PRT KANDAHAR/HELMAND: SECURITY CONCERNS TAKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 005025 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR BREZINSKI CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF SUBJECT: PRT KANDAHAR/HELMAND: SECURITY CONCERNS TAKE CENTER STAGE IN SOUTH REF: A. KABUL 3487 ¶B. KABUL 4369 Classified By: A/DCM Angus Simmons for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Taliban elements have re-infiltrated into parts of the districts of Panjwayi and Zharay. Security incidents in the area have increased, resulting in the deaths of six Canadian soldiers since late September. Canadian forces first shifted into a defensive position to get reinforcements from HQ ISAF but are now beginning Operation Medusa "Phase IV". They are also forging a new combat road between the two district centers in order to avoid the current route, which is an indefensible "IED alley." Kandahar PRT (KPRT) is working to ensure the road gets paved and to achieve development objectives as well. Canadian forces consider the absence of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to be the principle cause of the deterioration in security and want more ANSF deployed to the area. The Afghan National Police (ANP) Provincial Chief was sacked on October 4. Governor Khalid has dispatched 150 militia troops to Pashmul to assist the Canadian Battle Group. Food distribution continues slowly in the two districts, as IDP returns remain limited. Some IDPs have complained that they have been excluded from the lists because it is biased against the Noorzai tribe. KPRT is pursuing a solution. Provincial Council Head, Ahmad Wali Karzai, chaired a Provincial Council-hosted shura with elders from the two districts regarding damage lists from each village shura, which are finally beginning to trickle in. SUMMARY CONTINUED: During an October 8 meeting with Charge, Helmand,s Governor offered up a grim assessment of the security situation in his province, highlighting that the fragile security environment meant no progress on a host of priority issues, such as counter-narcotics, education, alternative livelihoods, and women,s affairs. The Governor pointed to several factors contributing to continued insecurity, including a lack of Afghan government support for security forces and provincial governments, ISAF &inactivity8 and poor coordination with Afghan security forces, and the Taliban,s evolving tactics. END SUMMARY Kandahar: Security Deteriorates -------------- ¶2. (C) Procedures for the reconstruction of the battle-damaged areas of Panjwayi and Zharay were planned at a PRT Kandahar hosted meeting on September 23 (Ref A). Even at the early stages of implementation, reports began to trickle in of Taliban re-entering the area. Governor Khalid and the ANP had promised additional ANSF forces would enter the area of operations to secure it against the return of the Taliban but this did not occur. By the end of September, credible reports of larger groups of Taliban re-infiltrating the districts were received. Multiple IED attacks had occurred accounting for injuries and the death of one Canadian soldier. Specifically, on October 3, simultaneous Taliban attacks including one SVBIED occurred in and around the area of operations and resulted in the deaths of two Canadian soldiers in addition to several wounded ISAF personnel. Additionally, another Canadian soldier was killed in an IED strike in the area on October 7. ¶3. (C) Harassed by multiple IED plantings and strikes along the existing winding north-south route between the village of Pashmul and Highway 1 in Zharay, the Canadian Battle Group's security priority shifted to the construction of a 4-km KABUL 00005025 002 OF 005 combat road running directly north from Panjwayi-Bazar to the Zharay District center. The road, now designated Route Summit, will be wider and straighter than the existing path and support considerably enhanced security operations for forces operating in the area. The road is roughly 50 percent complete. Canadian security forces guarding the road have been attacked, but the workers building the road have not. Two more Canadian soldiers were killed and two wounded in an October 14 RPG attack along the new road. TFKandahar plans to aggressively patrol the road once it is completed in order to deter IED emplacement. KPRT is currently working to follow up the combat road with a paved road, possibly with German funding. When paved, Route Summit should prove to be a commercial success, providing a direct link between the two population centers and better access to markets for local farmers. Separate consultations with numerous area actors have endorsed the benefits of the road. The planning for construction of a bridge across the Arghandab River to complete the link to Panjwayi-Bazar has not yet been concluded. ¶4. (C) Following the October 3 attacks, the Canadian Battle Group moved into a more defensive posture in order to get reinforcements from HQ ISAF, rather than one focused primarily on reconstruction. Canadian forces in Kandahar province anticipate augmentation by a squadron of tanks and a company of infantry in November. The infantry are to provide greater force protection to KPRT and the tanks will join the battle group. The plan worked out with RC South is to push forward on the road and push hard at a political level for the increased ANSF presence. Canadian forces anticipate using auxiliary police and any additional ANSF to bolster efforts to secure the area of Zharay district expanding westward from the new road. In support of this effort, 165 auxiliary police are scheduled to begin training in Kandahar on October 16. While these forces are being trained, recruiting efforts for the auxiliary police continue. In anticipation of these forces graduating on or about October 26, equipment to include weapons and uniforms