Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL4002
2006-09-06 11:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PROBATION BOARD RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THREE POLICE

Tags:  PGOV SNAR MARR PREL AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2463
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBUL #4002/01 2491121
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061121Z SEP 06 ZDK CTG RUEHZC #9925 2491210
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2311
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2802
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2953
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6280
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1631
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004002 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV SNAR MARR PREL AF
SUBJECT: PROBATION BOARD RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THREE POLICE
CHIEFS

REF: A) KABUL 2990 B) KABUL 3079

KABUL 00004002 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004002 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR BREZINSKI CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 TAGS: PGOV SNAR MARR PREL AF SUBJECT: PROBATION BOARD RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THREE POLICE CHIEFS REF: A) KABUL 2990 B) KABUL 3079 KABUL 00004002 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) The Police Probation Board met on August 30 to discuss the cases of three of the 14 police officials not on the original list of 86 (reftels). At the Senior Working Group meeting in mid-August, it was decided to review the cases of Abdul Basir Salangi (Nangarhar Police Chief),Haji Mohammad Leqha (Laghman Police Chief) and Sobqan Qul (Deputy Commander, Kabul Regional Police Command). The three were selected on the basis of CSTC-A mentor reports that evaluated their performances according to standards agreed by the Probation Board: leadership management and administration; effectiveness and efficiency in police operations and law enforcement; compliance with ethical standards and the rule of law; and police community relations. All three performed unsatisfactorily in at least two of these categories. ¶2. (C) Due in part to a thorough review at the Working Group level (Afghan participation was the same for both the Working Group and the full Board), the Probation Board quickly agreed to recommend all three individuals for removal from office. Later on August 30, the Board presented its recommendation to Minister of Interior Zarar Moqbil. Zarar said he would share the recommendations of the Probation Board with President Karzai and report the decision afterwards. He remarked that the problems with this second phase of police reform had to do with the "position in the community" of some of the officers. On behalf of the MoI, he pledged to do better in the third phase. (Note: the Selection Board for Phase III has almost completed its work; names of selected officers will be vetted for human rights concerns and then presented for Ministerial approval sometime around mid-October. End note.) ¶3. (C) Of the three police chiefs, the most sensitive case was that of Basir Salangi, formerly Kabul Police Chief and now in Nangarhar. Salangi is well-connected and powerful. While the mentor report showed his work
to be unsatisfactory, the strongest piece of evidence against him asserted that he was involved in the release of a terrorist who had been arrested with materials for making IEDs. Although the head of MoI,s Criminal Investigation Division had confirmed this evidence in the Probation Board, Zarar said in his meeting with the Board that Salangi had been framed by Nangarhar governor Gul Agha Sherzai. (Note: In a report passed back from Jalalabad through classified U.S. military channels the U.S. mentor said that while there was not incontrovertible evidence of release in exchange for a bribe, Salangi definitely did sign the release order. End note.) UNAMA Acting Head Chris Alexander pointed out that even without this evidence, the record sufficiently showed Salangi to be incompetent and he should be removed. ¶4. (C) In the meeting with Minister Zarar, Ambassador Neumann pointed out that while the Probation Board was a process of testing officers, it was also a test of the Government of Afghanistan. KABUL 00004002 002 OF 002 He noted that the officers on the Board have taken a real personal risk in making recommendations, and said he hoped that the government would take that into account. The Ambassador said he recognized that these were difficult decisions. ¶5. (C) EU Special Representative Vendrell also spoke in support of the Probation Board report. German Ambassador Seidt noted that there would be a high- level review of German policy toward Afghanistan on September 13. He said the German Embassy is under strict instruction to report closely on the progress in the police. Seidt expressed his pleasure at the constructive meeting of the Probation Board the morning of August 30 and said he would report back to Berlin that the dialogue was serious and constructive, reconfirming German trust in the Afghan Police. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Implicit in German Ambassador Seidt,s remarks was the position that German trust could be affected by the GOA,s decision on what to do with the recommendations. As Ambassador Neumann noted, it took a great deal of personal courage for the Afghan police officers on the Selection Board to stand up against a corrupt and dangerous warlord like Salangi, who still has strong connections to illegal armed groups. If President Karzai agrees to Salangi,s removal, it will be a positive sign that he is serious about police reform. However the international community will also have to work with CFC-A, ISAF, and the GOA to deal with any threats that may arise in Salangi,s home province of Parwan if he is removed. The same issue will come up in coming months as the Probation Board considers other candidates for removal. NEUMANN

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -