PRESIDENT KARZAI ON THE CROSS-BORDER JIRGA PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005002

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-76 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI ON THE CROSS-BORDER JIRGA PROCESS

REF: KABUL 4990

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. R. Norland, for Reasons 1.4 (B)
AND (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) President Karzai met with Charge and UN SRSG Tom
Koenigs late on October 12 to outline his latest thinking on
the cross-border jirgas which were agreed to during the
September 27 trilateral meeting with President Bush.
Karzai's outline tracked that provided by his NSA Dr. Zalmay
Rasool (Ref) on key elements, including that there should be
one agenda item: mobilizing civil society (in Karzai's mind
this means moderate tribal authorities) against terrorism.
The goal would be an end to actions (he mentioned sanctuary)
that support it. Karzai also agreed that the jirgas'
participants (he mentioned numbers between 350 and 800)
should be drawn from tribal, parliamentary, provincial, and
other social groups and should reflect a national rather than
simply regional constituency. Even more than Rasool, Karzai
underlined the need for the international community
(specifically the U.S. and the UN) to be involved in the
pre-jirga organization and selection process to ensure the
parallelism of the Afghan and Pakistani events in terms of
membership and agenda. "You are needed to keep it honest."
Karzai mentioned several names he is considering to chair
Afghanistan's planning committee and serve as POC. The names
include Parliamentary Secretary Farook Wardak (acceptable in
Embassy and UNAMA's view) and Sayyaf (not acceptable).


2. (C) Karzai confirmed he is looking for dates in late
November or early December if possible, and that the likely
sites would be Kandahar and Peshawar or, alternatively,
Jelalabad and Quetta. He was adamant that the first must be
held in Afghanistan. Karzai's outline differed from that of
Rasool in that the president said he would be willing to
allow the jirgas go on longer than two days. He also favors
having all participants from both sides -- not just President
Musharraf and himself or selected representatives -- attend
both jirgas. The idea, said Karzai, is to draw into the
process those responsible for or who are supporting or
allowing the cross border violence to continue and then
holding them publicly accountable. End Summary.

--------------
One Agenda Item: Ending Support for Terrorism
--------------


3. (C) President Karzai met late October 12 with UN SRSG Tom
Koenigs, Charge, D/SRSG Chris Alexander, and PolCouns to
outline his objectives for and ideas regarding the
organization of the cross-border jirgas he and President
Musharraf had agreed to in their September 27 meeting with
President Bush. Karzai emphasized that, in his view, there
should be only one agenda item: security, meaning ending
terrorism in the region. This is the issue people are
thinking about, and it is what they expect from the jirgas,
he said. "It is what they want." Pressed by Alexander to
consider related issues, including narcotics, schools, and
good governance, Karzai was adamant. Those are internal
issues, he said; "the one issue that needs to be addressed is
sanctuary, security in the region, and the fight against
terrorism."

--------------
Planning; Candidates to lead Afghan Efforts
--------------


4. (C) Karzai underlined his expectation that a small joint
bilateral planning committee be formed with a mandate to fix
the agenda and arrange that the two jirgas be parallel in
participation and organization. This parallelism would be
necessary to facilitate meaningful dialogue. The joint
bilateral committee would have to deal with contentious

KABUL 00005002 002 OF 003


issues, and the international community (he specified the
U.S. and UN) would have to be involved actively to keep the
process moving and the decisions "honest." Karzai added that
he was sure Musharraf will resist the idea of a joint
committee. Even if he does agree to that, he will likely
resiste international involvement and oversight.


5. (C) Outlining the qualities he will be looking for in the
individual he names to serve as Afghan POC for the planning
process (and senior Afghan member of a bilateral planning
committee),Karzai stressed the importance of "cleverness,"
knowledge of the regional dynamics, and credibility among all
Afghans. The person would not have to be a Pashtun, though
it might be helpful. He mentioned Mohaqaq (a Hazara) first,
and then Wolesi Jirga Foreign Affairs Committee Chair
Professor Sayyaf. Parliamentary Secretary Farook Wardak was
next on the list, with Shinwari, the former Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, as a fourth possibility. SRSG Koenigs and
Charge commented that Sayyaf (a former Jihadi commander, with
serious human rights liabilities) would be very controversial
and would likely not project the image to the international
community that would benefit Afghanistan or Karzai.
(Comment: Karzai seemed to be looking to us for support for
naming Farook Wardak, and indeed he would be an excellent
choice. We will reinforce objections to Sayyaf. End Comment)

