PAG REPORT OCT 4: KARZAI RALLIES HIS TEAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KABUL 004899

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: PAG REPORT OCT 4: KARZAI RALLIES HIS TEAM

REF: KABUL 4783

Classified By: CDA Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) At a three-hour marathon session of the PAG October
4, an engaged, focused and energetic President Karzai,
appearing at times frustrated, directed both his own
government and the international community to move forward
rapidly on the full menu of security, reconstruction, and
strategic communications efforts. He approved the concept of
Afghan Development Zones for the four provinces in the south
but urged that there be no public announcement. Seeming
somewhat impatient at what he saw as the deliberate pace of
the auxiliary police program, he urged that the program be
accelerated to the maximum extent possible while remaining in
line with vetting and training requirements. Karzai
characterized his trilateral meetings in Washington as
"wholesome" and described his idea for holding cross-border
jirgas together with President Musharraf. He called for
quicker action on reconstruction and development and rapid
approval and disbursement of funds for 4,000 pending
projects. He plans to convene a special PAG on October 12 to
address this. Karzai asked for a communications strategy to
counter the increase in suicide bombings, including
documenting, for public consumption, the places, methods, and
training of the bombers, many of whom were just "innocents".
END SUMMARY

Security in South More Stable
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2. (C) Defense Minister Wardak presented an improved
security situation in the south. He cautioned that, while
Operation Medusa was a tactical defeat for the enemy, we
could expect them to resort to more suicide bombings and
direct confrontation with our forces. ISAF and Afghan
security forces were now removing unexploded ordnance,
helping villagers relocate, and preventing the enemy from
returning. Wardak described the situation in Kandahar as
getting better, but said that Helmand remained troublesome.
He said security forces might need to launch another
operation there in November. The Minister called the
Coalition's Operation Mountain Fury, in particular, a
success, with no civilian casualties and the enemy having
retreated to the hills. He said that hatred among the people
for the Taliban had been rising. Wardak called on the
international community to supply technology against IEDs, as
was being deployed in Iraq. Wardak said Kabul would continue
to be under threat of suicide bombings and that the MOD would
continue working with ISAF, NDS, and MOI to strengthen
security in the capital. He concluded that "generally the
situation is better and prospects for the future are better".


Afghan Development Zones (ADZs)
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3. (C) Wardak summarized the October 2 PAG discussion on ADZs
(reftel),noting the group was ready to implement the
concept. With the success of Operations Mountain Thrust and
Medusa, the situation was ripe, especially in Kandahar and
Uruzgan. Helmand would be more difficult, he noted. He
described the PAG's September 16-23 ADZ visits as highly
successful in winning support from local officials and
shuras. The outreach by Kabul was generally welcomed in the
provinces. Wardak stressed the importance of being realistic

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about the size of the ADZs and the force structure needed,
with the first priority being increasing the capacity of the
ANA, for which plans were already being drawn up. He said
that reconstruction and development and a communications
strategy would follow behind. What was needed most now was a
broad nation-wide "reconcilation" strategy (note: Wardak was
not referring to the PTS Program per se),including visits by
Ministers and senior officials to the south. Overall, the
ADZ visits were successful, and with President Karzai's
approval, the ADZs will go into operation, he concluded.

Auxiliary Police
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4. (C) Minister of Interior Moqbil Zarar briefed President
Karzai and the PAG on the status of the auxiliary police
program. He noted that 150 new recruits would start their
training on October 7 in Zabul and other provinces would soon
see recruiting teams visiting them. Moqbil highlighted the
challenge of obtaining financial support and asked how the
GOA would be able to pay their salaries.

Reconstruction Efforts
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5. (C) Minister of Education Atmar described five priorities
for the joint teams that would focus on reconstruction in the
south. First, emergency humanitarian assistance was being
provided by the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and
Development (MRRD) and the international community. This
involved providing a full return package for those displaced,
including food, non-food items, transportation, and
rebuilding of homes. Second, relevant Ministries and the
international community needed to restart projects that were
held back due to the fighting, such as textbook distribution
and building schools (50 percent of the 300 schools were
closed in the four provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul and
Uruzgan). Also, health clinics and electricity projects
needed to be restarted. Third, various districts had
submitted their reconstruction priorities, but resources were
limited. Atmar said the picture would be clearer in a few
weeks and urged the international community to fund projects
that were ready to go forward. Fourth, the GOA should send
teams to work with the provincial governors since resources
are available but not well coordinated. Atmar called for a
common plan forged by the government in Kabul, the Governors,
and the international community. Fifth, the lack of
coordination between Kabul and the provinces was hindering
reconstruction. Atmar urged relevant Ministers to regularly
visit affected areas. He called on all Ministries to put
reconstruction at the top of their list and to ensure that
focus on the ADZs was not at the expense of already scheduled
development projects. Karzai commented on the last point,
"this is very important".

