AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH KANDAHAR GOVERNOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005215 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR DANIEL FATA CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH KANDAHAR GOVERNOR Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) During an October 22 meeting in Kandahar, Ambassador Neumann and Governor Khalid discussed the Afghan National Auxiliary Police Program (ANAP) and agreed that recruits for the ANAP needed to come from all regions of the province and not be based on one tribe or individual if we are to avoid turning ANAP forces into individual militias. The Ambassador suggested, and the Governor agreed, to work with Canadian or U.S. forces if necessary to get out to the elders to explain the ANAP program to tribal leaders throughout the province and seek their assistance in recruiting members for the program. The Ambassador and Governor shared concerns about the recent 14-point agreement in Musa Qala, Helmand Province, where Governor Daud struck a deal with local tribal elders that involves the withdrawl of British troops from hotly contested positions. Governor Khalid believes that the area will become a "paradise" for the Taliban and drug lords. One way to test the agreement will be to send in ANP forces from outside the area. END SUMMARY Auxiliary Police -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) During an October 22 visit to Kandahar, Ambassador Neuman briefed Kandahar Governor Assadullah Khalid on the latest developments on the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) program. He said the U.S. was currently paying for ANAP with help promised (but not yet received) from the Germans, the UK, Canada, and the Dutch. He explained that because Congress mandated where the money was to be used, funding for the ANAP program must be structured through the Ministry of Interior. He stressed the necessity for the ANAP to come from different tribes and regions for the program to work. He also emphasized the importance of drawing ANAP unit personnel from all of a province's tribes and clans; a non-representative force could provoke locals' hostility and degenerate into an oppressive tribal militia. Several provincial governors had requested village and district-level police and have been told the same thing -- that they must come from all parts of the province. A major challenge is that we must go "fast and wide", the Ambassador said. All major tribes needed to be involved, with no one left out. The program had to be based locally but answerable to the GOA. Otherwise, the ANAP program will fail and we will not be building the future of Afghanistan but establishing militias. The Ambassador asked for the Governor's help in bringing in effective and loyal auxiliary police. ¶3. (C/NF) Governor Khalid agreed, saying that this was an extremely important issue for him. He prefaced his comments by saying that the training at the Regional Training Center of the first group of ANAP recruits was too tough, especially during Ramazan. He suggested that calisthentics was not a good use of time during a short training program. He then promised to speak "honestly and openly" on the issue and asked that his comments not be shared with President Karzai. The Governor said he felt more responsible than anyone else on the ANAP issue, commenting that it was his idea originally. He believed that the ANAP program was necessary for Afghanistan and Kandahar, but cautioned that if it was not done properly, ANAP could be more dangerous than the Taliban. If ANAP is based on tribes or centered on an individual, the country will just end up with militias, not a KABUL 00005215 002 OF 003 national police. Basing ANAP in an area from just one tribe would mean that the police would just follow one tribal leader, not the government. The Governor then asked, "so where do we bring them from"? He explained that he would start talking to tribal leaders to explain the ANAP program and its security benefits. He would ask them to send their best people to join the ANAP. The Ambassador suggested and the Governor agreed to work with Canadian or U.S. forces as needed to reach out to elders to explain the program and seek their help in recruiting. The Governor shared his ideas for the total number of ANAP needed for various districts, including a reserve unit that could be mobilized around the province and neighboring provinces. These ideas have been passed to CSTC-A. ¶4. (C/NF) The Governor then addressed concerns he believed were held by some in CSTC-A that he was trying to build militias in Kandahar. The Governor shared that he told them that he is not from Kandahar, so he has no militias and asked "why do I need a militia"? He noted an example in his defense of what transpired when he fired the Police Chief in Zharay District. The local leader took his entire 40-man unit with him when he left. Similarly, on whether the Governor was overly influenced by Ahmad Wali Karzai (AWK), the Head of the Provincial Council in Kandahar and brother of President Karzai, he said that "he hears things on the streets" and knows that many people assume he is dependent upon AWK. The Governor noted that people often petition AWK for help on issues. The Governor is mindful that President Karzai is just a phone call away for AWK. The Governor stressed that he sometimes takes advice from AWK but "from others too". The Governor said that President Karzai was a "good guy, respected" and the only one in Afghanistan who could do the job. Answering a question about his relations with Deputy Minister of Interior Hadi Khalid, the Governor responded that he did not know him well but would answer the question honestly. The Governor said he thought that both Khalid and Minister of the Interior Zarar Ahmad Muqbil were "too weak". He reserved special scorn for the Minister, however, and said he was "not a good guy." However, he found the Deputy Minister to be "a guy who wants to do a good job". The problem was that "he had no base and maybe no support from Karzai". ¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador responded that we could move beyond these concerns by working with the elders and helping to build a strong ANAP in Kandahar. Those efforts would show people that the Governor was not interested in building his own militia. The Ambassador suggested that the PRT work with the elders and tribal leaders. If we continue to work together to build a strong ANAP, this would also build a base for strengthening the ANP. The first place to look for new ANP should be the ANAP, which is a temporary force, the Ambassador explained. (Note: The Ministry of Interior is deploying a team led by a senior officer to each province in which ANAP will be recruited. The purposed of this team is to engage the provincial and district elders and leadership to explain the ANAP concept and urge these leaders to send the "best sons of Afghanistan" to join the ANAP".) "Truce" With Taliban in Musa Qala Region of Helmand -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Governor Khalid raised his concerns about the recent 14-point agreement in Musa Qala where Governor Daud struck a deal with local tribal elders that involves the withdrawal of British troops from hotly contested positions in Helmand province. The Governor was afraid that such a deal might be replicated in Kandahar. He complained that KABUL 00005215 003 OF 003 ISAF is over-correcting a previous fault and is now placing too much attention on tribal relations. He predicted that Musa Qala would become a "paradise" for the Taliban and drug lords. The Ambassador said that we shared the same concerns. He suggested that one way to test the agreement would be to send in police from outside Musa Qala to patrol the area. That would tell us who was in authority. If the Taliban don't let the police in, then we'll know there is no agreement. The Governor responded that "we have already given the area back". ¶7. (C/NF) Ambassador Neuman stressed that until we've tested the agreement, there should be no other agreements like it. He said that he was nervous about the deal, especially since the area was near the Kajiki dam project which could not be completed with such an untested agreement as the sole basis for security. Foreigners will be working there for one year and we could not afford to have them be hostage to the Taliban keeping its word. He explained that the dam will be the most important project in the South, providing electricity to Kandahar and Lashka Gah and generating all kinds of economic activity. Moreover, the labor force would be coming from within the province, but if workers are unable transit the area, this would create big problems. (See also septel on the Musa Qala agreement). ¶8. (C/NF) Comment: Governor Khalid appears to be aware of the factors that negatively affect his reputation in the international community. He took particular pains to distance himself from Ahmad Wali Karzai. He also emphasized that his efforts in the security field were intended to achieve results but not to build his own militia. He agreed with all of the Ambassador's points on the ANAP program, softly backing away from his earlier viewpoint that his office should control salaries of the ANAP. Governor Khalid appears to be very concerned about his relationship with the Canadians and wants to maintain an open channel with the United States. End Comment. NEUMANN