PAG REPORT OCT 4: KARZAI RALLIES HIS TEAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KABUL 004899 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR BREZINSKI CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF SUBJECT: PAG REPORT OCT 4: KARZAI RALLIES HIS TEAM REF: KABUL 4783 Classified By: CDA Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) At a three-hour marathon session of the PAG October 4, an engaged, focused and energetic President Karzai, appearing at times frustrated, directed both his own government and the international community to move forward rapidly on the full menu of security, reconstruction, and strategic communications efforts. He approved the concept of Afghan Development Zones for the four provinces in the south but urged that there be no public announcement. Seeming somewhat impatient at what he saw as the deliberate pace of the auxiliary police program, he urged that the program be accelerated to the maximum extent possible while remaining in line with vetting and training requirements. Karzai characterized his trilateral meetings in Washington as "wholesome" and described his idea for holding cross-border jirgas together with President Musharraf. He called for quicker action on reconstruction and development and rapid approval and disbursement of funds for 4,000 pending projects. He plans to convene a special PAG on October 12 to address this. Karzai asked for a communications strategy to counter the increase in suicide bombings, including documenting, for public consumption, the places, methods, and training of the bombers, many of whom were just "innocents". END SUMMARY Security in South More Stable -------------- ¶2. (C) Defense Minister Wardak presented an improved security situation in the south. He cautioned that, while Operation Medusa was a tactical defeat for the enemy, we could expect them to resort to more suicide bombings and direct confrontation with our forces. ISAF and Afghan security forces were now removing unexploded ordnance, helping villagers relocate, and preventing the enemy from returning. Wardak described the situation in Kandahar as getting better, but said that Helmand remained troublesome. He said security forces might need to launch another operation there in November. The Minister called the Coalition's Operation Mountain Fury, in particular, a success, with no civilian casualties and the enemy having retreated to the hills. He said that hatred among the people for the Taliban had been rising. Wardak called on the international community to supply technology against IEDs, as was being deployed in Iraq. Wardak said Kabul would continue to be under threat of suicide bombings and that the MOD would continue working with ISAF, NDS, and MOI to strengthen security in the capital. He concluded that "generally the situation is better and prospects for the future are better". Afghan Development Zones (ADZs) -------------- ¶3. (C) Wardak summarized the October 2 PAG discussion on ADZs (reftel),noting the group was ready to implement the concept. With the success of Operations Mountain Thrust and Medusa, the situation was ripe, especially in Kandahar and Uruzgan. Helmand would be more difficult, he noted. He described the PAG's September 16-23 ADZ visits as highly successful in winning support from local officials and shuras. The outreach by Kabul was generally welcomed in the provinces. Wardak stressed the importance of being realistic KABUL 00004899 002 OF 007 about the size of the ADZs and the force structure needed, with the first priority being increasing the capacity of the ANA, for which plans were already being drawn up. He said that reconstruction and development and a communications strategy would follow behind. What was needed most now was a broad nation-wide "reconcilation" strategy (note: Wardak was not referring to the PTS Program per se),including visits by Ministers and senior officials to the south. Overall, the ADZ visits were successful, and with President Karzai's approval, the ADZs will go into operation, he concluded. Auxiliary Police -------------- ¶4. (C) Minister of Interior Moqbil Zarar briefed President Karzai and the PAG on the status of the auxiliary police program. He noted that 150 new recruits would start their training on October 7 in Zabul and other provinces would soon see recruiting teams visiting them. Moqbil highlighted the challenge of obtaining financial support and asked how the GOA would be able to pay their salaries. Reconstruction Efforts -------------- ¶5. (C) Minister of Education Atmar described five priorities for the joint teams that would focus on reconstruction in the south. First, emergency humanitarian assistance was being provided by the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) and the international community. This involved providing a full return package for those displaced, including food, non-food items, transportation, and rebuilding of homes. Second, relevant Ministries and the international community needed to restart projects that were held back due to the fighting, such as textbook distribution and building schools (50 percent of the 300 schools were closed in the four provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul and Uruzgan). Also, health clinics and electricity projects needed to be restarted. Third, various districts had submitted their reconstruction priorities, but resources were limited. Atmar said the picture would be clearer in a few weeks and urged the international community to fund projects that were ready to go forward. Fourth, the GOA should send teams to work with the provincial governors since resources are available but not well coordinated. Atmar called for a common plan forged by the government