PRT/TARIN KOWT - GOVERNOR MONIB: FOCUSED ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 003538 SIPDIS SENSITIVE, SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR BREZINSKI CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD REL NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF E.O. 12958 N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT - GOVERNOR MONIB: FOCUSED ON RESULTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND IMPROVING SECURITY KABUL 00003538 001.2 OF 005 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Since he took office on March 18, Uruzgan Governor Abdul Hakim Monib has been confronted by a number of challenges to his authority, most coming from former Uruzgan Governor Jan Mohammed Khan and his supporters, but also from a deteriorating security situation that has undermined his position. Since his return from Kabul on July 13, however, Monib seems to have found a new political confidence that has allowed him to move forward on a host of pressing security and governance issues that are beginning to solidify his position as governor and broaden his support base. By reaching out to previously marginalized tribes, educated locals, and disaffected Durrani tribesmen, including the Populzai, Monib is assembling a support base that should strengthen his position. By focusing on improving governance through removing incompetent officials and insisting on results from the provincial government, the governor is beginning to sway many locals to his side who simply want honest and effective administration. With time, Governor Monib's plans to create a viable, inclusive, and effective government that reaches all of Uruzgan should create a bulwark of stability against any future Taliban pressure. END SUMMARY. Monib, Jan Mohammed Khan, and other Power Brokers -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Though former Uruzgan Governor Jan Mohammed Khan had often complained about his weariness at being governor, a position he had held since January 21, 2002, his March 2006 removal came as somewhat of a shock to him. Over time, his initially welcoming and supportive behavior towards Governor Monib turned into overt opposition, as he began using his contacts in Kabul to interfere in the central government's budget and resource allocation for Uruzgan. He also appears to have orchestrated attacks by "Taliban" on Afghan National Army units in Uruzgan and then volunteered his security forces to defend the province. He has also actively spread rumors that it was only a matter of time before he was returned to power. Khan was quick to say that Governor Monib could not guarantee security in the province, as evidenced by the increase in Taliban activity shortly after taking office in March 2006, and that only he, Jan Mohammed Khan, could guarantee security in the area. Since much of the provincial administration and all district appointments had been made by Jan Mohammed Khan, Governor Monib was confronted not only by Khan's personal opposition but also by a local administration inclined against him. ¶3. (SBU) Other local political figures have challenged Monib's legitimacy as well. Provincial Council President, and former President of the Provincial Shura, Mullah Hamdullah has openly challenged Monib's political legitimacy since Monib took office, for example he has attempted to sign government documents that required the governor's signature and to speak on behalf of the governor when he was not entitled to do so. Though these efforts were eventually beaten back, Monib's efforts to build up his authority are an ongoing project. Former Provincial Police Chief Rozi Khan was also an KABUL 00003538 002.2 OF 005 initial supporter of Governor Monib but his subsequent replacement by Monib loyalist General Qasim soured him on the governor, and several reports now implicate his brothers - and possibly Rozi Khan himself - in anti-coalition and anti-GOA activities. Subsequent Taliban activity in Rozi Khan's Barakzai tribal area indicates either his complicit support of the Taliban or his passivity at confronting them - either of which could have the effect of undermining Monib's position in the province. ¶4. (SBU) Some residents of Uruzgan are wary of Monib due to his coming from the Ghilzai branch of the Pashtuns (most Uruzgan locals are Durranis). The governor's tribal background is particularly relevant because the great bulk of Taliban fighters in Uruzgan come from Ghilzai tribes. Monib's Ghilzai roots and background as a member of the Taliban regime suggest to some that he remains a Taliban sympathizer. Some say the increase in fighting in Uruzgan following his appointment is a sign of Monib's support for the insurgents, and others circulate tales of his alleged collaboration with Taliban leaders and fighters. (PRT Comment: After months of close scrutiny, we have seen nothing to