PRT/GHAZNI:NAWA, GHAZNI'S LOST DISTRICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000559 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KDEM PINR AF SUBJECT: PRT/GHAZNI:NAWA, GHAZNI'S LOST DISTRICT Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Mary Townswick for reasons 1. 4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Geographically isolated and largely ignored by the Afghan government and the international community, the southern district of Nawa is one of Ghazni's most troubled security environments and is vulnerable to infiltration by anti-government forces from neighboring Paktika and Zabul provinces. The government's presence in Nawa is limited to an embattled police chief who has one vehicle and 29 untrained police, and a district governor too frightened to travel back and forth between Nawa and Ghazni City. Nawa is a weak link in the front between relatively stable Ghazni and the more volatile environments of Logar, Paktia and Paktika to the east. In order to bring the district into the fold of the central government, a coordinated security and development effort by the provincial government, PRT Ghazni, and the maneuver force responsible for southern Ghazni is needed. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) PRT Ghazni has made several trips to Nawa in recent months, and thus has spent far more time there than Ghazni's provincial officials. Most recently, the PRT and the maneuver unit responsible for security in southern Ghazni met in Nawa on January 21-22 to receive an air drop of humanitarian supplies, which are intended to be stored in the district government center for distribution to needy families over the course of the winter. The PRT's Police Training and Assessment Team (PTAT) distributed weapons and clothing to the Nawa police in fall 2005, and the PRT is improving the main 40-kilometer access road from Gelan (on Route 1) to the Nawa district center, but has not initiated other projects due to security concerns and lack of an adequate government presence to work with. CONTEXT ======= ¶3. (U) Nawa District Center is about a five-hour drive southeast from Ghazni in good conditions. About an hour of that drive is along paved Route 1; the remainder is on a dirt road which passes through Nawa District Center and continues on to Waza Khwa in Paktika Province. The road is the only good route into Nawa. Nawa covers approximately 3,300 square kilometers (14 percent of Ghazni's land mass) and has a population of about 48,000 (19 percent of the Ghazni total). The population is almost exclusively Pashtuns from the Taraki tribe, which is also the dominant tribe in Gelan district to the north. Nawa, which is connected to the rest of Ghazni by a narrow neck of land, borders Paktika province to the east and Zabul province to the south and west; it has much in common with these provinces, which are primarily Pashtun and more tribal in structure than ethnically mixed and generally more stable Ghazni. HEALTH & EDUCATION ================== ¶4. (U) Nawa has several schools, but at the time of the PRT's most recent visit, all of them were closed. Some villagers claimed this was because of Taliban pressure; others said it was simply because schools are closed for two months in the winter. There is at least one report of a school burning in Nawa, but in neighboring districts, villagers themselves have burned schools because they did not want their daughters educated. There are no girls' schools in Nawa. On the health front, Nawa has one clinic adjacent to the district center which was built by the European Union and is staffed by one doctor. The clinic is open six days a week and sees 30-40 patients per day. Medicine and equipment are seriously lacking, however; the doctor told us complicated deliveries are one of his biggest problems. SECURITY & GOVERNANCE ===================== ¶5. (SBU) The Provincial Government has let the problem of Nawa simmer on a back burner, claiming the security situation does not allow the placement of a full slate of district officials there. Governor Sher Alam and other key officials have never visited Nawa. Nawa Police Chief Dawlat Khan has been in place for over three years, since he was appointed by previous Ghazni governor Asadullah Khalid (now governor of Kandahar). For much of those three years, he has been the only government official there. A slate of district officials (Education Director, Health Director, etc.) exists for Nawa, but these officials reside in Ghazni and do no real work because of Nawa's forbidding security environment, and lack of appropriate office space or living quarters. A new district governor, Ramazan, was appointed in October and moved into the district center. He is so concerned about his own security that he has not visited the provincial capital once since he was appointed. Although he is from Nawa and has a home a