in Kabul, the Governors, and the international community. Fifth, the lack of coordination between Kabul and the provinces was hindering reconstruction. Atmar urged relevant Ministers to regularly visit affected areas. He called on all Ministries to put reconstruction at the top of their list and to ensure that focus on the ADZs was not at the expense of already scheduled development projects. Karzai commented on the last point, "this is very important". Auxiliary Police (Part II),Police Reform, and New Judges -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Following the presentations by Ministers, there was a lengthy discussion of auxiliary police, including vetting, salaries, and a Canadian request to deploy auxiliary police to Kandahar. COMISAF LTG Richards asked about the schedule for delivering auxiliary police beyond Zabul and what the target number was for total auxiliary police. CSTC-A CG Major MGeneral Durbin explained that the target, based on analysis by the MOI and supported by CSTC-A, was 11,287. Currently, there was enough equipment for 4,000. The remainder of the equipment will be arriving in the coming weeks and will be provided at the pace that vetted auxiliary police enter the force. General Durbin assured President KABUL 00004899 003 OF 007 Karzai that he was working daily to get the additional equipment for the 7,000 more auxiliary police. ¶7. (C) The Canadian Ambassador asked for more Afghan National Army and police in light of the recent suicide bombings in Kandahar that killed Canadian soldiers. He said this demonstrated that we needed more police after Operation Medusa. This could not be delayed or we would lose the gains we've made. Karzai expressed his concern as well, saying, "We're moving too slowly on community police". Defense Minister Wardak responded that the police were too thinly spread out but announced that he had made a decision October 3 to send more soldiers to support the Canadian troops. Karzai admitted the lack of police was a problem. He said he was willing to send more police, but that the international community was not ready to accept untrained police. He commented, "if we wait for those procedures to be implemented, we'll lose more Canadian soldiers". ¶8. (C) COMISAF LTG Richards said he wanted to reassure everyone that there was a plan for auxiliary police. The rollout of the ANA was being done very carefully, which is why it is important for auxiliary police to fill the gap. He assured the Canadian Ambassador that he was working hard to get more police to those areas (and gently chided him for raising the matter in the PAG rather than in ISAF channels. He said the key issue now was to exploit the victory in the south, especially through reconstruction and development. He expressed concern that those efforts were not catching up with security gains. He suggested that the PAG circulate on a weekly basis agreed themes for the media, some shared talking points that the GOA and international community could draw on. He proposed that the PAG agree on a weekly set of themes for dissemination. ¶9. (C) General Eikenberry asked that Ambassadors realize that the ANA's numbers were limited, while the police can be dispatched quickly. He urged that renewed attention be placed on spending for reconstruction and building roads. He said his most important message to Ambassadors was to deliver reconstruction as quickly as possible as it contributed directly to security. ¶10. (C) General Durbin explained that there had been a tremendous amount of coordination regarding the auxiliary police, as the program must fit into the national police program. Therefore, Leahy vetting was necessary. He said that significant resources would be turned over to the MOI contingent upon a properly vetted and effective chain of command being in place. He reiterated that there was enough equipment for 4,000 auxiliary police, 500 of which can go to Kandahar, but the recruits would have to go through the vetting process. Karzai agreed with this approach, but said he didn't want to discuss it further. "Let's agree to do the vetting, so get it done", he exclaimed. General Durbin responded that vetting would start October 5 in Kandahar, but he needed to finalize the organization of sufficient training teams to train 500 police. Karzai said we should get organized and do this so he could reassure the Canadian Ambassador. COMISAF reminded Karzai that the auxiliary police were not available to the Canadian Ambassador under the program. "We can't afford to shift priorities", he said. He agreed that Kandahar happened to be a priority area, but pointed out that there were other areas in need as well. Karzai responded that we must begin in Kandahar immediately. He expressed his frustration that there had been so much talk about auxiliarly police for a long time and wanted to see movement. He said he wanted to reinforce his view that he didn't like to see losses on the ISAF/Coalition side and that the Afghan side should be taking the brunt of the attacks by KABUL 00004899 004 OF 007 the insurgency. ¶11. (C) General Eikenberry asked that the PAG agenda regularly include an item on Police Leadership Reform, since police reform was now moving down to the district level. He said we were entering the next phase, where district police chiefs were being named. He noted that auxiliary police would be of little utility unless they had proper leadership firmly under the government's control. Karzai agreed and said this was very important. General Eikenberry added that it was also important to review the performance of existing chiefs of police. The Minister of Interior responded that the MOI is continually reviewing this. Some police chiefs have been removed or