PRT/LASHKAR GAH: MUSA QALA ? AN INSIDER VIEW

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005638

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF
SUBJECT: PRT/LASHKAR GAH: MUSA QALA ? AN INSIDER VIEW

REF: KABUL 5584


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On November 21 PRTOff met with an
Afghan from Helmand Province?s Musa Qala district, someone
with some influence in the district and access to
information about the current situation on the ground. The
individual offered harsh criticism of the three factions
vying for control of the district: the local shura
nominally in charge (the Local Authority put in place
following the Musa Qala Agreement); opponents of the local
shura (individuals largely associated with former
warlords); and the Taliban. He described not only a quiet
district in which two shuras exert some influence, but also
an accommodation with Taliban elements in the district in
order to keep the warlord faction out of power. His
suggestion on the way forward is to support the admittedly
unattractive local administration with a nearby ISAF
presence, trained local security and reconstruction and
development. Support to the local shura would eventually
permit the community to dislodge and drive out the Taliban.
END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On November 21 PRTOff met with an Afghan from
Musa Qala district, located in the north of Helmand
Province, a person with some influence in the district and
access to information about the current situation there.
The individual described the situation in Musa Qala
following the controversial agreement between local leaders
in the district and the Government of Afghanistan (GOA),
wherein the local shura recognizes GOA authority and
provides assurances regarding maintenance of security, and
the GOA approves a slate of locally-chosen district
officials (REFTEL). Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
and ISAF have withdrawn from the district although they
aver they will return.


3. (SBU) The individual?s motivation is not entirely
clear, though he said that only when the true circumstances
of what is happening in Musa Qala come out can any progress
be made. He believes the GOA is not receiving the truth
about what is transpiring in the district, and cited
communications between the head of neighboring Baghran
district, Haji Abdel Wahid (a/k/a Rais Bagrani) and
ministers at the highest levels of the GOA. Describing
Wahid as a ?double dealer,? the individual says Wahid has
two satellite phones, one to call GOA ministers and assure
them there are no Taliban in Musa Qala, and the other to
call the Taliban to say the GOA is not in control.

Villagers Trapped Between Corrupt, Warring Elites
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) The person painted a picture of elites warring
with each other and standing between the ?international
donors? and ?the people.? According to this individual,
those elites are corrupt people, only interested in
personal enrichment, not in permitting the donors and the
people to make a connection that would lead to development.


5. (SBU) The individual focused most of his attention on
two of the three groups seeking to control the district.
The first is essentially the warlord class, identified with
the Akhunzadha clan of the former Governor and the current
Deputy Governor. The person vehemently denounced this
group, and said the Akhunzadhas? interests would be
threatened if Musa Qala became safe and secure. The other
group is comprised of the local shura and administration
that now claims to control the district, pursuant to the
agreement with the GOA. Those elders, he said, were
compelled to seek that agreement (and the resulting calm)
not only by the fierce fighting in the north of Helmand
this past summer, but also to keep the warlords at bay.
Taliban comprise the third group.

All is Quiet in Musa Qala ... Thanks to Two Shuras
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) The person said that the Musa Qala district

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center is quiet, for the time being. He said it is not
that difficult to maintain quiet, as the district is made
up of a single tribe, the Alizai, and everyone knows each
other. There are two shuras that decide disputes or
otherwise address problems that arise in the district. The
first is the ?official? shura, the one that reached the
agreement with the GOA. Apparently, this one lacks
credibility with the local population, and if this shura is
unable to resolve an issue, there is a second shura, 50
strong, to which the locals can turn. He said that the
?official? shura will accept the decisions of this larger
shura.

Corrupt, Incompetent Shura Maintaining Uneasy Balance
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) While he acknowledged that the ?official? shura
exerted some influence in the daily life of the district,
the individual had no praise for it. He counts among its
ranks Taliban and ?murderers? (alternatively, people with
?blood on their hands?). He also described the individuals
nominated by the shura for district positions (and approved
by the GOA) as ?murderers? that the people do not trust.
The shura is mostly illiterate, without any unifying idea
on how to govern. This makes shura members vulnerable to
influence from the outside, even by the Akhunzadha clan.


8. (SBU) While he made clear his own hatred of the Taliban
(specifically, foreign Taliban from Pakistan),he was not
clear about the level of support enjoyed by the Taliban
amongst the shura or the local community. Certainly, from
his description, there are many who wish the Taliban out of
the district. However, according to the individual, the
local shura cannot push the Taliban out, or rather, have a
compelling reason not to do so: the local elders have
reached a balance of sorts with the local Taliban, for by
accepting a Taliban presence in the district they are able
to keep the warlords out (something they cannot do alone).

Way forward: Support the Shuras with ISAF and Development
-------------- --------------


9. (SBU) The individual asserted that if the two shuras
are supported by ISAF and ?international donors? the
Taliban could eventually be forced out. (NOTE: He devoted
little attention to the GOA, describing it as weak and
unable to support the shura. END NOTE.) If no action is
taken, the Taliban eventually will decide to dissolve the
shura; they are reluctant to take such action now because
the people are happy with the relative calm and the return
of commerce, and disrupting that might provoke an unwanted
reaction. The individual thought ISAF should remain close
to the district, for with ISAF in the area the Taliban
would be reluctant to take action. If ISAF departs, then
?the next day the Taliban will take over the district.? He
also thought that the introduction of reconstruction and
development to the district would also support the shura.


10. (SBU) Asked whether the local community would accept
ANSF in the district, i.e., ANSF from outside the district,
the person said the people would accept those forces.
(COMMENT: This was a slightly unexpected comment, given the
common impression in Helmand that ANSF are corrupt,
especially the police. In a November 10 meeting at the
Embassy, the head of the Musa Qala shura hedged on the
question of ANSF being deployed in Musa Qala, saying they
could be accepted, possibly, in the ?long term? (REFTEL).
END COMMENT) The individual added that ANSF would
immediately be targeted by the Taliban if there was no ISAF
presence nearby. He thought that more immediate support
could be offered in the form of training for local security
forces. Trained local security would support the
government, and would eventually assist in turning the
Taliban out of the district. (NOTE: It has been proposed
that forty members of the woefully under-equipped Musa Qala
local security force be sent to Lashkar Gah for training
using the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)
curriculum; however, details have not yet been worked out.

KABUL 00005638 003 OF 003


END NOTE.)


11. (SBU) COMMENT: PRTOff cannot verify the information
provided by this single source. However, the individual
has influence in and access to the district, seemed
thoughtful and credible, and certainly was willing to
criticize all parties involved. He was dismissive of the
warring elites, and expressed interest in seeing a measure
of security and assistance for the local community. He
expressed a willingness to continue the discussion, saying
that he would report both ?positive and negative? things
about what was transpiring in that troubled district. His
version of the state of play tends to reinforce our
perception that the jury is still out on the MQ Agreement
but that the GOA and ISAF elements need to test access to
Musa Qala soon.

NEUMANN