SRSG KOENIGS' BRIEFING ON PROPOSAL FOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004009 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNAF NATO PK AF SUBJECT: SRSG KOENIGS' BRIEFING ON PROPOSAL FOR AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN POLITICAL DIALOGUE Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) In an August 27 briefing for resident embassy/mission representatives, SRSG Koenigs reported on his recent visit to Islamabad and sought support for his proposal for an organized political dialogue (as complement to the tripartite process and involving the UN, the NATO political representatives, and EU as well as the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan). Koenigs said he had discussed his proposal with Pakistani ForMin Kasuri, Interior Minister Sherpao, and Deputy ISI MG Mustapha in Islamabad and also discussed it with Afghan ForMin Spanta and NSA Rassoul. The SRSG credited his Pakistani interlocutors willingness to consider the idea of a political dialogue to recent events which have forced Pakistan to acknowledge the cross-border elements of the Afghan insurgency and to growing international pressure. The GOP has become more willing to say it must do more despite a lack of resources, and may be willing to consider a structure political dialogue as a way forward. Koenigs reported Afghan ForMin Spanta as being much more wary. This likely reflects concern over the political risks to President Karzai. Comment: Neither Koenigs nor any of the assembled mission representatives seemed aware of the recent ongoing quiet dialogues taking place between GOA NSA Rassoul and his GOP counterpart or incipient conversations which are beginning to take place between Afghan and Pakistani parliamentarian. End Comment. Koenigs reported "interest within the Security Council" for a briefing by ISAF, adding he supported the idea. End Summary -------------- -------------- Pakistan Officials Don't Say No to Political Dialogue -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On August 27, SRSG Tom Koenigs (joined by his Deputy Chris Alexander) briefed representatives of resident missions on his recent trip to Islamabad where he said he had outlined "a concrete proposal" for a regular political dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as a complement to the military-to-military consultations that take place within the Tripartite Commission process. He said he had in mind high-level talks every two to three months, involving the two governments as well as the UN, NATO political representatives (FYI: NATO senior civilian representative Everts attended this meeting),and the EU. ¶3. (C) Koenigs reported that he had in his most recent visit to Islamabad -- his third in as many months -- presented his idea to Deputy ISI MG Mustapha, MOI Sherpao, and ForMin Kasuri. Each had shown interest in the idea and agreed there is room for a richer political discussion. The SRSG highlighted growing and increasingly unified international pressure (citing Australia and Canada's recent efforts) as helping convince the GOP it needs to do more, despite limited leverage to affect events. ¶4. (C) Koenigs lauded what he described as a shift from Islamabad's "hands off approach" toward the Taliban to a more interventionist, law-enforcement approach. He added that what recent efforts have uncovered has made it impossible to sustain the "fiction" that the situation in Waziristan was manageable or to deny that the Taliban and al Qaeda cycle through Pakistan to Afghanistan. He reported that MOI Sherpao had said he had been "surprised when 'peace' in Pakistan had led to an increase in attacks in Afghanistan." In Koenigs discussion of his visit, he noted that it had been much more difficult to get into a discussion with Kasuri of the main issues without a lengthy and polite preamble avoiding any direct criticism of Pakistan,and that Kasuri was "totally" preoccupied by concern over public perceptions of Pakistan. Sherpao, on the other hand was much more down to earth. -------------- - KABUL 00004009 002 OF 003 Need for Careful Preparation and Orchestration -------------- - ¶5. (C) While expressing optimism that the GOP may becoming more open to the idea of a political dialogue, Koenigs underlined the need to lay the groundwork, including addressing the "persistence of a distorted view in Pakistan of the situation in Afghanistan." Alexander compared the views from Islamabad and Kabul as analogous to looking through opposite ends of a telescope. According to Koenigs, Islamabad sees the situation in the southern provinces as typical of Afghanistan as a whole, and considers the Karzai government as a rump government, controlled by the Northern Alliance. Alexander characterized the GOP's view as "out of touch; out of date" including regarding the number of coalition and ISAF troops on the ground. Koenig offered the aside that Pakistan's Ambassador to Afghanistan, Sardar Taria Azizuddin, has a good understanding of the situation -- but doubted if he influenced thinking in Islamabad. ¶6. (C) Note: In a conversation on the margins of the most recent military tripartite, A/PolMil Counselor asked Afghanistan's Ambassador to Islamabad, Nanguyalai Tarzi, for his views on the possibility of a political process. Tarzi had expressed skepticism, saying that for there to be hope of success, the GOA must be prepared to offer short, medium and long-term goals to match those of Pakistan. He underlined the importance of the vision coming from the very top on both sides, as not even ministers would have the authority to make the kind of decisions that would make a difference. He doubted if Afghanistan was prepared for such an effort. There would also be difficulties on the Pakistani side with the idea that "confidence-building measures" are required. Tarzi himself, given his understanding, would be willing to argue that, on the political side, it was precisely what was needed to address the massive distrust of Pakistan among Afghans at all levels. Any political process would need to begin slowly, with carefully orchestrated first steps, to avoid deepening rather than relieving the distrust. End Note. -------------- -------------- Afghan ForMin and NSA Very Wary; Cite Risks to Karzai -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Koenigs reported that he had also presented his proposal to Afghan ForMin Spanta and NSA Dr. Rassoul. While they both said they realized something along the lines of his proposal must be done, "they were not excited over the specific proposal." Spanta in particular highlighted the (domestic political) risks. The challenge would be how to protect President Karzai from being accused of "fraternizing with Pakistan," particularly if there were no significant payoffs. Spanta emphasized that the effort would have to be at the sub-ministerial level; even ministers' involvement would be too public and thus too risky. ¶8. (S) EU Special Representative Ambassador Francesc Vendrell offered that he understood Spanta's wariness and emphasized the need to keep the entire effort under the radar. He expressed concern that Pakistan might see the process as deflecting responsibility for addressing the cross-border issues. Koenigs agreed there was a risk of "talk replacing pressure on the Taliban," but thought it could be managed. The key would be united, coordinated, and sustained pressure and support from the international community. The SRSG said he planned to travel to Islamabad within the next two weeks to brief missions there as part of his effort to build momentum in support of the process. Alexander expressed hope the Musharraf-Karzai meeting in September might include discussion of the proposal and set the platform. -------------- SC Interest in ISAF Briefing -------------- ¶9. (C) Koenigs closed the meeting by reporting there is KABUL 00004009 003 OF 003 interest within the Security Council in asking ISAF for a briefing. According to Koenigs, this would be the first time the Council would be requesting a briefing by a non-UN mission, but, given ISAF's link to a SC Resolution, he supported the request as a sign of the close cooperation between the UN and NATO. Vendrell agreed, but said he was sure it would have to be a joint SRSG-ISAF briefing. He also speculated that "more than a little massaging" would likely be required to get France and Russia on board. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) There are advantages and risks to having the UN foster diplomatic efforts that do not include the U.S. to broker greater Afghan-Pakistani cooperation against the Taliban. The domestic risks to each party are substantial. Skepticism in Kabul about the proposal was underlined by the fact that, while ForMin Spanta expressed support for the concept of political dialogue (his preference would be for within the Tripartite Process),he did not mention Koenigs' ideas (Septel). We believe Koenig's proposal is a long way from being concrete, but see its value as encouraging the parties to focus on the value of a political process. We will want to use the upcoming meetings in Washington to reinforce this idea. In the meantime, we continue to highlight the value of concrete confidence-building measures and work to ensure any proposals complement our own. NEUMANN