PRT LASHKAR GAH - NORTH QUIET AFTER ISAF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 005399 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMIT CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH - NORTH QUIET AFTER ISAF WITHDRAWAL REF: A. KABUL 4369 ¶B. KABUL 5204 ¶C. KABUL 5194 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The situation in Musa Qala district in the north of Helmand Province, the site of serious clashes between ISAF and Taliban forces, remains relatively stable following ISAF,s recent withdrawal from the district center (DC). The withdrawal followed an arrangement between the local shura (council of tribal elders) and Governor Daud, which requires the shura to maintain security in the DC. The shura appears to be keeping up its end, and remains in contact with the Governor. Per reftel B, this arrangement could be: (a) the first step towards a more durable security environment and the gradual introduction of governmental authority in the district; (b) a mere lull before resumption of hostilities; or (c) a cover for creating control by the Taliban or local elements not under GOA control. With a local population possibly uncertain about whom to credit for the ongoing quiet, it is important that the government act to support local security efforts and development in the district. The Governor is coordinating with the central government on a list of reconstruction and development projects for the district. Tribal leaders from other districts have taken note of the Musa Qala arrangement, and there is a risk that proposals for similar arrangements might arise in the coming weeks, before the Musa Qala arrangement has been tested. However, for now, President Karzai has told Governor Daud, "No more deals". Recent intel indicators point to the strong possibility that the Taliban have reestablished significant presence in Musa Qala. Paragraph 15 contains a summary of the Musa Qala agreement's points. END SUMMARY. Volatile district quiet after ISAF withdrawal -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) The situation in Musa Qala, a district in the north of Helmand Province and the site of serious clashes between ISAF and Taliban forces over the last few months, remains relatively stable following ISAF,s withdrawal from the district center (DC) on October 16. While fighting has continued in neighboring districts, the Musa Qala DC has been quiet since Governor Daud, the local shura (council of tribal elders),and the Task Force Helmand Commander reached an understanding in early September, and at the Governor,s request ISAF stated it would only fire if fired upon (REF A). At that time the Musa Qala shura provided assurances that it could maintain security within the DC. (NOTE: Over the last several weeks fighting across the North generally has abated, though it has actually intensified in Nahri Sarraj, a northern/central district, southeast of Musa Qala and bordering both Lashkar Gah district and Kandahar Province. It is unclear, however, if the overall decrease in violence is due to the agreement, to Ramadan and Eid, or to the onset of the poppy planting season. Immediately after the MQ agreement, there were signs of a spike in attacks at Kajaki and Naw Zad. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C/NF) Anecdotal evidence provides both encouraging and worrying signs: on one hand, the bazaar in the Musa Qala district center is open and many people have returned, while on the other, women are not permitted in the bazaar and now must wear burkas, and girls can no longer attend school. Whether those alleged restrictions fall within cultural norms for Musa Qala, whether they are in response to some form of pressure, or whether residents are "hedging their bets" by adopting practices to keep certain elements at bay, is unknown. KABUL 00005399 002 OF 005 Shura holding up its end of arrangement -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Following ISAF,s withdrawal, there are indications that the local shura is adhering to its side of the bargain, i.e., it is enforcing security through a "tribal security force" and preventing other parties from establishing a dominating presence in the district, though this remains to be tested by the eventual interjection of Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) from outside the district (Ref B). Also, the shura continues to engage the Governor, e.g., on government support for reconstruction projects. (NOTE: during negotiations some weeks ago, the local leaders made clear to Governor Daud that they would only accept Afghans to work on reconstruction. END NOTE.) The Governor told PRT representatives that he feels the shura consists of genuine representatives of the local tribe. ¶5. (C/NF) (NOTE: UK officials have stressed that this is an "Afghan process," one result of the Governor's outreach to tribal leaders across Helmand over a period of months. They