RASSOUL REVIEWS AFGHAN SECURITY SITUATION WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005444 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMETT CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-76 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EAID MARR AF SUBJECT: RASSOUL REVIEWS AFGHAN SECURITY SITUATION WITH BOUCHER Classified By: Ambassador A/DCM ASimmons for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) National Security Advisor Rassoul used his November 8 meeting with Assistant Secretary for South and Central Affairs Richard Boucher to review Afghanistan's evolving security situation, which he characterized as generally improving due to NATO operations in the South, but still affected by developments on the Pakistan side of the border. He expressed concerns about the Musa Qala agreement, particularly if there were calls for it to be duplicated in other districts. He agreed on the importance of working closely with Pakistan on cross-border security, intelligence, and plans for the cross-border jirgas. Boucher briefed Rassoul on discussions in Islamabad, including assurances that President Musharraf is willing to do what is needed to enforce the North Waziristan Agreement. Rassoul said priority is being given to building up Afghanistan's inadequate and overstretched security forces, and welcomed the prospect of greater assistance. He told Boucher that the Policy Action Group (set up to deal with the security threat in the southern provinces) is proving to be an effective means to produce coordinated and effective action. The focus in now on delivering more at the local level. End Summary. -------------- Security Situation/Southern Provinces -------------- ¶2. (C) Afghan National Security Advisor Rassoul's November 8 meeting with Assistant Secretary Boucher focused on a review of the security situation, particularly in the four southern provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul) where, after a "hot summer", there seems to be an improvement. Rassoul gave credit for the shift to NATO's successful operations, particularly Operation Medusa. He said Medusa was successful for two reasons. First, militarily, the Afghan National Army performed well despite being ill-equipped. Second, Medusa fostered increased confidence and trust among the Afghan people toward NATO. Prior to Medusa, many doubted the capabilities of NATO. Canada was slow in getting up to speed, but the Medusa successes �A;provided a psychological boost. Rassoul said the challenge now is ensuring the Afghan National Security Forces move in behind NATO operations to provide stability and security. Standing up more Afghan National Police and Auxiliary Police forces and moving more visibly on reconstruction and development are key priorities in the Policy Action Group. ¶4. (S) Rassoul expressed concern over the increased frequency of suicide bombings, particularly in Kandahar. The Government was analyzing the root causes. One reason for the increase was that Operation Medusa had effectively dismantled the enemy's logistics and command and control system, causing it to resort to more asymmetric tactics. Rassoul reported that many would-be suicide bombers had been arrested while crossing the border -- from Waziristan to eastern Afghanistan, and then to Kandahar. He expressed hope that the Pakistan side would do more to disrupt the flow. Since Eid the government had noted a decrease in the suicide attacks, and there is a sense the situation in Kandahar is coming under control, with businesses returning. ¶5. (S) Rassoul characterized Uruzgan province as "stable at the moment." He noted the Dutch maintain a presence while U.S. Special Forces conduct operations. The situation has improved over the last six months. Rassoul described Zabul as another stable province, but one that had to be watched carefully. He noted that Romania had taken over the Provincial Reconstruction Team and that a small group of U.S. Special Forces was patrolling in the province. -------------- Helmand Province and Musa Qala KABUL 00005444 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶6. (S) Rassoul hightlighted Helmand as a "problematic area." The security situation is better than two months ago, but the government is watching the Musa Qala deal closely. Rassoul said he had sought assurances that it is a "genuine deal" with tribal leaders in charge rather than "something else" (a deal with the Taliban). He said there were different views on Musa Qala, but the important point was that Musa Qala was a special case which should not be duplicated in other districts. Boucher underlined that the test would be whether the agreement becomes a vehicle for introducing government authority and creating an environment for allowing reconstruction and development into the area. -------------- Eastern Provinces/The Dynamic with Pakistan -------------- ¶7. (S) Turning to eastern Afghanistan, Rassoul said the region was better than before, particularly in Konar where roads and schools were being built. He remained concerned, however, about the North Waziristan Agreement as attacks continue to come from across the border. Boucher pointed out that the increase in attacks occurred before the agreement was signed but have stayed at a high level. He said the deal was not a failure, but could not be called a success. Rassoul agreed that it was not a success and said Kabul would continue to closely monitor developments in the