NSA HADLEY HEARS PRESIDENT KARZAI'S VIEWS ON THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005387 SIPDIS SIPDIS ISLAMABAD FOR A/S BOUCHER DEPT FOR SCA/FO FOR GASTRIGHT STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR HADLEY, O'SULLIVAN, HARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-76 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR AF SUBJECT: NSA HADLEY HEARS PRESIDENT KARZAI'S VIEWS ON THE CROSS-BORDER JIRGAS REF: A. STATE 182909 ¶B. KABUL 5218 ¶C. KABUL 5002 ¶D. KABUL 4990 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) President Karzai used his November 2 dinner with NSA Hadley to lay out his goals and plans for the cross-border jirgas agreed to at the September 27 trilateral dinner in Washington. Karzai confirmed that he hopes there will be two parallel events, each addressing the security issues in the border region. Karzai's idea is to use a combination of tribal and state authority to confront and bring under control those elements behind the violence. Karzai said he has reached out to Pakistani tribal figures to explain his vision, but that claims that he had issued invitations were not correct. If Taliban supporters were to show up, Karzai would welcome seeing them "crushed" in the face of the authority of the jirgas. Karzai acknowledged there are risks involved in his plan, and he underlined that success will depend on both jirgas having "genuine," broad, national participation, drawn from secular tribal leadership as well as from federal and regional governmental structures, religious leadership, and civic organizations. Karzai has talked directly to Musharraf only briefly in Washington. He believes his Pakistani counterpart will press for participation drawn only from the immediate border region and a less bold agenda. Karzai agreed that he probably will have to see Musharraf personally to sell the idea of broader participation. The Afghan president hopes for U.S. and UN support in the planning process and representation at the jirgas. He welcomed NSA's invitation to explain how, despite years of disruptive war and dislocation, traditional tribal authority holds sway in the border region -- as a complement to democratic values. End Summary. -------------- Karzai's Vision for the Jirgas -------------- ¶2. (S) During the November 2 dinner in Kabul hosted by Afghan President Karzai for NSA Hadley, Karzai laid out his goals, plans and actions to date relating to the cross-border jirgas he and President Musharraf had agreed to during their meeting with the President on September 27 in Washington. Karzai confirmed that he wants the jirgas to focus on the issue of security in the border region. Whether or not the jirgas should have decision-making authority depends on how they are organized, but it can be effective. "When a jirga decides, the decision becomes binding. If it decides the violence must end, even the Taliban must submit." However, Karzai added that he would want to see how attendees are shaping up before deciding whether the jirgas should be a decision-making body, or merely consultative. ¶3. (S) Karzai reported he had written letters to more than twenty tribal elders in the region explaining his vision for the jirgas. Karzai mentioned Jamir Khan as one of those to whom he had written, but said reports that he had issued an invitation to Jamir Khan were not correct. Asked what he would do if Jamir Khan and others with Taliban connections were to show up at the jirga, Karzai said he would welcome this development. "They would be crushed by the authority of the jirga; they cannot defend what they do." -------------- Broad, Moderate Participation will be Needed -------------- ¶4. (S) Pressed by NSA Hadley on how confident he was that KABUL 00005387 002 OF 003 the agenda and outcome would conform to an agreed plan once the jirgas got underway, Karzai said it all depended on the participation. Both jirgas -- the one in Afghanistan and the one in Pakistan -- must include "genuine," broad, national participation. This means limiting participation by the polarized groups currently in the border region -- to less than 60 percent of those attending the Pakistani jirga, according to Karzai. The objective is ensuring a strong, moderate voice from representation drawn from a national pool of secular (read moderate) tribal authorities, as well as federal and regional officials, religous leaders, and civic organizations. Karzai highlighted the need to have a significant representation of women. ¶5. (S) According to Karzai, this broad participation would ensure the voice and authority of the jirgas would represent those who "reject violence, want peace, would be willing to fight against the Taliban and support civil socity." Karzai thought the only risk to his plan for binding decisions to deal with violence and terrorism would be the failure to have broad moderate representation at the jirgas. If he failed