MUSA QALA - SHOWING GOA AUTHORITY IS ESSENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 005437 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMETT CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF SUBJECT: MUSA QALA - SHOWING GOA AUTHORITY IS ESSENTIAL Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann, for reasons 1.4 (b),(d.) ¶1. (C) In a November 8 meeting with Helmand Governor Daud, Ambassador Neumann discussed the situation in Musa Qala and Daud,s own plans. Daud confirmed that he had told President Karzai that if Deputy Governor Amir Mohammad Akhundzada were not removed, Daud refused to return to Helmand. He said he was still waiting for a decision from the President. (Note: As of November 13, this situation had not yet been resolved. End note.) ¶2. (C) On Musa Qala, Daud reiterated the reasons for reaching agreement with the local elders. (Note: Septel from PRT Lashkar Gah will present Daud,s position in more detail.) The Ambassador, while acknowledging the difficult situation in the area, said the agreement has sparked a debate that will have wider political consequences. While we can live with the debate for a while, it will need to be resolved. In particular, the Ambassador said that the agreement could prove to be a good thing. However we need to look carefully at whether it is creating a safe area for the Taliban. He said that our long term mission is to build a state. If the Musa Qala agreement is a step in that direction, good. If it is peace at the price of no state, that is unacceptable. The Ambassador said that a recent PAG had discussed the need to send in some police from outside to show some real government authority - no number decided but around 50-70 patrolmen. While the Nov 8 PAG appears to have backtracked on this idea (septel),Ambassador told Daud he remains convinced that only the presence of outside security forces can show that that the government retains authority. He said that first this presence needs to be established and then government officials, including Daud, should conduct a public information campaign to counter the negative publicity that the agreement has received in various circles. He noted that everyone he has talked to - including Parliamentarians and other opinion makers - is concerned that the agreement might have ceded territory or influence to the enemy. ¶3. (C) Moreover, the Ambassador added, the lack of resolution of the Musa Qala situation would impact the Kajaki Dam project, a key USAID infrastructure investment. He said that there must be sufficient ISAF and ANSF presence in northern Helmand to protect the contractors working on the dam and allow reasonable assurance that the contractors can continue working once they mobilize. ¶4. (C) Governor Daud acknowledged the Ambassador,s concerns and, after some hesitation, said it should be possible to work something out regarding the deployment of external police to Musa Qala (Note: this statement was far less than firm. End note.) He said the police would probably come from elsewhere in Helmand rather than outside the province. Daud added he had met earlier that day with President Karzai and elders from the neighboring district of Now Zad. The elders were asking for an agreement similar to that for Musa Qala. He said a provisional agreement was reached in which - unlike in Musa Qala - the district administrator and police chief would be from outside Now Zad. The Ambassador said that would be an improvement, but advised that the GOA should be very careful to avoid concluding any agreements before the Musa Qala situation has been fully resolved. NEUMANN