assert that this particular arrangement was reached between the shura and the Governor, with the Governor engaging ISAF regarding an agreement to withhold fire and eventually withdraw from the DC. Other credible sources indicate that the UK acted unilaterally and was part and parcel of this agreement. From the Governor's perspective, it is an opportunity to help extend the reach of the government -- by recognizing traditional authority, he obtains recognition of the government's authority. Per reftel B, whether this arrangement indeed will extend the reach of the GOA remains to be tested, and the sooner the better. END NOTE.) Governor Focused on Development -------------- ¶6. (SBU) According to UK PRT officials, the provincial and central governments have set responding to Musa Qala's reconstruction and development needs as their priority. The Governor has provided the Policy Action Group with reconstruction priorities for the district, which include construction of mosques, schools and a road, and reconstruction of damaged shops and houses. Governor Daud has sent a survey team to the district. While the PRT has responded with some assistance, e.g., with USD 10,000 to equip the district center, and DFID will look into how their long-term development plan (HARD-P) can support Musa Qala reconstruction, PRT officials deem it appropriate that Daud is looking primarily to the central government for reconstruction support. Who gains from the lull in hostilities? -------------- ¶7. (SBU) It is difficult to gauge the perception among Helmand residents of the arrangement that secured a period of relative calm in Musa Qala, i.e., as to whether locals view this as a victory for the government or the Taliban. Few if any details of the arrangement have been made public. According to a media summary of Helmand compiled by an INL sub-contractor, the arrangement has been described as an example of Taliban weakness, as a defeat. However, one article concerning the improved security situation in Helmand highlighted the arrangement and quoted locals as giving tribal leaders credit for bringing peace to the district, not the government; one tribal leader even thanked the Taliban. ¶8. (C/NF) One beneficiary of this arrangement is ISAF, which has now freed troops that had been fixed for months in an isolated "platoon house" in the district center. As UK officials have stressed, particularly in the press, it was the Governor who asked that ISAF troops be placed in district KABUL 00005399 003 OF 005 centers; this arrangement then reflects a response to the Governor's subsequent request that, following his engagement of the local shura, circumstances favor unfixing. ¶9. (C/NF) An indirect beneficiary is Pakistan, who holds up the MQ agreement as a validation of its North Waziristan Agency agreement. That the two agreements are in fact very different may only be admitted by Pakistan if the MQ arrangement falls apart and no longer proves to be a positive corollary. What is Ahead for Musa Qala? -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) Whether this arrangement results in a measure of stability leading to development and the gradual (re)introduction of governmental authority, whether it collapses, or whether it results in creating an enemy sanctuary, lawlessness and a return of hostilities, depends on the shura and its ability to maintain security in cooperation with the ANAP officers who should arrive in the district center in mid-November. The shura also must continue to constructively engage the Governor, and thereby recognize his authority. The Governor has already produced much, in ISAF,s assurances and withdrawal, but he will also seek to commence reconstruction projects. Also outstanding is the potential for military activity outside the District Center but still in Musa Qala, a possible gray area that could create difficulties for the Governor. Nevertheless, close monitoring of the situation in Musa Qala is needed to alert ISAF to potential blowback on President Karzai's government if the agreement were to crumble. Can This be Replicated Elsewhere in Helmand? -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) Neither ISAF nor the Governor views the Musa Qala arrangement as a template that can or should be mechanically applied in other districts. COMISAF underlines that the value of the arrangement is not yet known and must first be tested. Daud continues to reach out to tribal leaders across the province, leaders who have taken note of the calm in Musa Qala. According to PRT officials, the Governor has found that the prospect of development has spurred the interest of local shuras, at least as much as (and in some cases more than) the prospect of a measure of security. Daud has engaged local leaders in the northern districts of Sangin, Baghran an Naw Zad, and the southern district of Garmser. PRT officials say that leaders in those districts are engaging Daud