Auxiliary Police (Part II),Police Reform, and New Judges
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6. (C) Following the presentations by Ministers, there was a
lengthy discussion of auxiliary police, including vetting,
salaries, and a Canadian request to deploy auxiliary police
to Kandahar. COMISAF LTG Richards asked about the schedule
for delivering auxiliary police beyond Zabul and what the
target number was for total auxiliary police. CSTC-A CG
Major MGeneral Durbin explained that the target, based on
analysis by the MOI and supported by CSTC-A, was 11,287.
Currently, there was enough equipment for 4,000. The
remainder of the equipment will be arriving in the coming
weeks and will be provided at the pace that vetted auxiliary
police enter the force. General Durbin assured President

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Karzai that he was working daily to get the additional
equipment for the 7,000 more auxiliary police.


7. (C) The Canadian Ambassador asked for more Afghan National
Army and police in light of the recent suicide bombings in
Kandahar that killed Canadian soldiers. He said this
demonstrated that we needed more police after Operation
Medusa. This could not be delayed or we would lose the gains
we've made. Karzai expressed his concern as well, saying,
"We're moving too slowly on community police". Defense
Minister Wardak responded that the police were too thinly
spread out but announced that he had made a decision October
3 to send more soldiers to support the Canadian troops.
Karzai admitted the lack of police was a problem. He said he
was willing to send more police, but that the international
community was not ready to accept untrained police. He
commented, "if we wait for those procedures to be
implemented, we'll lose more Canadian soldiers".


8. (C) COMISAF LTG Richards said he wanted to reassure
everyone that there was a plan for auxiliary police. The
rollout of the ANA was being done very carefully, which is
why it is important for auxiliary police to fill the gap. He
assured the Canadian Ambassador that he was working hard to
get more police to those areas (and gently chided him for
raising the matter in the PAG rather than in ISAF channels.
He said the key issue now was to exploit the victory in the
south, especially through reconstruction and development. He
expressed concern that those efforts were not catching up
with security gains. He suggested that the PAG circulate on
a weekly basis agreed themes for the media, some shared
talking points that the GOA and international community could
draw on. He proposed that the PAG agree on a weekly set of
themes for dissemination.


9. (C) General Eikenberry asked that Ambassadors realize that
the ANA's numbers were limited, while the police can be
dispatched quickly. He urged that renewed attention be
placed on spending for reconstruction and building roads. He
said his most important message to Ambassadors was to deliver
reconstruction as quickly as possible as it contributed
directly to security.


10. (C) General Durbin explained that there had been a
tremendous amount of coordination regarding the auxiliary
police, as the program must fit into the national police
program. Therefore, Leahy vetting was necessary. He said
that significant resources would be turned over to the MOI
contingent upon a properly vetted and effective chain of
command being in place. He reiterated that there was enough
equipment for 4,000 auxiliary police, 500 of which can go to
Kandahar, but the recruits would have to go through the
vetting process. Karzai agreed with this approach, but said
he didn't want to discuss it further. "Let's agree to do the
vetting, so get it done", he exclaimed. General Durbin
responded that vetting would start October 5 in Kandahar, but
he needed to finalize the organization of sufficient training
teams to train 500 police. Karzai said we should get
organized and do this so he could reassure the Canadian
Ambassador. COMISAF reminded Karzai that the auxiliary
police were not available to the Canadian Ambassador under
the program. "We can't afford to shift priorities", he said.
He agreed that Kandahar happened to be a priority area, but
pointed out that there were other areas in need as well.
Karzai responded that we must begin in Kandahar immediately.
He expressed his frustration that there had been so much talk
about auxiliarly police for a long time and wanted to see
movement. He said he wanted to reinforce his view that he
didn't like to see losses on the ISAF/Coalition side and that
the Afghan side should be taking the brunt of the attacks by

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the insurgency.


11. (C) General Eikenberry asked that the PAG agenda
regularly include an item on Police Leadership Reform, since
police reform was now moving down to the district level. He
said we were entering the next phase, where district police
chiefs were being named. He noted that auxiliary police
would be of little utility unless they had proper leadership
firmly under the government's control. Karzai agreed and
said this was very important. General Eikenberry added that
it was also important to review the performance of existing
chiefs of police. The Minister of Interior responded that
the MOI is continually reviewing this. Some police chiefs
have been removed or recalled to Kabul.


12. (C) Karzai announced that 29 new provincial judges had
been approved and announced by the Chief Justice.