few villages over from the Nawa district center, he has not slept at home in months because he is afraid of being attacked by anti-government forces and only feels safe at the district center under the protection of the police. ¶6. (C) Police Chief Dawlat Khan, who has been the only constant government presence in the last few years and is more influential than Ramazan, gained the favor of a succession of U.S. maneuver commanders because of his willingness to actively engage anti-government forces and put his own safety on the line. He calls U.S. forces regularly with intelligence and suggestions for operations, and then leads the charge with his one Hilux pickup full of police, cordoning off and searching compounds and detaining suspects. This is in stark contrast to many other police chiefs in Ghazni, who always seem to have an excuse for not participating in a proposed operation. Dawlat's brother and cousin were reported to have been killed by Taliban, which may explain his dedication. However, concrete results of these operations are not clear. It is difficult to assess the intelligence value of detainees, many of whom are subsequently released by the provincial government. Thus, it is hard to know how useful Dawlat Khan's intelligence has been, or whether he is using Coalition Forces to help settle personal scores. ¶7. (C) On the negative side of the balance sheet, Dawlat Khan is minimally educated and seems to employ a bandit mentality in his relationships with villagers. PRT representatives have heard reports from multiple sources, including directly from Nawa residents, that Dawlat Khan takes money and supplies from local shopkeepers with a vague promise to pay the money back later. (NOTE: His men are surviving on salaries of 600 Afghanis/month (about USD 12), and he has no operating budget, so Dawlat may feel extortion is his only option. END NOTE.) Villagers tell us that Taliban passing through Nawa do pay for the food and services they receive. In a meeting with PRT on January 30, Sub-Governor Ramazan repeated many of the criticisms we have heard of Dawlat Khan. He said Dawlat told him when he arrived that he would be all right as long as he cooperated with Dawlat, but if not, Dawlat would have him removed. ¶8. (SBU) Since winning hearts and minds is as key a part of counter-insurgency strategy as conducting military operations against the enemy, it may be that Dawlat Khan has reached a point where he is doing more harm than good and is actually deterring people from supporting the government. Dawlat was informally appointed by Governor Asadullah, who wanted a loyal deputy in Nawa; he was never officially approved by the Ministry of Interior, and in recent weeks Ghazni Governor Sher Alam and Deputy Police Chief Colonel Ali have talked of replacing him with a more professional officer. PRT and maneuver commanders recommended against removing him at this time, but suggested monitoring and mentoring him more closely. A STRATEGY FOR NAWA =================== ¶9. (SBU) Although the Ghazni government feels the security situation prohibits a full government presence at this time, PRT has argued that the security situation is exactly why a broader government presence is needed. Nawa residents who are on the fence about supporting the government may be swayed if they realize the government is aware of their needs, and is working to improve schools, roads, and health care. Getting the Ghazni provincial government to engage Nawa more effectively will require a concerted effort by the PRT and the maneuver forces responsible for Nawa. SUJECT: PRT/GHAZNI:NAWA, GHAZNI'S LOST DISTRICT ¶10. (C) PRT Ghazni and maneuver Task Force Fury are requesting air support to fly Governor Sher Alam and other key provincial officials to Nawa in mid-February to meet with elders and discuss what the government can do for Nawa. An important message will be that the government (and PRT) can and will help address Nawa's needs, but these efforts must be in tandem with improving security and the denial of shelter to anti-government forces. This visit could kick off a more robust government program for Nawa. PRT will continue to push for positioning at least a handful of district officials (perhaps health and education directors) in Nawa, and will encourage the government to develop Sub-Governor Ramazan as an effective district leader. Governor Sher Alam is already beginning to focus on the security situation in Nawa, and is proposing operations there. ¶11. (SBU) Another key piece of the government campaign should be professionalizing the police force in Nawa - whether this means removing Dawlat Khan or training and mentoring him to be more effective. The PRT is pursuing the idea of a dedicated, 150-person police training course for Ghazni at the Gardez Regional Training Center; some of these trained police should be pushed out to Nawa. NEUMANN