--------------
Participation
--------------


6. (C) Despite the single, regional focus of the agenda,
Karzai said it was important for there to be national
representation in both jirgas. The problem of terrorism is
national, and all groups and regions should be involved in
the discussion. This would be natural for the Afghans, all
of whom are affected, but something Karzai anticipates
Musharraf will resist. According to Karzai, this would be
because national involvement would make it harder for
Masharraf to exclude the "seculars or moderates" (including
Pashtun elders who have been driven from the border region)
who might not follow his line. Karzai was determined,
however, saying that, if the exercise was to have
credibility, it is essential that both jirgas include wide
and diverse voices. "What matters is what happens in the two
tents." He expressed certainty that, if the events are
organized correctly, "the mullahs will stand up," and the
needed decisions will be made.


7. (C) According to Karzai, Afghan participants would be
drawn from parliamentarians (the leadership and heads of
committees are likely),heads of provincial councils,
religious leaders, tribal leaders, and civil society/NGOs.
"For the first time in history," he claimed, there would be
women named as participants in tribal jirgas. He was unclear
about the total number that would participate -- ending up
saying it would probably be somewhere between 500 and 800 on
each side.


8. (C) Karzai added a detail on participation which Rasool
had not mentioned two days earlier (Ref) -- that not just the
two presidents, but all of the Afghan and all of the
Pakistani participants would attend both jirgas. This would
reinforce the unity of the agenda and reinforce the
credibility of the outcomes. Karzai agreed with Rasool in
saying the international community should attend as
observers/monitors. He also said he would welcome live press
coverage. The presidents might be present for the duration
of each jirga, or they might stay for only part.

--------------
Location and Timing: Afghan Jirga Comes First
--------------


9. (C) Karzai confirmed Rasool's view that the best
locations would be Kandahar and Peshawar or, alternatively,
Jalalabad and Quetta. He said he would like to aim for dates
in late November or early December for the two jirgas, if

KABUL 00005002 003 OF 003


possible. Unlike Rasool, Karzai is prepared to let the
jirgas extend beyond two days. Confident that the jirgas (if
participation and organization is right) will come to the
right conclusion, Karzai's view was "let them talk." The
president was adamant, however, that the jirga in Afghanistan
would be held first.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) Karzai has a clear idea of what he wants the outcome
of the jirgas to be and how the jirgas must function to gain
those results. Knowing Musharraf has his own ideas, Karzai
welcomed the opportunity to lay out his plan and lobby for
support. When SRSG Koenigs described Karzai's expectations
as "ambitious," Karzai shot back "that's the whole purpose."
He argued that the only way to put an end to the terrorism
stemming from the region is to create a forum where there is
"public debate" -- where it is possible to "confront
publicly, face to face, and face down those behind the
violence and terrorism. If this is done, the elders,
supported by the people, will stand up against it."


11. (C) Karzai understands Musharraf's goals and plan are
not the same as his -- and that preparations and organization
may well determine whose model prevails in the jirgas. He is
approaching the decisions on timing, participation, and
agenda like a chess player who senses an opportunity, but he
is keenly aware of Musharraf's strengths and the traps that
lie ahead. Karzai is counting on U.S. and UN involvement in
the planning process to help him avoid being outmaneuvered.


12. (C) More broadly, clearly energized by his trip to
Washington, Karzai signaled that he senses the time is ripe
for a change in the political tide in Afghanistan. He
volunteered that his skepticism about the wisdom of
hard-hitting military campaigns against the insurgency had
been misplaced. "I was wrong about their likely effect on
Afghan public opinion; they have in fact raised hopes (that
something can be done about terrorism)." He added that
people are looking to him to follow through on the political
front to address the cross-border causes of the violence
Afghans are enduring. He welcomed the opportunity to lay out
his plans for doing so through the cross-border jirgas and
promised to consult at each step of the way. End Comment
NORLAND