recalled to Kabul. ¶12. (C) Karzai announced that 29 new provincial judges had been approved and announced by the Chief Justice. ¶13. (C) President Karzai then raised several issues: his recent visit to the U.S. and Canada and the joint Afghan-Pakistan jirgas on the border, the lack of an effective communications strategy, civilian losses in Kandahar, ADZs, suicide bombings, the effectiveness of PAG decisions on public morale, and the status of development projects. Visits to U.S./Canada and Border Jirgas -------------- ¶14. (C) Karzai thanked Canada for the huge welcome he received at the Canadian Parliament. He hoped to keep up engagement with Canada, including with opposition groups. He described his trilateral meetings in the U.S. as "wholesome". He said there were "good conversations" among the three presidents, all issues were on the table -- terrorism, cross-border disputes, and Afghan-Pakistan irritants. Karzai said he suggested that civil society relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan be strengthened, particularly in the border areas which had become radicalized. He said that for years Afghan civil society had been undermined "by extremists who want to destroy our way of life". Karzai reported that he also made the suggestion to hold meetings with tribes on both sides of the borders. He said Musharraf agreed. ¶15. (C) President Karzai explained his proposal to convene a gathering of spiritual leaders and legitimate clergy from all over Afghanistan to meet their counterparts in Pakistan. The first meeting would be held in Afghanistan, followed by a second meeting in Pakistan. Both Presidents would attend. The gathering would speak about problems, who was radicalizing society, training grounds, all the tough issues. Karzai saw the gathering as having two specific purposes: (1) to pinpoint trouble areas on both sides of the border and give that a public focus; and (2) revitalize the role of civil society against radicals who have taken us hostage, especially in Pakistan. Karzai plans to establish a commission supported on both sides to work on preparation of lists of participants and an agenda. He called on his Ministries to get involved to ensure the right people attended on the Pakistani side. He said that noted Pakistani journalist Ahmad Rashid and others have expressed concern that the Pakistani side might "rig" the meeting, so it was important for the Afghan side to ensure the right people are at the table. He said that President Bush supported the idea. Karzai hoped UNAMA and the international community would do likewise. In terms of a timeframe, Karzai proposed "sooner rather than later, by the end of November or early December". The gathering should include representatives from all over Pakistan, not just the border areas. Answering a question about establishing Parliamentary ties, Karzai KABUL 00004899 005 OF 007 explained that this had been tried before but that Pakistan was not interested. He said there is a "tussle" going on between the Parliament and the GOP and the Pakistan Parliament had relations with the Taliban, which complicates matters. Strategic Communications -- Countering Radicalism -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) Karzai said that CDs and tapes were circulating in Pakistan that depicted a horrible picture of the West and Western "oppression" of Afghanistan. He complained that there was nothing being done to counter this. He pointed out that there were Fatwahs issued by Saudi clerics against suicide bombings but that these were not being disseminated around Afghanistan. Karzai asked that the Minister of the Hajj and Endowment start attending the PAG meetings. Karzai wanted more use of the radio in broadcasting GOA messages. He said that, after auxiliary police, better communications with the Afghan people was his top priority. He wanted future PAG meetings to examine this issue more closely and look at how to better organize the government and international community to do this. He tasked the Minister of Information and Culture to recruit better spokesmen, people of the same quality that private television stations were able to attract. Civilian Losses in Kandhar -------------- ¶17. (C) President Karzai asked the PAG how it was addressing civilian losses in Kandahar. He noted reports that 52 had been killed and a number of homes and vineyards destroyed. Karzai said that he would take money from government coffers to help these people. Education Minister Atmar explained that a GOA/NATO/ISAF/UN team was doing an assessment in the region. He said that there were differences in the casualty figures, with the GOA saying 13, while others say 52. USAID has provided USD 5 million for the effort. Atmar described the "standard practice" that would be used: (1) return package: providing tents, food, and reconstruction for IDPs; (2) those that didn't evacuate will receive similar assistance; and (3) vineyards, roads, and irrigation would be targets for assistance. Karzai asked if mosques would get assistance. Atmar said that the international community might have restrictions, in which case the GOA would fund the rebuilding. Atmar stated that he would be holding a meeting with the international community to design a full package for the two hard hit districts in Kandahar. Afghan Development Zones -------------- ¶18. (C) President Karzai reiterated that he did not want areas outside the ADZs ignored in reconstruction efforts. He wanted to see continuation of reconstruction and development in these areas, even though it might be at a lower level than in the ADZs. Minister Atmar assured Karzai that the ADZs were not being set up at the expense of other areas. Karzai said "don't announce it, just do it". He