened, and he asked for U.S. help in providing services and "keeping the criminals and destroyers out of our district." "Unlike those with big cars, we have no interest in fighting...please don't doubt us anymore." -------------- Give Us a Dam and We Can Guarantee No Poppies -------------- ¶10. (SBU) During their November 9 meeting, PolCounselor had pressed Agha on the issue of poppy production. This time, Agha raised the issue, saying the LA was committed to end poppy production but needed help. He reiterated that counternarcotics programs now in place were not working -- in part, he claimed, due to corruption among the local officials and contractors the programs relied on. He drew a map to demonstrate how an irrigation dam would allow farmers to grow other crops and said that if the international community would build the dam, the elders of the community could guarantee there would be no poppy production. Asked to clarify if the elders would have the ability to make and KABUL 00005698 004 OF 004 guarantee compliance with an agreement to halt poppy production, Agha answered yes, no one would dare violate an agreement signed by the elders. This would be possible if a dam were built. (PRT Note: Governor Daud is also pushing the idea of an irrigation channel for the north of Helmand, and also defending that proposal as a good way to encourage a licit economy and stability in the province. End Note) -------------- Karzai Uneasy -------------- ¶11. (C) In a December 5 meeting, President Karzai was distinctly uneasy about the Musa Qala agreement. He noted the recent fighting with the Danes as evidence that the area is becoming a Taliban strong hold. He and NSC head Rassoul continue to be bothered by the destabilizing effect the agreement has had on other parts of Afghanistan. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) There is no doubt that contempt for the corruption, bad governance and violence that has plagued the district was a motivation for the Musa Qala Agreement. This does not mean, however, that the LA meets the standards of acceptable governance or that we are obligated to support it. We will continue to argue that the arrangements put in place by the Agreement can and should be tested to ensure they neither allow for Taliban control nor prevent the assertion of government authority. We believe we are engaged in a useful dialogue with the leaders of the LA, that they understand our concerns, and that they want us to believe they are being addressed. We have made it clear that we are not yet satisfied. ¶13. (C) The LA's willingness to accept assistance channeled through line ministries is a first step in the right direction, but does not go far enough. The jury is still out on whether the LA will be willing to take the critical steps needed, including accepting government security forces from outside the district. If this and other critical steps are taken, it would provide leverage for establishing and enforcing higher standards for other possible agreements, as are being proposed. The recent Agreement in Khost Province, where elders agreed to support Afghan and international forces in dealing with the insurgency is an example of one which is acceptable. (The Musa Qala elders were unaware of the Khost Agreement.) Helmand Province will continue to be a particular challenge, but the cost of lowering the bar there is a precedent that will further weaken the government in Kabul and the fight against the Taliban. NEUMANN