with greater urgency, while leaders in other districts are also saying they want an arrangement like the one in Musa Qala. ¶12. (S/NF) Sangin is one example of how the Musa Qala arrangement is not easily replicated. Governor Daud's engagement with Sangin leaders has proven more difficult than with Musa Qala leaders, there being less tribal homogeneity in Sangin and doubts about some local leaders and their goals. The Governor has said that negotiations with Sangin leaders could take some time. COMISAF has briefed local NATO Ambassadors that ISAF would not agree to withdraw from Sangin district center, since it lies on the main transit route to the Kajaki Dam, a key reconstruction effort in the South. However, there are some indications that ISAF may have already begun preliminary negotiations with tribal elders in Sangin. Rumors of like agreements being considered may raise doubts among Afghans as to ISAF's degree of commitment. Daud has also expressed concern that the Sangin Council may include a heavy influence from narcotics dons who simply want to secure a lighter foreign presence/peace until they can harvest their crop. (CFC-A Comment: CFC-A is concerned that the attraction of the apparent quiet gained by what may very KABUL 00005399 004 OF 005 well be a short-term accommodation will blind ISAF to the harmful long-term effects on the counterinsurgency campaign, which calls for continual pressure on the enemy. Recent intel indicators point to the strong possibility that the Taliban have reestablished significant presence in Musa Qala. End Comment) ¶13. (C/NF) Despite the differences with Musa Qala, latest indications are that the Governor seems to be making progress in Sangin, as he says he now has a list of proposed district officials, provided by local leaders, that he says he can accept. Daud is looking for some concessions from the shura, principally a guarantee of security for the road that needs to be built from Highway 1 to Kajaki, the site of USAID's high-priority dam/energy project (REF B). Daud believes there is a need for a joint ISAF/Afghan National Army operation in neighboring Nahri Sarraj district (using existing, not additional, forces),to clear out Taliban, after which the Sangin shura will be able to look to its own security. (Note: The Ambassador's cautionary comments on the Musa Qala arrangement recently were published in the local and British press. Some British officials feel that if an arrangement with the Sangin shura provides security for, and helps advance, a major U.S. project like the one in Kajaki, the U.S. may set aside possible reservations about these types of deals -- they are wrong. End Note). ¶14. (C/NF) COMMENT: The arrangement in Musa Qala brings some relief to locals weary from fighting and displacement, and creates an opening to be exploited, by the government or by those opposed to the government. If locals are unsure of whom to credit for the lull in fighting, it is important that the government not be seen to recede but to re-insert Afghan security forces to test the arrangement and to help bring development into a conflict-torn district. This will help win over the local populace but also clarify the intentions of the local shura handed an unusual opportunity to assert its own authority. However, we continue to hold doubts about this kind of arrangement, and it remains to be seen whether the Musa Qala agreement will last. Karzai told NSA Hadley that he (Karzai) had instructed Governor Daud that there should be "no more deals". END COMMENT. ¶15. (SBU) Summary of points in Musa Qala Agreement: -- "Local Administration" (LA) will work to serve the public, under the Afghan national flag. -- Uphold the constitution and avoid illegal activity. -- Maintain security in district, help stabilize region. -- Facilitate develop and rehabilitation projects. -- Collect taxes and consult wtih provincial authorities on spending them on welfare activities. -- The LA will support children going to schools and keep doors open to the public. (Note: The government would tolerate the curriculum being limited to the Koran if that was the Shura's choice; no explicit direction to permit girls' attendance). -- Facilitate government missions and NGO activities. -- Cooperate on keeping roads open. -- Guarantee the movement and security of international and national security forces while relocating ; protect government property. -- LA committed to not supporting any insurgency in other districts and to not letting the district to again become a haven for terrorists. -- LA will coooperate with Ulemas to try to bring "Islamic unity and fraternity" to all people in the region, bring peace and remove enmity. -- Ban and control illegal arms. -- Facilitate the return of IDPs. -- Approved LA will commence activities only after Governor's approval. KABUL 00005399 005 OF 005 -- Adjust arrangement only in agreement with the Governor. End Points. NEUMANN