PAG REPORT SEPT 14: SECURITY SITUATION STRETCHED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004161 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR BREZINSKI CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF SUBJECT: PAG REPORT SEPT 14: SECURITY SITUATION STRETCHED Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) An Afghan National Directorate for Security (NDS) briefing to the September 14 Policy Action Group (PAG) continues to paint a stretched security situation in the four southern provinces of Helmand, Farah, Zabul, and Uruzgan. Military gains are being put into jeopardy due to lack of police and auxiliary police to reinforce security in the districts once the military pulls out. PAG members reinforced the need to speed up ongoing efforts to turn the tide, including moving faster on reconstruction teams and Afghan Development Zones (ADZ),as well as recruiting more auxilliary police beginning with a pilot project in Zabul. ISAF is planning a major media blitz on Saturday (September 16) on the success in Kandahar, stressing the Taliban's overwhelming defeat as well as development and reconstruction efforts that are underway. END SUMMARY -------------- Stretched Security Situation -------------- ¶2. (C) The September 14 Policy Action Group (PAG) meeting, chaired by National Security Advisor Dr. Zalmai Rassoul, focused on the continued stretched security situation in the south, particularly in Helmand, Farah, Zabul, and Uruzgan provinces. National Directorate for Security (NDS) Chief, Amrullah Saleh, delivered to the PAG a detailed description of the security situation in the four provinces, which generated lively discussion over how best to respond. ¶3. (C) In Helmand, Saleh described several pockets of Taliban fighters which continue to put pressure on various districts. His sources detected over 200 Taliban gathered south of the road to Kandahar. In the Kajaki area, there were over 300 Taliban under various commanders. Other districts had similar numbers. Saleh said that the Taliban had been able to raise over USD 150,000 within the province. Other sources of funding, supplies and logistics were coming from Pakistan. He said that individual Taliban groups of 30 members were paid about 500,000 rupees (USD 10,000) every two months. He described Operation Medusa as effective in disrupting the Taliban's command structure and scattering the Taliban from key districts into villages, but urged the PAG to do more to hold these areas so that the Taliban did not regroup, which is what has been happening. Saleh said that in some districts, such as Panjwai District in Kandahar, there were only 16 police. He was skeptical that, unless more police or auxiliaries were deployed to secure districts, Operation Medusa would be able to sustain its military gains. ¶4. (C) ISAF/NATO Lt. General Richards agreed that the Taliban command structure had been fractured, especially at the mid-levels. He said that we should not be deterred by Taliban regrouping as long as we kept up the pressure. He would instruct the Canadians not to depart from districts taken until the police could reinforce security. ¶5. (C) In Farah, Saleh described the poor peformance of the civilian and ANA management of the province, which has encouraged the Taliban to return. In particular, Bakwa had seen the return of several "mullahs" (it was a common Taliban tactic, he said, to label commanders "mullahs" whether they had any religious training or not). Other districts had seen similar returns, such as in Balabulak. The mullahs command individual groups of about 20-30 Taliban, most of which had KABUL 00004161 002 OF 003 moved out of the district center to Farah-ro, near Pakistan, but are easily able to enter the provincial center on foot. If the Taliban take the provincial center, it will be a huge symbolic blow, Saleh argued. ¶6. (C) Saleh noted that there was conflicting information coming out of Uruzgan. His deputy of operations did not believe the Taliban were using the province as a base for attacks, but rather as a safe haven for medical treatment and rest. Another view was that the government had done an effective job, which had resulted in a stalemate as well as recovering certain areas due to Operation Mountain Thrust. The overall view is that Operation Mountain Thrust has contributed significantly to security in the province. Still, the province is home to around 66 Taliban groups, centered around three major Taliban leaders. Saleh was hearing reports that the Governor was not receiving sufficient funding from Kabul for changes he is trying to make in the provincial government, e.g., there were still no department heads in key posts. Saleh again lamented what he saw as a "typical problem" -- we clear out the Taliban, but if we can't intervene quickly with management and leadership changes, we risk losing the province. ¶7. (C) Saleh then briefed on the Taliban's overall communications structure. He said that at the strategic level, a unified command structure