Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5196
2006-10-25 09:51:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

DEPUTY INTERIOR MIN KHALID: REFORM NEEDED ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9476
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #5196/01 2980951
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 250951Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3720
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005196 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, OSD FOR BREZINSKI, CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG
CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: DEPUTY INTERIOR MIN KHALID: REFORM NEEDED ON
GOVERNORS, MOI AND ANP

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann by reason 1.4(A) and (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005196

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, OSD FOR BREZINSKI, CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG
CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: DEPUTY INTERIOR MIN KHALID: REFORM NEEDED ON
GOVERNORS, MOI AND ANP

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann by reason 1.4(A) and (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: A/DCM and Polmiloff met with Afghan Deputy
Minister of the Interior (MoI) Khalid, Afghan National Police
(ANP),General Salihi A. Baiani and Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Senior Police Advisor
Colonel Pitchlynn October 15. In a candid, confidential, and
wide-ranging discussion Khalid (strictly protect) expressed
the need to remove several provincial governors involved in
heavy corruption and with close ties to the drug trade, as
well as the need to remove the current Minister of the
Interior Zarar. He argued that a combination of corruption,
narcotics trafficking involvement and incompetence
contributed to the deterioration of provincial security. He
also addressed the need for further ANA reforms and more
training for the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP).
END SUMMARY

--------------
CORRUPT GOVERNORS AND PROBLEMS AT THE MOI
--------------


2. (S) Khalid claimed a number of governors had strong ties
to the drug trade. These corrupt officials are indirectly
supporting the Taliban through their illicit activities and
are loosing the support of their populations. The GoA needs
strong and competent leaders as provincial governors.
However, he asserted that former Northern Alliance leaders
are in these positions and they are more or less acting as
warlords. Taliban support is growing in provinces where they
are able to guarantee security for the population as well as
the poppy crop, he said. Khalid suggested President Karzai
sack Kandahar Governor Assadullah Khalid and choose a
national figure, from outside the province, with age and
stature. According to Khalid, Governor Assadullah does not
have respect for the local conservative traditions and has
angered many tribal elders. Khalid recommended an elder
"statesman" for the Khandahar position, one who would

understand the traditions and could work with tribal elders
and provincial religious leaders. He also cited Helmand's
National Directorate of Security (NDS) chief as another
official contributing to instability due to his former
affiliation with the Taliban and protection of known poppy
growers. Although Khalid stated there were many corrupt
governors, he said that if he could pick only two for removal
Assadullah and Balkh governor Mohammad Atta would top his
list.


3. (S) Khalid (strictly protect) also called for the removal
of his boss, Minister Zarar. According to Khalid, Zarar is
not qualified for the job, but also is corrupt. "The MoI has
always suffered from a lack of credible leadership at the
top," he said and cited two previous ministers who used their
positions to populate the ANP with Northern Alliance
commanders. Khalid also said mismanagement within the MoI has
led to a general inability to address high level corruption
among the senior levels. It was stated that there are
"10,000 ANP officers who are directly under the control of
the former MoI officials" and that many of these officers owe
their positions due to patronage networks led by two previous
ministers, both whom are now parliamentarians. Khalid noted
that former Minister Jalali was a good man, and was good
working the social scene in Kabul, but had not been strong
enough to make the kind of personnel changes necessary to
root out corruption and factionalism that had permeated the
ministry by the time of his arrival.

-------------- --------------
ANP REFORM MUST REMOVE CORRUPT GENERALS, OFFER BETTER TRAINING
-------------- --------------


4. (S) Kahlid stated that Afghanistan needs a good national
police force as well as a professional intelligence service.
He complained that the GoA focuses too much energy on
creating a strong Afghan National Army (ANA). "The army's
role is to protect the state from external threats," Khalid
said, "The Taliban are an internal security threat that can

KABUL 00005196 002 OF 003


be countered through a strong national police force."
Commenting on the NDS, he added, "They are overly concerned
with Pakistan, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries and
have not provided intelligence on the drug traffickers
infiltrating the country and operating freely in much of the
south."