13. (C) President Karzai then raised several issues: his
recent visit to the U.S. and Canada and the joint
Afghan-Pakistan jirgas on the border, the lack of an
effective communications strategy, civilian losses in
Kandahar, ADZs, suicide bombings, the effectiveness of PAG
decisions on public morale, and the status of development
projects.

Visits to U.S./Canada and Border Jirgas
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14. (C) Karzai thanked Canada for the huge welcome he
received at the Canadian Parliament. He hoped to keep up
engagement with Canada, including with opposition groups. He
described his trilateral meetings in the U.S. as "wholesome".
He said there were "good conversations" among the three
presidents, all issues were on the table -- terrorism,
cross-border disputes, and Afghan-Pakistan irritants. Karzai
said he suggested that civil society relations between
Afghanistan and Pakistan be strengthened, particularly in the
border areas which had become radicalized. He said that for
years Afghan civil society had been undermined "by extremists
who want to destroy our way of life". Karzai reported that
he also made the suggestion to hold meetings with tribes on
both sides of the borders. He said Musharraf agreed.


15. (C) President Karzai explained his proposal to convene a
gathering of spiritual leaders and legitimate clergy from all
over Afghanistan to meet their counterparts in Pakistan. The
first meeting would be held in Afghanistan, followed by a
second meeting in Pakistan. Both Presidents would attend.
The gathering would speak about problems, who was
radicalizing society, training grounds, all the tough issues.
Karzai saw the gathering as having two specific purposes:
(1) to pinpoint trouble areas on both sides of the border and
give that a public focus; and (2) revitalize the role of
civil society against radicals who have taken us hostage,
especially in Pakistan. Karzai plans to establish a
commission supported on both sides to work on preparation of
lists of participants and an agenda. He called on his
Ministries to get involved to ensure the right people
attended on the Pakistani side. He said that noted Pakistani
journalist Ahmad Rashid and others have expressed concern
that the Pakistani side might "rig" the meeting, so it was
important for the Afghan side to ensure the right people are
at the table. He said that President Bush supported the
idea. Karzai hoped UNAMA and the international community
would do likewise. In terms of a timeframe, Karzai proposed
"sooner rather than later, by the end of November or early
December". The gathering should include representatives from
all over Pakistan, not just the border areas. Answering a
question about establishing Parliamentary ties, Karzai

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explained that this had been tried before but that Pakistan
was not interested. He said there is a "tussle" going on
between the Parliament and the GOP and the Pakistan
Parliament had relations with the Taliban, which complicates
matters.

Strategic Communications -- Countering Radicalism
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16. (C) Karzai said that CDs and tapes were circulating in
Pakistan that depicted a horrible picture of the West and
Western "oppression" of Afghanistan. He complained that
there was nothing being done to counter this. He pointed out
that there were Fatwahs issued by Saudi clerics against
suicide bombings but that these were not being disseminated
around Afghanistan. Karzai asked that the Minister of the
Hajj and Endowment start attending the PAG meetings. Karzai
wanted more use of the radio in broadcasting GOA messages.
He said that, after auxiliary police, better communications
with the Afghan people was his top priority. He wanted
future PAG meetings to examine this issue more closely and
look at how to better organize the government and
international community to do this. He tasked the Minister
of Information and Culture to recruit better spokesmen,
people of the same quality that private television stations
were able to attract.

Civilian Losses in Kandhar
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17. (C) President Karzai asked the PAG how it was addressing
civilian losses in Kandahar. He noted reports that 52 had
been killed and a number of homes and vineyards destroyed.
Karzai said that he would take money from government coffers
to help these people. Education Minister Atmar explained
that a GOA/NATO/ISAF/UN team was doing an assessment in the
region. He said that there were differences in the casualty
figures, with the GOA saying 13, while others say 52. USAID
has provided USD 5 million for the effort. Atmar described
the "standard practice" that would be used: (1) return
package: providing tents, food, and reconstruction for IDPs;
(2) those that didn't evacuate will receive similar
assistance; and (3) vineyards, roads, and irrigation would be
targets for assistance. Karzai asked if mosques would get
assistance. Atmar said that the international community
might have restrictions, in which case the GOA would fund the
rebuilding. Atmar stated that he would be holding a meeting
with the international community to design a full package for
the two hard hit districts in Kandahar.

Afghan Development Zones
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18. (C) President Karzai reiterated that he did not want
areas outside the ADZs ignored in reconstruction efforts. He
wanted to see continuation of reconstruction and development
in these areas, even though it might be at a lower level than
in the ADZs. Minister Atmar assured Karzai that the ADZs
were not being set up at the expense of other areas. Karzai
said "don't announce it, just do it". He stressed that ADZs
should bring together security, reconstruction/development,
and governance. He again urged that the auxiliary police
program be accelerated under the terms and conditions set out
by General Durbin.