existed, but not at the tactical level. The Taliban leadership had an overall view of what to do and where to attack, but on the ground, they faced tactical problems. Strategic planning was being carried out in Pakistan, where they saw the entire picture. Attacks in one region are often used to relieve pressure in another. Saleh sees this as a new strategy compared to six months ago, a "new situation". This generated a lively discussion of how to respond, e.g., was there a non-military response, since there were only three Taliban commanders in the province? The Deputy Minister for the Interior argued that this was not a conventional war, that the Taliban were brutal people, and that the war could only be won if we had real support from the local people for the ANA and the police. He said that police assigned from outside the region would always lack strong ties to the community and that what was needed were auxiliary and community police from the area. He argued that 20 well-trained police from the area were worth more than 200 ANA police since they knew the community, the roads, and who the enemy was. ¶8. (C) The Deputy Minister of Interior reported on his two-week visit to Zabul. The Deputy Minister came away with conflicting stories -- that the "Taliban were at the gates" or "all is calm". There were reports of 1,500 Taliban fighters in the province, six times more than the strength of the ANA. Many districts had only one police chief who policed his district with his extended family. Most residents were afraid of the government and saw a poor administration which lacked attention to their daily lives. The Taliban had control in some areas and was now fighting to get control of the highway where it has been stopping trucks from Kandahar. Some Taliban fighters were being specifically trained to block traffic, while others were learning other tactics, such as IED placement or kidnapping. Most of the 1,500 Taliban were receiving pay from sources in Pakistan. (Comment: Given the mixed picture we are getting in Zabul, we are intensifying our efforts to develop a reliable, first-hand impression of the situation there. End Comment) -------------- -------------- Response: Reconstruction, ADZ and More Auxiliaries -------------- -------------- KABUL 00004161 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) PAG members reinforced the need to speed up ongoing efforts to turn the tide, including moving faster on reconstruction teams, moving forward more quickly on Afghan Development Zones (ADZ),including getting more input from provincial governors, and recruiting more auxiliary police along the lines of the Zabul model being developed on a pilot basis starting September 16. On the auxiliary police, NSA Rassoul argued for the need to separate out the audit from recruitment, "due to the urgency of the situation". He said MOI's March timeline for auxiliary police was not practical as the ANA was stretched and ISAF could not be stuck in the districts indefinitely. He agreed that we needed to move faster on the ADZs. ¶10. (C) Defense Minister Wardak similarly argued against waiting for the audits and called for recruitment and training to start right away. Just shift money from one side to the other as we need police in place, he said. He disagreed that it was better to have police from the local areas since they had too many local ties. CSTC-A Major General Durbin responded that it took one week for recruitment and two weeks for training, including vetting. Auxiliary police were under the same criteria as the regular police. He said that you cannot just take 300 militants and put them into the auxiliary police without training. It was important to proceed in a formal sequential manner, including vetting. ¶11. (C) Lt. General Richards stressed that we were on the right track. The ADZs would help with security and Major General Durbin's police work would reinforce military gains. What we must not do is go chasing the Taliban around. "Let them dance to our tune". If a district falls, we will take it back in our own time, like we have been doing, he said. Auxiliary police will be key to all of this. A major development and reconstruction effort is being put on the back of the military operation in Kandahar. ¶12. (C) Lt. General Richards informed the PAG that a major media blitz would be launched on Saturday (September 16) on the success in Kandahar. The message would be that we delivered a large military defeat to the Taliban and that a major reconstruction effort was now underway. The Taliban had lost huge numbers and realize now that they cannot defeat ISAF. ¶13. (C) Comment: This session of the PAG brought home the growing severity of the security challenge in the South, as the Taliban display strategic acuity in trying to lessen ISAF pressure on them in Kandahar and Helmand by stirring up trouble in neighboring Farah. ISAF hopes not to be distracted, but much will hinge on the ability of auxiliary police forces to be raised and deployed quickly. NEUMANN