suggest that Monib is a Taliban sympathizer. End comment.) In addition, some locals feel that Monib is too young and inexperienced for his position. Broadening the Base: Tribal Inclusion and Reaching Out -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Since his return from Kabul on July 13th, Governor Monib has worked aggressively and decisively to broaden his support base, improve governance, and enhance provincial security - efforts that are beginning to bear tangible results. He has been actively reaching out to previously marginalized tribes and making allies among the majority Durrani Pashtun by delivering on his promises and practicing good governance. On July 20th, Governor Monib convened a series of meetings with village elders from Mirabad, Drushan, and Sar Marghab (areas in Chora and Tarin Kowt districts with security problems) to discuss the security situation in their areas and their development needs. What is notable about this meeting is that these elders had never met former Governor Jan Mohammed Khan when he was in power. Khan regularly victimized the villagers, who mostly come from Ghilzai tribes. Khan's oppression of Uruzgan's Ghilzai minority had the predictable effect of alienating them from the GOA and making them sympathetic to the Taliban, which justified Khan used to rationalize his further persecution of them. By contrast, the elders felt comfortable talking with Governor Monib not only because he is an outsider to the tribal conflicts in the area but also because he is a fellow Ghilzai. Governor Monib has also been reaching out to tribesmen in the remote district of Caher Cineh, which is largely populated by the Noorzai subtribe of the Ghilzai. Governor Monib hopes to bring the Noorzai tribal leader Arif Noorzai, who is also a member of KABUL 00003538 003.2 OF 005 Parliament, to the area later this month to help select a District Chief and to bring the Noorzai closer to the GOA. Since 2002, all the District Chiefs and most of the Police Chiefs of Caher Cineh had been appointed by Jan Mohammed Khan from his own Populzai tribe. ¶6. (SBU) The governor is also making a point of visiting each district for up to five days at a time to consult with village elders and to get a sense of the community's needs and on how their district and village leaders are doing, and the PRT has worked closely to support him with logistics and transportation for these visits. He also uses these meetings to gain a better understanding of the local political and tribal situation and uses this information in his decision of who he would like as a District or Police Chief in the area. This type of local consultation was utterly lacking during Jan Mohammed Khan's administration, as he imposed his policies and appointees on an unwilling population. Additionally, Governor Monib is planning to hold elections for the position of Mayor of Tarin Kowt and will likely expand this idea to other major villages. (Note: the constitutional implications of this are unclear, and could be disputed by Monib's opponents. End note.) Good Governance: Promoting Accountability, Providing Structure -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Another legacy of former Governor Jan Mohammed Khan's administration is the lack of local government structure and the absence of accountability and results from public officials. Governor Monib has made it his express intention to provide this badly needed structure and has systematically removed incompetent or corrupt officials while retaining and promoting educated, competent, and honest civil servants. In April, Governor Monib fired the illiterate and corrupt Director of Agriculture and promoted the only trained employee of the directorate to director. On July 20, he arrested the Director of Health, Dr. Khan Agha, for selling government-purchased medical supplies in Tarin Kowt and is actively recruiting a new director and getting local doctors, many of whom had been alienated by Dr. Agha, to join the Health Directorate. He has also replaced the Director of Education with a more competent administrator and is in the process of finding suitable replacements for the Directors of Communications and Public Works, both of whom are incompetent (and are Jan Mohammad cronies). On July 25, Governor Monib replaced the corrupt and incompetent Mayor of Tarin Kowt, Mullah Obaidullah, with the Director of Irrigation Engineer Kabir. Mullah Obaidullah, a member of the Populzai tribe and long-time friend of Jan Mohammed Khan, was appointed by the former governor in August 2004 and his replacement is yet another sign of a shift towards a more honest and effective administration at the local level. ¶8. (SBU) The governor also convenes regular weekly meeting of his directors, security officials, and development officials and expects participants to KABUL 00003538 004.2 OF 005 have reports ready for