Stopping Suicide Bombings
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19. (C) Karzai believed that many of the recent suicide
bombings were not really suicides and urged circumspection in

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the way we characterized them in our statements. He recently
saw pictures of a suicide bombing victim who had his torso
broken below the waist. Karzai said this would not happen to
a suicide bomber, suggesting that the bombers were being
blown up remotely. He pointed to a conversation he had with
the Paktika Governor who relayed a story about threatening
phone calls he regularly receives from Pakistan. The callers
try to extort money from him by saying suicide bombers were
on their way but if the Governor gave them money the caller
would blow up the suicide bombers en route. Karzai said this
meant that the bombers were just innocents who may not even
know they were suicide bombers. Karzai asked that we "cool
down" the announcements on suicide bombings, as they were
frightening the population. Charge suggested that this
particular story (of unwitting or manipulated bombers) would
be important to disseminate, particularly if the Governor of
Paktika was willing to go on the radio. Karzai agreed that
the Governors of Paktika and Kandahar were the best
communicators to do this. Karzai continued that drug addicts
and the terminally ill were being used as suicide bombers.
The terrorists go to their families in Pakistan and pay their
families for their services. The victims become martyrs, and
400,000 rupees is a lot for a family whose member was already
dying. Karzai described madrassas in Pakistan where they
turn young people into drug addicts, then withdraw the drugs
"which drives them mad". Karzai asked if the U.S. had
experts on putting together a communications strategy.
Charge responded that the U.S. had good contacts with the
Ministry of Information and Culture on this issue.


20. (C) Karzai explained that he had asked the NDS to collect
information and document the places, methods, and training
used by the suicide bombers and their handlers. This will be
presented at the next PAG. Karzai suggested that NDS work
together with the Paktika Governor on this. He said the
bombers are sold and turned into a business commodity, while
the handlers are making money. Minister Atmar suggested that
the policy objective should be to document the evidence and
inform the public everywhere. The international community
also needed to be mobilized and should work jointly with the
GOA to systematically document the situation. Atmar stated
that the GOA and the international community did not have a
shared understanding of the situation, which is why a shared
"evidence sheet" was needed.

PAG Decisions That Impact People's Morale
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21. (C) President Karzai asked if the PAG had a public
relations campaign related to outcomes of PAG meetings.
COMISAF LTG Richards said that there was a mechanism, but
that the PAG needed to have media talking points post-PAG
meetings so that everyone was on the same sheet. Karzai
asked that there be daily announcements on the reconstruction
and development work that was being carried out. Charge said
it was more important to announce what actions were taking
place, not just announcements of funding. Charge suggested
that the effort have an Afghan face and be presented by the
GOA. Karzai agreed, but wanted the people to know where the
money was coming from.

Reconstruction Projects
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22. (C) Karzai reaffirmed Education Minister Atmar's status
in the PAG as the GOA point person for all reconstruction
projects going on in the four provinces. Karzai requested
that at the next PAG meeting an outline of all the projects
(old and new),both implemented and pending, be presented to
him. He wanted in particular to discuss how to increase

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employment levels through the reconstruction process. Atmar
explained that there were currently around 4,000 projects,
mostly ongoing, worth about USD 400 million. He said that
there were significant disparities among the provinces,
however. For example, only USD 5 million was going to
Uruzgan, but the good news was that the Dutch had agreed to
increase funding to the province. The Dutch representative
responded that the funding was there but the capacity was
still lacking. Karzai instructed his Ministers to raise
capacity in the respective provinces. UNAMA DSRSG Alexander
noted that only 14 percent of the development budget had been
disbursed during the first half of the fiscal year. The
Minister of Finance explained the reason for this was a lack
of well-prepared projects. He said he would love to spend
the money, but needed better projects. Karzai called for a
special meeting on reconstruction and development on October
12 involving all the relevant Ministers. The Minister of
Finance explained that most of the funding came from the
World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) which
had conditions and procedures for disbursement. It wasn't
that simple to just speed up spending. Karzai responded that
he wanted the WB and ADB at the meeting also.


23. (C) Comment: Karzai was engaged and focused (indeed,
perhaps more focused than his Ramadan fast-weary Ministers
would have liked) for a full three hours. He is using the
PAG process as it was intended. Both his Ministers and the
international community will be busy following up over the
next month until the next Presidential PAG, beginning with a
focus on humanitarian and reconstruction follow-up to
Operation Medusa.

NORLAND