to achieve that, he would not want to modify the jirgas' terms of reference from "decision-making" to simply "consultative." Pressed again on his confidence that the agenda could be controlled, Karzai said the only risk would be if the issue of the Durrand Line were raised, but he was confident that could be avoided by careful planning and outreach to participants beforehand. ¶6. (C) NSA Hadley asked Karzai about the dynamic between tribal traditions and state structures and authority -- as part of the jirga process and more broadly. Karzai stressed that, in his view, the two systems are compatible and complementary. He observed that Afghan civil society may not be defined as Westerners see it, but it also is based on a strong consultative tradition. Karzai was strong in saying that having tribal and elected elements together strengthens rather than subverts democracy. -------------- Afghan-Pakistani Consultations and Planning -------------- ¶7. (S) Karzai agreed with NSA Hadley that successful jirgas will probably require direct discussions with Musharraf. Karzai said he and Musharraf talk regularly and have discussed the jirgas (if superficially) on two occasions since the Washington meeting. He used his call to Musharraf on Eid (October 23) to say the sooner the jirgas take place, the better. Musharraf had not disagreed. The Pakistani president called back a few days later, when, according to Karzai, Musharraf reiterated his belief that Baloch tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti's grandson (and reported successor) is currently in Afghanistan and insisted that he be delivered to the GOP. Karzai said that, to this point, Musharraf has been vague on timing and organization of the jirgas. ¶8. (S) Invited by NSA Hadley to name those he would like Musharraf to name to represent Pakistan in planning discussions, Karzai volunteered the names of Pakistani Minister of Interior Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao and Minister of Culture GG Jamal. Asked about Northwest Provinces Governor Orakzai, Karzai said that, while Orakzai would certainly be "in Musharraf's hands," his being part of the Pakistani planning team was "okay." ¶9. (S) NSA Hadley asked Karzai who would be representing Afghanistan in planning discussions with Pakistan. Karzai said that Farook Wardak would be responsible for heading the planning "secretariat," but that a respected political figure with strong tribal ties and credentials would be given the overall lead in talks with Pakistan. Pressed to confirm that Pir Gailani would hold that position, Karzai said only that Gailani's name had been discussed in a meeting the previous day, but that not everyone had the same view. The key KABUL 00005387 003 OF 003 criteria was that there needed to be individuals involved who have strong ties to Pakistan. He assured NSA Hadley the Afghan committee would be named shortly, adding "we are ready to move on this. I don't know if Pakistan is, but we are ready." -------------- U.S. and United Nations' Role -------------- ¶10. (S) At three points in the meeting Karzai mentioned that he wanted the UN and U.S. to play a role in the jirgas. This would be particularly important in the planning process to ensure that moderate elements were represented in both jirgas. Karzai also welcomed international presence at the jirgas themselves. NSA Hadley reiterated U.S. support for the cross-jirga concept, underlining the expectation that we would be supporting a process that would lead to positive and constructive cross-border dialogue. -------------- On the Role of Tribes in Afghanistan Today -------------- ¶11. (C) During the informal pre-dinner meeting, NSA Hadley invited Karzai to describe the role of tribes in contemporary Afghanistan -- specifically whether 30 years of war and aftermath has undermined tribal effectiveness. Karzai agreed that years of war, leading to lost homes and community ties, had resulted in a generation that has lost contact with Afghan history and traditions. These are the young men vulnerable to madrassess. But the losses are not universal; there are many provinces where the tribal structure and influence remains strong. Karzai cited Arghandab District in Kandahar, right next to Panjswai where he said the Taliban have almost free rein. When the Taliban showed up in Arghandab, the head of that district convened a shira and organized a resistance. According to Karzai, the district has remained perfectly safe. ¶12. (C) Karzai cited tradition and political service as the keys to tribal influence. "You can't buy it; no amount of money or guns will earn you that influence." You earn it by being part of the tribe and serving the community. He added that great responsibility comes with the influence. Elders are responsible for seeing that the traditions and values -- "the psychology of the tribe" -- are passed down. ¶13. (U) This cable has NSC Clearance. NEUMANN