Getting the Interior Ministry to Pay Its Police: Case Study

UNCLAS KABUL 005593 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR HARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD SENSITIVE, SIPDIS E.O. 12958 N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF SUBJECT: Getting the Interior Ministry to Pay Its Police: Case Study in Zabol Ref: Kabul 5284 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Fixing the profoundly dysfunctional Ministry of Interior (MoI) is a long-term project. We want to encourage Afghans to look to their own ministries, and not to us, to resolve problems; however, we find ourselves forced to intervene even in basic administrative functions to prevent MoI incompetence from eroding police morale and effectiveness. Paying ANAP recruits in Zabol is a case in point. End Summary. ¶2. (U) During the Ambassador's visit to the Zabol provincial capital, Qalat, to observe the November 6 graduation of the second Afghan National Auxiliary Police class, several graduates, who had been members of the now disbanded Afghan National Highway Police, complained they had not been paid in several months, though they had been patrolling the "Ring Road" continuously on the orders of the Zabol chief of police (REFTEL). One patrolman loudly announced he cared nothing for President Karzai nor for Afghanistan; he just wanted the money owed him. If he didn't get it, he said, he would quit the auxiliary police. His colleagues quickly registered their intent to do the same. ¶3. (U) The Ambassador relayed this complaint to Karzai, who ordered Minister of Interior Zarar Moqbil to make good on the arrearages. Zarar dispatched a senior ministry general to Qalat with two-month's back pay in cash for each of the former highway police. Regrettably, the patrolmen now credit the settlement of their salary complaint not to their own president, but to the intervention of the Ambassador. ¶4. (SBU) This small incident demonstrates the MoI's inability to execute even the most fundamental of administrative responsibilities: paying its employees. This is not the first time the Embassy, CSTC-A or Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan has had to intervene to fix a problem that appears inexplicably beyond the capacity of this ministry. Since spring of this year, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has led a top-to-bottom overhaul of the MoI's police function. The overhaul extends to a competency review of all Afghan National Police (ANP) officers, including, when necessary, replacing them, as well as the installation and development of entirely new command and control, management, personnel, training, logistics and pay systems. Current systems are so dysfunctional and the managerial culture so negligent that we expect the overhaul to take at least two years to produce even a minimally competent ministry that kindles loyalty among its junior personnel rather than anger at their seniors' habitual lack of concern for their welfare. ¶5. (SBU) Although we seek to encourage the loyalty of the ANP rank and file for their uniformed commanders and senior civil servants, we will occasionally find ourselves intervening overtly - as in this case in Zabol - to alleviate egregious personnel grievances for the sake of maintaining the ANP's minimal security effectiveness. Indeed, since policemen across the country are complaining about chronic salary arrearages, we may find ourselves soon intervening again. We will remain reluctant to do so as we seek to inculcate among Afghan government employees and the country's citizenry the habit of resorting first to their own ministries when seeking redress for their grievances. NEUMANN