discussion. Each meeting has an agenda, which is followed, and the proceedings are well run. The governor is adamant that participants bring paper and pen to take notes and aggressively questions his officials about how many employees they have (often a source of corruption with payrolls being padded),the nature of their work, the resources they have at their disposal, and their plans for the future. Monib has also been reclaiming the stolen public property that many officials took with them after they were removed. The governor even tasks the PRT to deliver on its promises and gives the commander deadlines for information, resources, and assistance. The administrative coherence Monib is giving to local administration and his insistence that people do their jobs is a fresh departure from the administrative wreckage Jan Mohammed Khan left behind. Improving Security: Professionalizing the Police -------------- --- ¶9. (SBU) With the removal of Provincial Police Chief Rozi Khan in May, the rudimentary force that was called the Afghan National Police (ANP) completely disappeared in the province. Smaller police units in the districts, which were largely beholden to their respective commanders and nominally under the control of Rozi Khan, melted away at a time when district Police Chiefs were being replaced and the threat from the Taliban increased in late spring. Due in part to the security vacuum this created, the Taliban were able to significantly step up their attacks in the province. To counter this threat and to begin the process of creating a professional police force for Uruzgan, Governor Monib has undertaken a process of recruiting competent Police Chiefs and police, training them at the Kandahar Training Center, outfitting them with the right equipment, and constructing checkpoints in key villages and along the Tarin Kowt - Kandahar Road. ¶10. (SBU) Using one hundred standby police given to him by the central government as a stabilizing force in Tarin Kowt, Governor Monib set out to bolster the Police Chiefs of Chora. In southern Chora district, in a region called Chenartu, he provided the Police Chief, Akhtar Mohammed, with 10,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 600,000 Afghanis (approximately USD 12,000) to recruit new police and increase the pay of existing police, and foodstuffs to feed the additional men. In northern Chora, the governor arrested District Chief Obaidullah for cooperating with the Taliban and installed a new Police Chief, Mohammed Gul, who is well thought of locally, and provided him with ammunition and money as well. He has also done the same thing for the Police Chief of Deh Rawud, Haji Abdul Ghani. Governor Monib told the PRT he has received money from Kabul to recruit two hundred additional police from the local community, which he intends to use, and that he plans to send these men to Kandahar to receive training. (Note: the MoI has not yet worked out a procedure for training auxiliary police like these. End note.) As a stopgap measure, though, he plans to use another two hundred additional police that he KABUL 00003538 005.2 OF 005 expects receive soon to maintain security while the local security forces are trained. Monib is also planning to construct three checkpoints in the problem villages of Mirabad, Drushan, and Sar Marghab and provide the police there with radios, heavy weapons, and vehicles. He is also hoping to construct eight checkpoints along the Tarin Kowt- Kandahar Road. Jan Mohammed Khan: A Diminished but Enduring Power -------------- -------------- ¶11. (SBU) While some village elders will continue to meet in Kabul to try and convince President Karzai that Monib must be replaced by Jan Mohammed Khan, the former governor seems to have already become resigned to the fact that he will not be returning anytime soon. Jan Mohammed Khan has moved his entire family to Kandahar and left a son to watch his compound. Meanwhile his local militia leader (former Tarin Kowt District Police Chief Haji Ali Ahmed) has also evacuated his family after being removed from his position. With the replacement of his last political ally in Tarin Kowt, Tarin Kowt Mayor Mullah Obaidullah on July 25, the former governor has few friends left in official government positions. While Afghan Highway Police Commander Matiollah might be a source of instability for Governor Monib, their on-again off-again relationship seems to have stabilized with Matiollah supporting Monib (thanks largely to President's Karzai's intervention). Additionally, Governor Monib has split the Populzai community through his active political and material support of Chenartu District Chief Maleem Faez Mohammed and Aktar Mohammed, both of whom are Populzai tribesmen and former bodyguards to President Karzai. This too should weaken Jan Mohammed's support base in Uruzgan, and mitigate against any attempted comeback. NEUMANN