POST VIEWS ON PRESSURING EU EXTRADITIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005610 SIPDIS SIPDIS, SENSITIVE STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR MKIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958 N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF SUBJECT: POST VIEWS ON PRESSURING EU EXTRADITIONS Ref: A) Emails between Temin Nusraty (SCA/A) and Gary Peters (ROL Coordinator) Notal ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In response to ref requests from SCA/A, Post has reviewed the issue of encouraging EU members to increase the number of extradition requests made to the GoA. While post recognizes the importance of bringing criminals to justice, we do not believe that substantially increasing the number of extraditions will help the situation on the ground, and in contrast, could potentially undermine the Karzai government. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Refs requested Embassy views on the issue of encouraging the USG and EU members to substantially increase the number of extradition requests to the GoA for crimes that could be prosecuted elsewhere. ¶3. (SBU) Embassy Kabul does not agree with the proposal to use extraditions to relieve the strains on an overburdened or inadequate judicial system. In our view, extraditions should be the rare exception and not the rule. Extradition is certainly a tool that may be helpful in exceptional cases. However, Post believes that the primary focus should be on building Afghan capacity in counter-narcotics and, more fundamentally, in justice and governance as a whole. Frequent extraditions would undermine faith of Afghans in the effectiveness of their own justice system and reinforce existing perceptions that their real governance is coming from the West. ¶4. (SBU) Frequent extraditions could also erode popular support for Karzai. Supporters of those extradited will be inclined to believe their offenses were political and not criminal -- possibly offenses against the international community but not against Afghanistan. The Afghans would miss the learning and confidence building experience of seeing evidence presented in open court and would fall back, as they do now in virtually all terrorist detention cases, on the allegation that the arrest is mistaken, politically inspired or results from tribal (or international) enemies concocting a case. ¶5. (SBU) The Afghan heroin problem affects Europe more than the US. Thus, there will be relatively few cases that would lead to extradition to the U.S. EU members will act in their own interest without US direction and any pressure from us could be ill-received and counter-productive. We note that many EU countries lack effective extradition procedures. ¶6. (SBU) There are also pending extradition regulations that are now under consideration by the Taqnin. While there has been some support in Washington for proceeding on this issue by way of regulation instead of law in the interests of time and efficiency, Post believes that proceeding by way of a law is essential, at least as to the fundamental principles and policy questions involved. To do otherwise is likely to insult and anger the Parliament and to set back Afghan political support for Karzai, Sabit and the issue of extradition itself. However, we do agree that a law should focus on the essential principles and that there is certainly a role for using regulations as an implementing mechanism once the law is passed. Historically, Afghans have been inclined to use law exclusively. This has produced some very inflexible mechanisms. ¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: The reality here is that there will KABUL 00005610 002 OF 002 be relatively few high-level cases for trial in the near future. The Afghans have to learn by doing, including taking on difficult cases. We can help them in that learning process, but not by taking it over from them or recommending procedures that would circumvent their legislative processes. END COMMENT. NEUMANN