stressed that ADZs should bring together security, reconstruction/development, and governance. He again urged that the auxiliary police program be accelerated under the terms and conditions set out by General Durbin. Stopping Suicide Bombings -------------- ¶19. (C) Karzai believed that many of the recent suicide bombings were not really suicides and urged circumspection in KABUL 00004899 006 OF 007 the way we characterized them in our statements. He recently saw pictures of a suicide bombing victim who had his torso broken below the waist. Karzai said this would not happen to a suicide bomber, suggesting that the bombers were being blown up remotely. He pointed to a conversation he had with the Paktika Governor who relayed a story about threatening phone calls he regularly receives from Pakistan. The callers try to extort money from him by saying suicide bombers were on their way but if the Governor gave them money the caller would blow up the suicide bombers en route. Karzai said this meant that the bombers were just innocents who may not even know they were suicide bombers. Karzai asked that we "cool down" the announcements on suicide bombings, as they were frightening the population. Charge suggested that this particular story (of unwitting or manipulated bombers) would be important to disseminate, particularly if the Governor of Paktika was willing to go on the radio. Karzai agreed that the Governors of Paktika and Kandahar were the best communicators to do this. Karzai continued that drug addicts and the terminally ill were being used as suicide bombers. The terrorists go to their families in Pakistan and pay their families for their services. The victims become martyrs, and 400,000 rupees is a lot for a family whose member was already dying. Karzai described madrassas in Pakistan where they turn young people into drug addicts, then withdraw the drugs "which drives them mad". Karzai asked if the U.S. had experts on putting together a communications strategy. Charge responded that the U.S. had good contacts with the Ministry of Information and Culture on this issue. ¶20. (C) Karzai explained that he had asked the NDS to collect information and document the places, methods, and training used by the suicide bombers and their handlers. This will be presented at the next PAG. Karzai suggested that NDS work together with the Paktika Governor on this. He said the bombers are sold and turned into a business commodity, while the handlers are making money. Minister Atmar suggested that the policy objective should be to document the evidence and inform the public everywhere. The international community also needed to be mobilized and should work jointly with the GOA to systematically document the situation. Atmar stated that the GOA and the international community did not have a shared understanding of the situation, which is why a shared "evidence sheet" was needed. PAG Decisions That Impact People's Morale -------------- ¶21. (C) President Karzai asked if the PAG had a public relations campaign related to outcomes of PAG meetings. COMISAF LTG Richards said that there was a mechanism, but that the PAG needed to have media talking points post-PAG meetings so that everyone was on the same sheet. Karzai asked that there be daily announcements on the reconstruction and development work that was being carried out. Charge said it was more important to announce what actions were taking place, not just announcements of funding. Charge suggested that the effort have an Afghan face and be presented by the GOA. Karzai agreed, but wanted the people to know where the money was coming from. Reconstruction Projects -------------- ¶22. (C) Karzai reaffirmed Education Minister Atmar's status in the PAG as the GOA point person for all reconstruction projects going on in the four provinces. Karzai requested that at the next PAG meeting an outline of all the projects (old and new),both implemented and pending, be presented to him. He wanted in particular to discuss how to increase KABUL 00004899 007 OF 007 employment levels through the reconstruction process. Atmar explained that there were currently around 4,000 projects, mostly ongoing, worth about USD 400 million. He said that there were significant disparities among the provinces, however. For example, only USD 5 million was going to Uruzgan, but the good news was that the Dutch had agreed to increase funding to the province. The Dutch representative responded that the funding was there but the capacity was still lacking. Karzai instructed his Ministers to raise capacity in the respective provinces. UNAMA DSRSG Alexander noted that only 14 percent of the development budget had been disbursed during the first half of the fiscal year. The Minister of Finance explained the reason for this was a lack of well-prepared projects. He said he would love to spend the money, but needed better projects. Karzai called for a special meeting on reconstruction and development on October 12 involving all the relevant Ministers. The Minister of Finance explained that most of the funding came from the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) which had conditions and procedures for disbursement. It wasn't that simple to just speed up spending. Karzai responded that he wanted the WB and ADB at the meeting also. ¶23. (C) Comment: Karzai was engaged and focused (indeed, perhaps more focused than his Ramadan fast-weary Ministers would have liked) for a full three hours. He is using the PAG process as it was intended. Both his Ministers and the international community will be busy following up over the next month until the next Presidential PAG, beginning with a focus on humanitarian and reconstruction follow-up to Operation Medusa. NORLAND