east. ¶8. (S) Rassoul reported that Afghanistan is working more closely with Pakistan on security questions. At the same time, the government will use the quieter winter months to prepare for a possible increase in the insurgency next summer. The goal is to use reconstruction and development projects to create a more stable political and security situation. ¶9. (S) As a complement, the government is working hard to build up the Afghan National Army. The priority is to "Afghanize" the fight against terrorism. This will require outside help, as the Afghan National Army is currently overstretched and police numbers and skills are still a problem. Boucher said that close coordination will increase prospects for success. As NATO clears an area, Afghan security forces should move in to provide stability, allowing reconstruction and development, education, and services to be developed. He explained that Washington was currently reviewing priority areas and was hoping to do as much in as many areas as possible. -------------- Assurances Boucher Heard in Pakistan -------------- ¶10. (S) Boucher briefed Rassoul on his November 7 meeting with President Musharraf. He described his discussions as "frank" and said that Musharraf understands that the Waziristan agreement is not successful, although he is determined to make it work. This would mean more military action, especially if the U.S. or Afghanistan could provide intelligence. Musharraf had said he wanted to build up the authority of the tribal elders who have lost out to the military, and that he was determined to gain control of the border. Boucher had told Musharraf that closing the border would not be feasible and suggested to him that the question be discussed in military channels. He told Rassoul that the U.S. was becoming more economically involved in the tribal areas. ¶11. (S) Rassoul stated that closing the border was not supportable politically or from a practical standpoint. He described the real problem as not the border itself, but the madrassas that were producing the terrorists who were coming across with the many legitimate travelers. Fencing will not help if the training of extremists and radicals continues. Rassoul reiterated that the solution must be to get to the KABUL 00005444 003 OF 003 root causes. Boucher explained that he discussed both issues with President Musharraf. In response to a question from Boucher, Rassoul agreed that refugee camps were also a source of terrorism, especially those in the Izlami and Peshawar areas. ¶12. (S) In response to Boucher's query, Rassoul said there was not yet much progress on the intel exchange agreed to in Washington in September, but he did report the process had started. Rassoul reported on his meetings with his Pakistani counterpart Aziz whom he invited to visit Afghanistan. He said they had "spoken freely without provoking each other". Rassoul regretted the public posturing between the two Presidents at the Washington tripartite meetings, but said President Karzai had to respond to provocation in order to maintain credibility with the Afghan public. Rassoul saw a need for more bilateral discussions as a complement to those in the tripartite military channels. Boucher noted that the key issue that both countries shared was trying to extend governance on both sides of the border. Rassoul will be inviting Azziz to visit Afghanistan after November 16, when the Pakistani side hopes to meet to work out ideas for the jirgas. (Note: According to Rassoul, Aziz does not like to fly, so the meeting will likely take place in Jalalabad.) -------------- Cross Border Jirgas -------------- ¶13. (S) Boucher said there appeared to be two different conceptions of the cross-border jirgas developing and urged discussions to begin immediately before differences get locked in. He reiterated that the U.S. was willing to help, but encouraged Rassoul to work directly with his Pakistani counterparts. ¶14. (S) Rassoul said Afghanistan needed U.S. help "because we want the jirgas to work." President Karzai is focused on creating a climate for discussions that will bring about real results. This involves a central role for tribal chiefs, backed by national authority. Rassoul explained that the tribal chiefs have played an important role for thousands of years, encouraging moderate, secular civil society, including controlling mullahs. While this role has been undermined to some extent, the jirgas are an opportunity to revive this role and are the best means to bring radicals who are behind the violence under control. -------------- Policy Action Group -------------- ¶15. (C) Rassoul saw the Policy Action Group process (set up earlier this year to address the security crisis in the South) working quite well. He said it had been producing good results. The weekly meetings served as an important coordination mechanism and Rassoul himself was in charge of ensuring follow-up and implementation. President Karzai's attendance once a month ensured that key issues and decision were brought to his attention. The group was now working to deliver more at the local level. Boucher responded that we saw the group as a good mechanism for turning policy into action. Rassoul agreed, noting that in the past it was a talk shop with little action but was now focused on implementation of its four pillars: security, development, governance, and communications. ¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by Assistant Secretary Boucher. NEUMANN