have already been prepositioned in Kandahar to expedite the deployment of the newly trained auxiliary police. ¶5. (C) In a separate development, Kandahar Police Chief General Aziz Ahmad was replaced on October 5 by General Esmatullah Alizai, an officer with a strong reputation who has already impressed KPRT security personnel. Governor Asadullah Khalid, just back from the Presidential PAG in Kabul, confirmed on October 6 that he would "immediately send 150 auxiliary police, what you call militia" to work with the Canadian Battle Group to secure the large village of Pashmul, where the return of IDPs has been very low. He was personally arranging for vehicles for the transport. The governor said he continues to press for a total of 3,500 auxiliary police for the province but that the MOI is only agreeing to 1,300. An audit conducted by the MOI will verify the requirement for auxiliary police in the province. He would plan to send the first of the newly trained auxiliaries to Panjwayi and Zharay and then send the existing militia to be trained as auxiliary police. Clearly the decision where to deploy auxiliary police is a decision that must be made by the Minister of Interior and the Deputy Minister of Interior and not Governor Asadullah Khalid. Khalid also stated that he and his fellow governors lacked confidence in the Regional Police Chief. (NOTE: A high-level MOI delegation led by General Atmar was reviewing police issues with the governor on October 6, including the development of a recruiting process for the auxiliary police. END NOTE.) KABUL 00005025 003 OF 005 Kandahar: Rehabilitation Efforts -------------- ¶6. (C) Initial steps on rehabilitation efforts have moved forward but have been slowed significantly by the security situation. Governor Khalid on October 6 estimated returns in specific areas as follows: Panjwayi-Bazar (90%),Sperwan (10%),Siah Choy (30%),Pashmul (2%). KPRT convened a meeting on October 3 with the Disaster Management Committee (DMC),Departments of Agriculture, MRRD, Public Works, and members of the Panjwayi and Zharay District shuras. Many of the elders present complained that the area was not secure and that they were confronted with Taliban moving in and around their villages. Nonetheless, the DMC agreed to establish a work plan to conduct assessments including identification of estimated costs and an implementation plan. It was also agreed that those who have traveled a long distance and were not able to carry personal belongings would receive priority for distribution of non-food assistance. In cases where two families are staying together only one non-food package will be provided. Some elders from Zharay District raised issues with the representativeness of lists for food distribution -- specifically claiming that the list was biased against Noorzai IDPs. CIMIC teams have tried to assist in individual cases, but the DMC agreed to establish a process for handling such cases. The mechanism has not yet been implemented, and KPRT is pushing for action to address this problem. ¶7. (C) The Head of the Provincial Council, President Karzai's brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, convened a shura with elders from the affected area on October 5, following the increased level of Taliban activity. Karzai lectured the elders regarding the efforts of the government to modernize Afghanistan, the need for education, the obligation to keep the Taliban out of the villages, and the importance the government attaches to the rehabilitation of the area. He told the elders that they should complete the lists of damage for each village and turn them in by October 8. He told them the assessment process would take place rapidly thereafter. Many of the village shuras convened immediately to plan their next steps. Several elders accused the Zharay District leader of corruption in having influenced the recipients of the food packages. An elder from Siah Choy said he had returned to his village a day earlier and found that Taliban were present and had beaten some of the returnees. As of October 14, the DMC has received lists for 227 claims from Siah Choy, Zangabad, and Pashmul relating to personal injuries or death and damage to homes, other property and even mosques. ¶8. (C) KPRT CIMIC Teams continue to maintain a presence in the area, organize small-scale cash-for-work projects, and gather information to assist the rehabilitation process. WFP has distributed its packages for a total of 9,846 families: 5,000 in Kandahar, 1,896 in Zharay, and 2,950 in Panjwayi. UN agencies have also distributed non-food assistance for 648 families in Panjwayi. In accordance with a decision by Governor Khalid, food distribution in Kandahar city is expected to resume on October 16 for the remaining 5,000 IDP families on the original DMC-generated list. There have been reports of corruption and tribal favoritism affecting the food assistance program, but this has not disrupted the process. ¶9. (C) COMISAF LTG Richards believes that we will shortly see a big improvement in the number of security forces in the area. He informed Embassy October 7 that his recent meeting KABUL 00005025 004 OF 005 with President Karzai and others led to a clear recognition that urgent ANP/ANA deployment, as well as more vigorous effort from Task Force Kandahar, is required. He tells us that the necessary steps have been taken. Kandahar: Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The Canadian approach to assisting the provincial government as it takes responsibility for the rehabilitation of the battle-damaged areas of the two districts should pay off over the medium and longer term. While the process is taking longer than we would like, the significant security constraints limit the speed with which even a more efficiently organized procedure could be implemented. Post will work to support Canadian