PRT/SHARANA - SUMMER OF THE TALIBAN: A TALE OF TWO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003439 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR BREZINSKI CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER AF SUBJECT: PRT/SHARANA - SUMMER OF THE TALIBAN: A TALE OF TWO PAKTIKA DISTRICTS Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Marie Richards, for reasons 1 .4 b, d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Insurgent/Taliban forces have taken over two districts in Paktika province this summer. The remote districts of Naka and Dila have come under insurgent control with Afghan government forces either surrendering their weapons or simply leaving the districts in the face of insurgent activity. The district government centers were overcome by insurgents, and the government buildings were burned to the ground. To date no regular Afghan government forces or leadership have returned to these districts. ¶2. (C) Naka and Dila, two of Paktika,s 23 (19 official, 4 unofficial) districts, at first glance have little in common. Naka, located in the wooded mountains of Paktika,s extreme northeast and Dila, situated on a flat desert plain encircled by a dry mountainous moonscape, is Paktita,s most westerly district. Both are remote districts located in areas of traditionally strong Taliban influence. Dila was taken over by insurgents on 7 May 2006 with the withdrawal of the District Commissioner and all of the police and the subsequent burning of the district center buildings. No Afghan government presence has been seen in Dila since 7 May. Naka, lost to insurgent on 15 June, was recovered in late June by a former Taliban and Hakkani supporter Mohammad Akbar and his thirty followers who were deputized and paid by Governor Khpulwak for this operation. Naka does not have any conventional Afghan government forces in the district. End summary. Naka District -------------- ¶3. (C) Naka district lies in a high mountain valley at 8400 feet. Heavily wooded 12,000 foot mountains surround a bowl-shaped mountain valley where the majority of Naka,s population lives in near-complete isolation. Located on the southern edge of the Zadran tribal area, Naka shares a tribal affiliation with several often troubled districts in Paktia and Khowst provinces to the North and East. Directly to the east, Ziruk district, also a Zadran area, shares a long and porous border with Pakistan. Lying along an old Mujahideen trail running from Pakistan through Ziruk, Naka, Sar Hawsa and into the Shai Khot valley of Zormat district in Paktia, Naka is no stranger to insurgent activity. On June 15, this activity spiked when insurgents intimidated and disarmed the Afghan National Police (ANP) stationed in the district center and subsequently burned the district center building, a converted school. After being unable to persuade the ANP or the Afghan National Army (ANA) stationed in Paktika province to retake the district, Governor Khapulwak, in desperation, deputized Mohammad Akbar and tasked him with recovering it. Mohammad Akbar, a recently reconciled former Taliban and Haqqani supporter with a less than stellar civic record, quickly retook the district with the assistance of thirty of his followers, all now on the governor,s payroll as KABUL 00003439 002 OF 003 contract police. Dila District -------------- ¶4. (C) Dila district located in the extreme west of Paktika province is a dry, unfruitful plain dissected with deep wadis and surrounded by extremely rocky barren mountains. Isolated even by Afghan standards, Dila,s district center, the village of Dila, is a four-hour drive over nonexistent roads from the closest coalition outpost at Waza Khwa and a bone-jarring eight-hour trek from Paktika,s capital village of Sharana. Dila, isolated from the center and on three sides (north, south, and west) bordered by insurgent dominated districts of Ghazni Province, was taken over by Taliban elements on May 7, 2006. The police and district government officers fled and the government district center buildings, crude mud structures, were put to the torch. There has been no Afghan government presence in the district since early May. Coalition forces have made several trips into Dila. On one of these excursions U.S. forces killed two Taliban during a bold daylight insurgent attack on the coalition patrol. Despite American willingness to travel to and through the district, the Afghan security forces (both ANA and ANP) have not attempted to reoccupy the district. ¶5. (C) On 12 July, American military forces from PRT Sharana and the PRT DOS representative visited Dila,s district center and spoke with local residents. Local shop owners and farmers readily admitted that the Taliban were openly in the district but had not yet attempted to set up a shadow government. According to these local sources the Taliban in Dila have targeted only people working for the present Afghan government and have even instituted their own form of a reconciliation program. According to this program, Karzai government employees could buy their way back into the good graces of the Taliban by turning over all of the money earned from their work with the Afghan government. Those successfully reconciled would be issued a Taliban identification card and no longer be bothered by insurgent elements. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Naka and Dila both present problems for the Afghan government. They have likely been under some form of Taliban influence for quite some time as they are extremely remote, barren, or surrounded by Taliban lines of communication and areas of influence. The ANSF are not yet large enough to allow deployment of forces in such remote areas. The unforgiving and sparsely-populated terrain make these districts of less strategic value compared to others in RC South and RC East. Thus does not take much military force for the Taliban to take over their "district centers." The Taliban, as they are behaving elsewhere, have flowed into where GoA influence is weakest. However, looking forward, building governance and the ANP remain key. In Naka KABUL 00003439 003 OF 003 a nominally pro-Karzai militia element is now in charge of the district. Where the true loyalties of these mercenaries lie is unknown. ¶7. (C) Comment cont,d: In Dila, no form of Afghan government is in place. Although the district is in Taliban hands, the people are not afraid to meet with coalition forces and they are not opposed to the Karzai government. However, at this stage the Karzai government and the coalition are more foreign to the people of Dila than are the Taliban. The Taliban, as Pashtuns, are not considered a foreign element. Taliban control of the district is not strongly opposed as it is not a radical change from the normal conservative lives of these very poor, uneducated, rural people. Rather, the more foreign elements are within the Afghan government with its non-Pashtun employees, in the ANP and ANA officer corps and in the American-dominated coalition elements. Until the Afghan government demonstrates the size and strength to provide a serious alternative to the Taliban in Dila the local population will continue to acquiesce to de facto Taliban control. Upcoming Mountan Fury operations, both kinetic and non-kinetic, will demonstrate coalition and ANSF strength in Paktika and help extend the reach of the GOA during late August and September. End Comment. NEUMANN