Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL4779
2006-10-04 02:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

TRIBAL AFFAIRS MINISTER ON SECURITY AND BORDER

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8947
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #4779/01 2770251
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 040251Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3217
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0150
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3124
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3254
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6582
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1929
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004779 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: TRIBAL AFFAIRS MINISTER ON SECURITY AND BORDER
JIRGAS

REF: KABUL 4772

Classified By: CDA Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004779

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: TRIBAL AFFAIRS MINISTER ON SECURITY AND BORDER
JIRGAS

REF: KABUL 4772

Classified By: CDA Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During an October 1 courtesy call, Minister of
Frontier and Tribal Affairs Abdul Karim Brahowie blamed
Pakistan for Afghanistan's security woes. While no concrete
results have been seen from the North Waziristan agreement,
the Minister sees a role for tribal leaders in reducing
border tensions provided that the GOA places trust and
confidence in them. The Ministry is prepared to convene a
cross-border jirga between Presidents Karzai and Musharraf as
soon as it receives an order from President Karzai. END
SUMMARY


2. (SBU) During an October 1 courtesy call on Minister of
Frontier and Tribal Affairs Abdul Karim Brahowie by A/DCM,
Political Counselor, and Public Affairs Counselor, the
Minister shared his views on tribal relations and security,
the North Waziristan agreement, and joint jirgas between
Presidents Karzai and Musharraf and tribal leaders on both
sides of the border.

Tribal Relations and Security
--------------


3. (C) In response to a question from A/DCM about the role of
the tribes in establishing and maintaining security, Minister
Brahowie responded by blaming Pakistan, saying "I can tell
you about security in one sentence -- it's related to the
policies of neighboring countries". He said that if
Afghanistan's neighbors wanted peace, we would have it. If
not, tensions would continue regardless of all the talks.
Commenting on the North Waziristan agreement, he observed
that it was strange that a national leader of a country had
to sign an agreement with his own people. The Minister
thought this was strange and showed the GOP's "weakness".
Brahowie described Musharraf's performance in Washington as

aggressive toward the U.S, UK, and President Karzai, in
contrast to President Karzai who was "calm". While
recognizing that Musharraf was in a "hard position", the
Minister said it was difficult to defend his policies. He
contrasted Pakistan with Iran "which didn't blame others for
its cross-border problems". The Minister called on the GOP
to demonstrate that it was not beholden to the ISI and to
prove this was not the case. The GOP had a responsibility to
do this, he asserted. In short, if Pakistan wanted peace and
security, it was easy to accomplish. We don't need all these
agreements, he said dismissively.

North Waziristan Agreement
--------------


4. (C) Asked by A/DCM about the quality of elders in the
North Waziristan region that would participate in the
proposed jirgas, the Minister responded that the leaders
there were "certainly very influential". The tribes
maintained a traditional lifestyle and their leaders were
well respected. He explained that, if the tribal leaders
agreed to accept the NW agreement, problems could get solved.
If they opposed it, problems would continue. If tribal
members don't follow the orders Q their leaders, they know
it will be difficult for them to seek assistance in the
future. Moreover, tribal leaders had the power to evict
foreigners from their regions and thus play a key role,

KABUL 00004779 002 OF 002


particularly because they all know each other. The Minister
continued that the tribes at the border had good inter-tribal
relations because they were essentially one tribe.


5. (C) A/DCM asked if the Minister had seen any concrete
results from the NW Agreement. Brahowie responded that he
had seen no improvement and that the pressure and insecurity
were still there. POLCOUNS asked if the shuras could
influence those responsible for the insurgency. The Minister
highlighted this as an important issue. He said it would
depend on how seriously and honestly we carried out the
jirgas and how much importance we placed on the elders. He
stressed that it was important for them to "feel the
government's respect and reliance on them" for the jirgas to
work. He explained that when tribal leaders say they will do
something, they will. Tribal leaders have told the Minister
that if the government used them to control the borders, they
would be helpful. If the government didn't trust or rely on
the tribes, then they would feel no responsibility to be
cooperative. The tribes would even bear arms if they had the
support and respect of the government.

Cross-Border Jirgas
--------------


6. (C) Regarding the proposed cross-border jirgas between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Minister stressed that if the
two countries proceeded down that path, there would be a
positive outcome. He argued that tribes could set the course
for both Presidents to talk and stop the violence. Whether
it happens and how is the big question, he concluded.


7. (C) Brahowie explained that his Ministry was ready to
convene the cross-border jirga between the two Presidents
whenever he got the order from President Karzai. He said it
could be arranged within a week. He was just waiting for
instructions.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Minister Brahowie was, not surprisingly, more upbeat
than others, including FM Spanta (reftel) about the role of
tribal leaders, shuras, and jirgas in resolving the border
security problem with Pakistan. The timing of the
cross-border jirgas remains to be decided, although Afghan
officials talk about convening the first one soon. Equally
important is ensuring that the jirgas can contribute
something tangible to relieve tensions, given that the tribal
and ethnic leadership has been weakened during the past 25
years and that the Taliban have not hesitated to kill tribal
leaders in Waziristan. We will work with the GOA to develop
concrete ideas. When the cross-border jirgas are organized,
the Tribal Affairs Ministry may play a significant support
role, but the jirga initiative will (and must) clearly be
organized and controlled out of the presidential Palace.
NORLAND