PRESIDENT MUSHARAF'S VISIT TO KABUL: LAYING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004062 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER PK AF SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARAF'S VISIT TO KABUL: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON Classified By: DCM Richard Norland for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Keenly aware of domestic skepticism over Pakistan's claims that it is committed to controlling cross-border elements of the ongoing insurgency, President Karzai nevertheless made the decision to host a very public visit by President Musharaf to Kabul on September 6-7. The theme of the visit was "Security in Afghanistan means Security for Pakistan," and the goal was laying the groundwork for constructive and forward-looking discussions during the presidents' upcoming visit to Washington. Karzai and Musharaf met privately for an hour and a half (Septel). The local press and public focused on the presidents' joint public appearance for Musharaf's speech at the end of the visit. The event had been scripted to avoid questions in order to prevent provoking Musharaf, who highlighted the need for tough action against militants complemented by outreach to give those tempted to join insurgencies an alternative. The result: even skeptical Afghans found little to complain about in Musharaf's remarks, but they joined Karzai in underlining that they will be looking for action to match the assurances given. End Summary. ¶2. (C) President Musharaf's September 6-7 visit to Kabul produced much of what the GOA has been demanding in terms of acknowledging the extent to which activities in Pakistan contribute to the security problem in Afghanistan. Presidential advisors had, prior to the visit, highlighted the political risk to Karzai if the visit had produced less. Kicked off by a televised arrival ceremony, the visit included an hour and a half private meeting between the two presidents (Septel),followed by a state dinner (which the Iranian and Indian Ambassadors reportedly left conspicuously early). The key-event, in terms of public opinion, was a speech by Musharaf and reciprocal remarks by Karzai before a group of approximately 400 parliamentarians, officials, and opinion-makers. -------------- Musharaf's Public Speech: Worth the Risk -------------- ¶3. (C) Keenly aware of the political risks involved, President Karzai had been wary of accompanying his Pakistani counterpart to the event where Musharaf would make public remarks. In the end -- with quiet encouragement from the Ambassador and the British -- he agreed to attend. The event, attended by approximately 400 selected parliamentarians, cabinet members, and religious leaders, was organized to avoid questions that might "provoke" Musharaf to make unhelpful statements beyond his prepared speech. ¶4. (C) In his almost 70 minutes of remarks, Musharaf worked to draw a line between Pakistani support of the Taliban prior to 9/11 and now, when the GOP no longer sees the Taliban as representing Pashtuns. He acknowledged that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are active in Pakistan ..."as they are in Afghanistan," but also drew a distinction between militant and non-militant Taliban. He linked the former with terrorism which he assured the GOP would isolate and fight with force in order: 1) to prevent the "Talibanization" of Pakistan, 2) to avoid undermining efforts to build regional coalitions, and 3) to escape the economic and cultural "backwardness" the militants attempt to impose. Musharaf defended the Waziristan Peace Accord, claiming that the government's "bottom line" (expulsion of foreigners from the region; no training camps; and no Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan) had been accepted. ¶5. (C) Musharaf called for several initiatives to draw moderate Taliban to the mainstream: bolstering civil society, working through tribal chiefs (or Maliks),massive redevelopment, and integrating into the political process individuals "tired of fighting." He outlined several measures to address what he described as the root causes of terrorism: illiteracy and lack of options. The measures would include providing moderate education, reforming the Madrassa system, and curtailing spread of hate messages through loudspeakers and 'night letters'. KABUL 00004062 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Musharaf closed his remarks by returning to his opening theme: that it is time to put accusations and blame in the past and to work for future cooperation. He underlined the interdependence of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and read, in Dari, lines by an Afghan poet: "Whenever there is trouble in Afghanistan, there is trouble in all of Asia." -------------- Karzai: Appreciative, but Looking for Action -------------- ¶7. (C) President Karzai's brief remarks in response were addressed to Musharaf rather than the audience. He expressed appreciation for Pakistan's hospitality during the Jihad years and expressed Afghanistan's intention to have peaceful relations. He underlined the GOA's determination to prevent foreign elements using Afghan soil for anti-Pakistani activity and called for Pakistan's help "as a brother" to control extremist activity. He repeated the message, which he also offered in the joint press conference following the presidents' private meeting, that what Afghans are looking for is action and results to match assurances. -------------- Public/Officials' Response to the Visit -------------- ¶8. (C) Public response to the visit was mixed, but dominated by a skeptical, wait and see tone. In private remarks, Parliamentary Speaker Qanooni characterized the visit as an opening to an expanded political dialogue, while former Afghan President (and current parliamentarian) Rabani was not prepared to accept Musharaf's assurances that the GOP is fully committed to fighting the Taliban. One university student expressed stronger skepticism, noting that Musharaf has talked of friendship on each of his visits, but that tensions and cross border activity continue. For most Afghans, the test of Pakistan's assurances will be in its actions over the coming months. ¶9. (C) MFA officials shared President Karzai's and the public's 'actions speak louder than words' assessment of the visit. MFA North American Desk Officer Mirwais Samadi told us the government said the Ministry was pleased to hear Musharaf's assurances but observed they came only after the Pakistani president can no longer deny that Pakistan is the source of equipment and training for terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan. He said Afghanistan will support the Waziristan Peace Accord if it helps stop cross border activity. He reported that President Karzai had reassured Musharaf that the GOA would not permit India to interfere in Pakistan as Afghanistan had itself suffered from decades of foreign interference. ¶10. (C) Deputy National Security Advisor Ibrahim underlined that the GOA and Karzai personally had worked hard and taken risks to orchestrate a positive visit. The goal of laying the groundwork for a positive, constructive and forward-looking talks in Washington had been achieved. The GAO had decided not to use the visit to push ahead with the idea of a bilateral commission out of concern that it might experience teething problems that could complicate the discussions in Washington. Ibrahim sought to assure us that, when Karzai and Musharaf see President Bush, "they will be arriving as friends." NEUMANN