MUSA QALA - SHOWING GOA AUTHORITY IS ESSENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 005437

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMETT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: MUSA QALA - SHOWING GOA AUTHORITY IS ESSENTIAL

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann, for reasons 1.4 (b),(d.)


1. (C) In a November 8 meeting with Helmand Governor
Daud, Ambassador Neumann discussed the situation in
Musa Qala and Daud,s own plans. Daud confirmed that
he had told President Karzai that if Deputy Governor
Amir Mohammad Akhundzada were not removed, Daud
refused to return to Helmand. He said he was still
waiting for a decision from the President. (Note:
As of November 13, this situation had not yet been
resolved. End note.)


2. (C) On Musa Qala, Daud reiterated the reasons for
reaching agreement with the local elders. (Note:
Septel from PRT Lashkar Gah will present Daud,s
position in more detail.) The Ambassador, while
acknowledging the difficult situation in the area,
said the agreement has sparked a debate that will
have wider political consequences. While we can
live with the debate for a while, it will need to be
resolved. In particular, the Ambassador said that
the agreement could prove to be a good thing.
However we need to look carefully at whether it is
creating a safe area for the Taliban. He said that
our long term mission is to build a state. If the
Musa Qala agreement is a step in that direction,
good. If it is peace at the price of no state, that
is unacceptable. The Ambassador said that a recent
PAG had discussed the need to send in some police
from outside to show some real government authority
- no number decided but around 50-70 patrolmen.
While the Nov 8 PAG appears to have backtracked on
this idea (septel),Ambassador told Daud he remains
convinced that only the presence of outside security
forces can show that that the government retains
authority. He said that first this presence needs to
be established and then government officials,
including Daud, should conduct a public information
campaign to counter the negative publicity that the
agreement has received in various circles. He noted
that everyone he has talked to - including
Parliamentarians and other opinion makers - is
concerned that the agreement might have ceded
territory or influence to the enemy.


3. (C) Moreover, the Ambassador added, the lack of
resolution of the Musa Qala situation would impact
the Kajaki Dam project, a key USAID infrastructure
investment. He said that there must be sufficient
ISAF and ANSF presence in northern Helmand to
protect the contractors working on the dam and allow
reasonable assurance that the contractors can
continue working once they mobilize.


4. (C) Governor Daud acknowledged the Ambassador,s
concerns and, after some hesitation, said it should
be possible to work something out regarding the
deployment of external police to Musa Qala (Note:
this statement was far less than firm. End note.)
He said the police would probably come from elsewhere
in Helmand rather than outside the province. Daud
added he had met earlier that day with President
Karzai and elders from the neighboring district of
Now Zad. The elders were asking for an agreement
similar to that for Musa Qala. He said a
provisional agreement was reached in which - unlike
in Musa Qala - the district administrator and police
chief would be from outside Now Zad. The Ambassador
said that would be an improvement, but advised that
the GOA should be very careful to avoid concluding
any agreements before the Musa Qala situation has
been fully resolved.
NEUMANN