OUR TAKE ON AFGHANISTAN OBJECTIVES AT THE RIGA

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 005414 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM,INL/FO STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMETT CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD USNATO FOR AMBASSADOR NULAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016 TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL EAID AF SUBJECT: OUR TAKE ON AFGHANISTAN OBJECTIVES AT THE RIGA SUMMIT REF: A. USNATO 628 ¶B. USNATO 634 ¶C. USNATO 576 ¶D. KABUL 5205 ¶E. KABUL 5204 ¶F. KABUL 5025 ¶G. KABUL 5023 ¶H. KABUL 5012 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann; reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The upcoming NATO Summit in Riga offers a prime opportunity to advance our agenda in Afghanistan with our NATO Allies. We believe it essential to continue to project a steady, measured message on the need to eliminate caveats some nations have imposed on the deployment of their troops. Further, the failure of nations to fulfill the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) continues to constrain COMISAF's options and raises the overall risk level for the nations engaged most directly in the fighting in the South. The NAC's September 27 decision to help equip the ANA was a major step forward. he proper integration of security and reconstruction efforts will determine whether ISAF is able to consolidate the gains of its recent and future operations. The NAC's October 27 approval of NATO's role as Secretariat for the Tripartite Commission (ISAF/Afghan SIPDIS military/Pakistan military) is a major step forward in engagement with Pakistan. NATO nations with influence in Islamabad must continue working to convince Pakistan to take action against Pakistan-based Taliban command and control nodes and sanctuary. End Summary. -------------- Keeping Up the Pressure on Caveats -------------- ¶2. (C) Though we are mindful of the potential for the caveat issue to exacerbate tensions between the Allies fighting in the South, and those who have affixed themselves to tasks in the North, West, and/or Kabul, our talks with COMISAF convince us it is essential to continue to project a steady, measured message on the need to eliminate caveats some nations have imposed on the deployment of their troops. More than fulfilling the remaining CJSOR requirements -- important as that is -- eliminating the caveats a number of major Allies have imposed on their troops would provide COMISAF significant additional operational flexibility for responding to unexpected challenges, and for meeting more routine demands. Just one small example: COMISAF recently noted to local NATO Ambassadors that a number of nations with troops in Kabul have caveats that restrict the utility of those troops in patrolling areas near the capital from which rocket attacks have been launched. This, COMISAF emphasized, actually puts those troops stationed in Kabul at greater risk, in addition to undermining ISAF's ability to support the security of the GOA leadership. ¶3. (C) More broadly, COMISAF has reiterated here what SACEUR has told the NAC in Brussels: caveats on ISAF troops continue to channel ISAF operations toward the "economy of force" end of the spectrum. Over the medium to long-term, this likely will suffice to keep the Taliban from re-taking control of the country, provided NATO publics sustain their support for the mission in the face of the continued losses we should expect from the Taliban's continued use and refinement of asymmetric warfare techniques. However, such an approach appears inadequate to empower the GOA to project good governance and economic development into the rural areas most at risk, particularly in the South. This, after all, will be the key to our success in Afghanistan. And the north still could cause trouble that would pit the elements with the strongest caveats against the troublemakers. -------------- Fulfilling the CJSOR -------------- ¶4. (C) Though the conclusion of Operation Medusa in September marked an overall decrease in ISAF's operational tempo, the failure of nations to fulfill the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) continues to constrain COMISAF's options and raises the overall risk level for the nations engaged most directly in the fighting in the South. Poland's plans to send additional troops in February are certainly welcome, but as discussed in mil-mil channels, their impact as a potential reserve force will be limited unless other nations provide the requisite rotary and fixed-wing assets to ensure their mobility. Another as yet only partially fulfilled requirement is for NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs),which, like their U.S. Embedded Trainer Teams (ETT) counterparts, are geared to professionalize the Afghan National Army (ANA) and to ensure that their host ANA units are able to participate effectively in combined operations with ISAF. While realizing many nations are feeling stretched by other commitments, we believe it important to maintain a steady chorus on the importance of NATO nations meeting this military need that NATO nations themselves have mutually identified. -------------- Providing Additional Support to the ANSF -------------- ¶5. (C) The NAC's September 27 decision to help equip the ANA was a major step forward. Although a number of Allies already have provided equipment donations to the ANA and/or Afghan National Police (ANP),the NAC decision provided this effort a second wind by making it a high-profile Alliance objective. Properly equipping and training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF: ANA and ANP) with quality equipment is fundamentally in line with our long-term goal of empowering the GOA to project security with reduced reliance on the international community. We should continue to use all opportunities to highlight the importance of following up on this decision, so manifestly in the interest of all NATO nations and partners. Moreover, in the immediate future, we should look for ways to expand NATO nations' support for equipping and training the ANP, a critical and thus far under-developed element of Afghan national security. Currently there is a substantial requirement for mentors within the ANP. The orchestration of a concept silmilar to the OMLT program should be broached with NATO - preferably with the Germans leading the effort in brussels if they are willing to substainitally increase their own role - to facilitate mentoring at the regional, provincial, and district levels. Participation in this concept should not be limited to military police but also encompass the totality of the civilian police expertise that is resonant within the countries belonging to NATO. An increase in police mentors is required to continue to build the ANP into a viable force that is capable of enforcing the rule of law throughout the nation. -------------- Bringing Pressure to Bear on Pakistan -------------- ¶6. (C) It is clear that the insurgency is more and more tied to the festering problem of Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan. Although it is not the sole determinant of campaign success, failure to redress the Pakistan-based Taliban threat will lengthen the struggle and significantly increase the expenditure of U.S., NATO, and Afghan blood and treasure on the overall effort here. We note the NAC's October 27 approval of NATO's assumption of Tripartite Secretariat responsibilities, which can be expected to nurture the overall relationship and foster better unity of effort between NATO, the Pakistani Army, and the ANA, especially regarding activities focused on security of the border region. However, the issue of Pakistani action on their side of the border is larger than simple operational mil-to-mil border arrangements, and has broader strategic implications. We feel the Government of Pakistan has the necessary capacity to act yet has been unwilling to make the strategic-level decision to actively combat the Taliban and AQAM command and control. Though NATO's ability to influence politically the Government of Pakistan is limited, the U.S. and other NATO Allies with influence in Islamabad should strive to reach consensus on this issue and to pursue a coherent engagement policy aimed at convincing Pakistan to act decisively to eliminate the sanctuary. The nascent NATO Ambassadors' informal group in Islamabad could provide a means of informal coordination. -------------- Integrating Security and Reconstruction -------------- ¶7. (C) The proper integration of security and reconstruction efforts, and an increase in development funds, will determine whether ISAF is able to consolidate the gains of its recent and future operations. COMISAF and a number of Allies are keenly aware of the ISAF deficit that still remains in this area, and have been thinking creatively about how to fill some of the gaps -- for example, considering the creation of a CERP-like fund for ISAF commanders engaged in clearing and stabilization operations. More Allied funding for reconstruction would be very welcome, in both strategic infrastructure and PRT-led smaller projects. COMISAF has also relayed to us his thoughts on whether there needs to be a more direct dedication of ISAF maneuver units to force protection tasks associated with reconstruction and development assistance. For the most part, PRT commanders, particularly in the South, often are stretched too thinly to provide adequate security for civilian counterparts attempting to establish and monitor reconstruction projects in rural areas. Doing this well will be important to ISAF's long-term success, as well as to generating near-term good news stories that will help us to keep NATO and partner publics in the fight. Continued emphasis on contributing nations' financial resources toward development projects is also in order. NEUMANN