requests for additional ANSF assets to secure the area. A strong formula of security and assistance will be essential for rehabilitation of the area and for our ability to incorporate the area into the province's Afghanistan Development Zone (ADZ). End Comment Helmand: Governor,s downbeat assessment of security -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) In a meeting with the Charge at Embassy on October 8, Helmand Province Governor Engineer Daud held out little hope of positive developments in the province over the next year or more. Progress on all fronts ) counter- narcotics, education, alternative livelihoods, women,s affairs ) depends on a secure environment, he stressed. Daud described the current environment as &very fragile,8 and asked rhetorically how one could expect progress when only 200 meters from an ANSF checkpoint one could find a Taliban checkpoint. Daud said that only when the Taliban,s pressure on Helmand communities was reduced would there be the opportunity to engage villagers and farmers on subjects like counter-narcotics. Daud pointed to several factors at play in the current insecure environment: lack of support for ANSF; lack of resources for provincial governors; ISAF resources and coordination with ANSF; and evolving Taliban tactics. ¶12. (C) Daud said the reason he is in Kabul was to &fight to find salary8 and other support (e.g., food) for the Afghan National Police (ANP). Until the ANSF (including the ANA) in Helmand are well-equipped, well- paid, and in sufficient numbers there will be no improvement in security. Daud has had little success, again asking rhetorically, &How many times should one ask a minister ... 100? 500? There are limits to everyone,s patience.8 (NOTE: Daud said he has lost confidence in the Policy Action Group (PAG),dismissing it as a lot of words and meetings. END NOTE.). Daud requested assistance in securing additional ANSF support. ¶13. (C) Daud also pointed to a lack of support from Kabul for himself and other governors in the south. He described prior provincial administrations as &strong,8 and said those governors had money and resources, though admittedly not always from government sources. Current administrations are weak and under-resourced. ¶14. (C/NF) Daud pointed to several problems he saw in ISAF. He opined that there might not be enough ISAF troops in Helmand, but appeared to place more importance on how active ISAF has been in the province (or, more widely, in the south); in his view, ISAF showed weakness to the Taliban by not being active enough. Daud thinks that ISAF wants to bring troops to the province,s central districts rather than KABUL 00005025 005 OF 005 &expand8 outward, and wonders whether ISAF has the capacity to reach out from the center to provide security for the northern district of Kajaki and the dam/energy project there. He also complained in general terms about &planning and coordination8 between ISAF and ANSF, and specifically referred to problems in securing timely air support for operations. (NOTE: During the September PAG visit there was a discussion of coordination between ANSF and ISAF, including problems that emerged in recent operations in the province and how to resolve them. PRT representatives pointed to the Provincial Security Coordination Committee (PSCC) as the mechanism and emerging model of effective cooperation. END NOTE.) ¶15. (C) Regarding the Taliban, the Governor referred to a &reorganization8 of Taliban forces in Pakistan. He said they had strengthened because &they see our weakness8. He pointed to the increase in suicide bombings in Afghanistan, saying not a day goes by without an incident somewhere, and referred to rumors of &hundreds8 of suicide bombers in each province. He described how a new &refreshment8 of Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces from Pakistan were impacting the south. Asked about his outreach to tribal leaders, and &arrangements8 in which assurances are provided to tribal leaders that ANSF and ISAF will only fire when fired upon, and those leaders, promise to secure a cessation of hostilities from the Taliban (Ref B),Daud held out little prospect of those efforts bearing any fruit. He thinks the agreements do not constitute a &durable solution8 and can be disturbed by the Taliban, especially those from outside of Helmand who do not live amongst the villagers and have their own agendas. Calling the agreements a &temporary solution,8 Daud said when the government cannot bring security, all it can do is listen to tribal leaders, request for a cessation of hostilities and try to respond. ¶16. (C) According to British Ambassador Stephen Evans, the British hope to make an earmarked contribution to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA),the UN Development Program-managed fund that pays the salaries of the Afghan National Police to support the northern Helmand force. MG Durbin undertook to convey to LOTFA the importance of prompt and reliable payment of the northern Helmand force,s salaries. A British intention to augment force pay beyond the $70/month currently planned for ANAP patrolmen will be arranged directly by the British with the Ministry of Interior. Similarly, the British will arrange directly with the Ministry to provide the force with additional equipment so that it can fulfill a mobile quick reaction role. Helmand: Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) The Helmand Governor,s obvious frustration was likely fueled by the apparent failure during his current visit to Kabul to secure additional support for the ANP in Helmand. He raises a crucial point that progress on most fronts will be stymied until security expands beyond the central districts. Post will support ongoing efforts to improve ANSF coordination with ISAF, in addition to requests for additional ANSF assets to help secure the province. NORLAND