AFGHAN POLICE REFORM: CIVIL ORDER MAINTENANCE -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004232 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM, INL/FO STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR BREZINSKI CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV AF SUBJECT: AFGHAN POLICE REFORM: CIVIL ORDER MAINTENANCE - CONSTABULARY FORCE CONCEPT REF: KABUL 4001 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann; reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C/REL CAN) Summary: Ongoing Afghan National Police (ANP) reform efforts are focused on removing corrupt/incompetent leadership, increasing the quality of training and equipment, and "rebalancing"/augmenting the force in favor of provinces with the greatest security needs. As important as these measures remain, there are critical policing gaps in Afghanistan that cannot be filled simply by hiring more policemen and distributing the ANP to favor the most populous or at risk areas. Under current plans, the ANP will remain ill-equipped to respond to civil disorder and to provide credible police services in high-threat rural areas. In an effort to address these important gaps in the ANP's capabilities, the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) recently developed a concept for an ANP "Civil Order Maintenance/Constabulary" (COM/C) force. The COM/C would be under the control of the MOI, and have a target force size of 5,000 personnel deployed in four 1,200-man brigades. CSTC-A estimates that training and equipping an ANP COM/C to perform these essential tasks would require an initial investment of 130 million dollars and annual sustainment costs of 5.5 million dollars. We will pursue the concept in close coordination with the GOA, Germany, UNAMA and other key players on police issues. End Summary. -------------- AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE REFORM -------------- ¶2. (C/REL CAN) Ongoing ANP reform efforts are focused on removing corrupt/incompetent leadership, increasing the quality of training and equipment, and "rebalancing"/augmenting the force in favor of provinces with the greatest security needs (specifically, Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Paktia). Accomplishing these tasks in the face of the increasingly violent Taliban insurgency is becoming more difficult and costly. In fact, the police "rebalancing" directive issued by President Karzai in July has been significantly delayed by recruitment and discipline problems (i.e., AWOLs, refusal to transfer from home district or unit). To date, approximately 700 of the target total of 2,100 additional ANP have been recruited in accordance with the rebalancing directive, with another 300 expected to be hired by the end of September. An additional effort to increase the number of police in the South via the recruitment of "auxiliary police" (reftel) is ongoing as a pilot project in Zabul province. Even if these two programs (auxiliaries and rebalancing) are fully implemented, those police will be of only limited initial value as they will have only received minimal training in order to deploy these forces rapidly. -------------- CIVIL ORDER MAINTENANCE/CONSTABULARY CONCEPT -------------- ¶3. (C/REL CAN) Developing a fully trained and professional police for use in riot control and deployment to Afghanistan's least secure districts remains critical to our success here. As was evident during the May 29 riots, which many here still see as a defining moment with respect to confidence in Karzai's government, the ANP currently lacks the capability to respond to civil disorder or emergencies. Additionally, the ANP generally does not have the mobility and firepower to provide effective police presence and other KABUL 00004232 002 OF 003 services in remote rural areas threatened by heavily armed insurgents, narco-traffickers, or criminals. In an effort to address these important gaps in the ANP's policing capabilities, the CSTC-A Police Reform Director recently developed a concept for an ANP COM/C. ¶4. (SBU) According to the CSTC-A concept, the COM/C would have a dual mission of maintaining civil order in the cities while providing an increased police presence throughout the country. The COM/C would be under the control of the MOI, and have a target force size of 5,000 personnel in a force structure appropriate to the threat. The COM/C force structure would come from the Afghan Standby Police. The new force would be multi-ethnic, highly trained, and nationally recruited. Three of the COM/C units would be equipped to project a robust police presence in high threat rural areas. They would patrol from 13 forward operating bases (FOB), focused primarily in the South, East, Central, and West regions. The FOBs would be manned in either 200- or 400-man configurations. The fourth COM/C unit would be deployed in 150-man units across the eight major metropolitan areas of Kabul, Feyzabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Farah, Kandahar, Gardez, Jalalabad. These urban units would be specially trained and equipped to respond to civil disorder (i.e., riots),hostage/kidnapping situations, and emergencies. The German Police Program Office (GPPO) has initiated a project that closely aligns with the riot control training. ¶5. (SBU) CSTC-A estimates that training and equipping an ANP COM/C to perform these essential tasks would require an initial investment of 130 million dollars and annual sustainment costs of 5.5 million dollars. Under this concept, the COM/C would be outfitted with armored vehicles (including SWAT vans),radio communications packages, medical trucks, machine guns, non-lethal weapons, and the infrastructure required at the 13 forward operating bases. It is projected that the first unit of about 400-500 patrolmen would be operational within nine months, i.e. June ¶2007. Standing up Kabul riot police and an initial deployment to the South would be the first priorities. The force would continue to grow as facilities and funding permit. -------------- GERMAN REACTION -------------- ¶6. (C/REL CAN) DCM and Polmiloff, with CSTC-A Deputy Commanding General BG O'Brien, met with German Police Advisor Ambassador Frick and members of the GPPO on September 10. Frick said he recognizes that the situation in Afghanistan right now, especially in the South and Southeast, requires a paramilitary-style element on a transitional basis, although he said Germany still looks forward to a time when Afghanistan can have a peacetime police force. While noting that Germany would prefer that the Afghan National Army (ANA) take on the task of securing remote districts, Frick accepted our explanation that the ANA is overstretched and fully committed to other duties. The ANA should not reduce its force structure to take on what is essentially a police responsibility. Frick said that he agrees in principle with the COM/C plan, and that the GPPO and German Embassy will want to remain fully involved in the planning process. BG O'Brien noted that a working group has already been set up for that purpose. (Note: Under the CSTC-A plan, Germany would be invited to provide police expertise for the Civil Order Maintenance, i.e. riot police training. End note.) Finally, Ambassador Frick remarked that the word "constabulary" did not seem appropriate to the task, and KABUL 00004232 003 OF 003 suggested new terminology, such as "intervention police." BG O'Brien said that the Interior Ministry is working on new terminology in Dari and we will change the name in English to reflect its decision. ¶7. (C/REL CAN) In an earlier meeting with the GPPO, Mr. Collins, Director, CSTC-A Police Reform Directorate, who designed and drafted the COM/C plan, emphasized the critical importance of incrementally establishing the rule-of-law throughout Afghanistan. Insurgents and organized criminal gangs act with impunity in Afghanistan's hard-to-reach rural areas. PRT Commanders routinely report requests made by local elders for police presence, support and services for their people and villages. The elders report intimidation, harassment, and wide scale abuse of the public by vigilantes, thugs, gangs, and heavily armed insurgents. Mr. Collins explained to the GPPO that Germany's plan was good, but, unlike the COM/C plan, it did not go far enough in addressing police service and rule-of-law issues. Afghanistan's porous borders cannot be controlled by the ANP Border Police alone. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C/REL CAN) The COM/C concept is still under development at CSTC-A, and has not been approved by the GOA or officially endorsed by any members of the international community. The concept does meet a request from the Minister of the Interior for a force of this type to address the serious requirements the ANP face. Initial reactions from the Germans were largely positive, and there is a strong case to be made for such a force. We will pursue the concept in close coordination with the GOA, Germany, UNAMA and other key players on police issues. The GOA's ability to respond appropriately to civil disorder in urban areas and to provide Afghanistan's rural population with credible, fully professional police services is essential to support our security, rule of law, and reconstruction goals here. NEUMANN