5. (S) Khalid called for the removal of all senior ANP
Generals. When asked, Khalid claimed that even the process of
selecting 31 senior generals and 86 senior MoI officers
jointly with the international community had failed to select
upright officers, even before President Karzai intervened
with his late appointments. (Note: Many of the late
appointments made by President Karzai have been found by an
International Probation Board to possess a background of
human rights violations, excessive corruption and poor
leadership. After reviewing weekly mentor reports and
significant background material provided by post and UNAMA, 6
of the 14 late appointments have been recommended for
dismissal to the Minister of Interior and President Karzai
and three have so far been fired. End Note)


6. (S) The Regional Training Centers are U.S. centers run by
contractors, not Afghans, Khalid said. He recognized the
RTC's teach basic police skills but he said they did not
instill enough 'patriotism and sense of duty' in the
curriculum. "The issue is not how to fight, Afghans have done
this for 30 years, the issue is to teach them why they are
fighting and instill a sense of pride and loyalty to the new
Afghanistan." Khalid also noted cases of cultural
insensitivity that led to new (and often illiterate) recruits
undergoing education and training for the first time in their
lives, leaving or being dismissed from training before they
had been socialized into accepting the ANP system of
discipline. Kahalid believed that a softer "Afghan" approach
was sometimes needed. One example he gave occured when a
recruit had turned the visor on his cap sideways so it
wouldn't bump into the floor when praying at the RTC mosque,
and then was upbraided by his western mentor after he came
out and had not switched it back to the standard front
position for the visor. This incident quickly led to a larger
confrontation because a number of the recruits were his
fellow tribesmen. Khalid also claimed that, although there
were mosques at the RTCs, there were no Imams attached to the
mosques.


7. (S) Addressing recruitment, Khalid also said that the ANP
needs higher caliber recruits. He suggested the MoI recruit
directly from communities with consultation and support of
tribal elders and religious leaders who have support of the
population. Khalid opined that dividing the regional commands
up into eight zones, would be better for police work than the
current five, which matches the current Army regional command
structure. He also cited the need to reorganize the MoI
intelligence division to focus on warlords and illegal armed
groups. Comment: At one DIAG meeting, Khalid stated that the
MOI had no operating orders specifying a duty to carry out
DIAG work and no MOI office with that responsibility, even
though everyone knew it was a national goal. End comment.
Khalid also said the Kabul police force needs to be reformed
so that it is a truly national force representative of all
Afghans. Otherwise, some people from the provinces point at
Kabul and complain that the national garrison is all made up
of one ethnic group.


8. (S) Regarding intelligence sharing, Khalid criticized the
NDS for not sharing information with the MoI. He said what
information they shared often turned out to be incorrect.
"NDS should deliver information about many activities:
warlords, drug traffickers, and border controls," he said
adding, "NDS intelligence is also politically motivated."


9. (S) Border security is recognized as a crucial task that
must be accomplished and is imperative to Kabul's defense.
The corruption within the border police and at checkpoints
directly threatens Kabul's security. The ANP's inability to,
stop the terrorists at the border has recently led to the

KABUL 00005196 003 OF 003


development of a plan to defend Kabul from the increased
threat of suicide bombers and the infiltration of large
quantities of explosives into the capitol region.

--------------
SUPPORT FOR A/G SABIT
--------------


10. (S) Khalid offered strong praise for Chief Justice Azimi
and for Attorney-General Sabit. He said that his
relationship with Sabit is sufficiently close that he talks
to him regularly. In fact he mentioned that he had called
Sabit on his cell phone that day to discover that Sabit was
in Mazar-I-Sharif. When Khalid asked him what he was doing
there, Sabit replied "hunting." (Comment: Sabit's term for
rooting out corrupt local officials. End Comment)

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (S) COMMENT: CSTC-A and post are actively working on many
of the issues Khalid raised. The ongoing ANP Rank and Reform
Process to evaluate senior ANP officers for their competence
and honesty is an important example of an initiative aimed at
the heart of the problems that Khalid identified. Several
generals who have not met the criteria have already been
sacked. Additionally, CSTC-A and the German Police Project
Office (GPPO) are aware of the training deficiencies Khalid
identified and are developing instruction plans to include an
emphasis on Afghan culture and values as well as the
importance of policing within the Afghan society. However,
matching seasoned police trainers with cultural sensitivity
will continue to be a challenge. United Nations Assistance
Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) Political officer David
Izadifar voiced praise for Khalid during an October 17
conversation on an unrelated matter. Additionally, he added
Khalid has a strong reputation throughout the GOA for
integrity. Others question whether he is strong enough for
his job. And like most Afghan officials we suspect Khalid
has his own agenda and hopes for USG support. All that said,
there is much merit in his views. END COMMENT
NEUMANN