PRT/KUNDUZ: BRINGING DOWN A PROMINENT WARLORD --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003317 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, S/CT, SCA/A NSC FOR AHARRIMAN CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN, ABAUKOL STATE PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG REL NATO/ISAF, AUS, NZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINR AF SUBJECT: PRT/KUNDUZ: BRINGING DOWN A PROMINENT WARLORD -- AND KEEPING HIM THERE Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEWMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Amir Gul, a former Taliban commander and one of Baghlan's most prominent warlords, was arrested after a large arsenal of incriminating bomb-making material, weapons and ammunition was found at his compound during an Afghan National Army (ANA) cordon-and-search operation in Baghlan on July 16. The evidence indicates that he may have been responsible for many of the recent attacks against ISAF, including perhaps last month's suicide car bomb attack in Kunduz. Now that Gul has been turned over to the National Directorate of Security (NDS),Post will work closely with Afghan authorities to ensure he is not released. NDS Director Saleh has assured Ambassador that the investigation will be complete and that he will not be released on the basis of influence. We hope that the ANA operation against Gul will start to serve notice to local warlords that they can no longer carry out criminal and anti-regime activities in the northeast with impunity. END SUMMARY. AMIR GUL ARRESTED IN JULY 16 ANA OPERATION -------------- ¶2. (C) Amir Gul, a former Taliban Commander who has long been suspected of being involved in improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against ISAF, was arrested July 16 along with nine of his associates during an early-morning cordon-and-search operation at his compound in Baghlan. The operation, which was carried out by the Afghan National Army (ANA) battalion based in Kunduz (1st Kandak, 209th ANA Corps) under the guidance of a US Special Forces detachment, netted a large arsenal of incriminating bomb-making material, weapons and ammunition. Much of the seized material was relatively new and from China or Pakistan; it was not the typical mujaheddin leftovers from the Soviet period. The new German Operational Military Liaison Team (OMLT),which is scheduled to take over the training of the 1st Kandak from the current US Embedded Training Team (ETT) in early August, played a key part in the operation by coaching the ANA on formation of the outer cordon. Gul attempted to flee when the ANA first arrived, but thanks to the well-executed cordon, could not get away. PLANNING FOR SUICIDE CAR BOMB ATTACK? -------------- ¶3. (C) The material seized indicates that Gul, age 44, has been not only orchestrating many of the recent IED attacks in the northeast, but also that he may have been responsible for the June 27 suicide car bomb attack in Kunduz and could have been planning another. Among the items found were a 95-pound home-made plastic explosives bomb primed with commercial detonation cord and a white Toyota Corolla like the one used in the June 27 attack. The car, which was found hidden in a locked metal shipping container, tested positive for explosives residue and had wires running from the battery to the front grill. Experts from the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell (CEXC) at ISAF HQ believe a front bumper pressure switch had been originally attached to these wires. This would have allowed the suicide bomber to detonate the device by ramming the car into the intended target. The explosive material and other items were removed from the car, probably right after the first suicide attack, when there was a very heavy police and ANA presence looking for a second white Toyota Corolla, which intelligence sources indicated would be used in a follow-on attack. HEAVY PRESSURE FOR GUL'S RELEASE -------------- ¶4. (C) Within a few hours of the operation, Gul's nine associates were transferred to the Kunduz NDS. There are conflicting accounts of how long the Kunduz NDS detained the KABUL 00003317 002 OF 003 nine before releasing them. The understanding of the US Special Forces detachment in Kunduz is that the nine were released by the morning of July 17, less than 24 hours after the turnover. Baghlan NDS Director Mohammed Wali confirmed to PRTOff that the Kunduz NDS "was under serious pressure" to release the men and decided to let them all go after "just a few questions." He claims the Kunduz NDS did not ask him for any possible derogatory information about the nine until after they were already released. Kunduz NDS Director Kamaludin Gulalai insisted, however, that the men were held for two or three days and were only released after provincial elders gave assurances that they would not flee. Gulalai claims that he received no pressure from the central government to release the men. The only pressure was from local elders, family members and friends of the men in Baghlan. COULD CAUSE "BIG HEADACHES" -------------- ¶5. (C) Gul was not transferred to Kunduz NDS, although the US Special Forces detachment reports that the Kunduz NDS made repeated requests that he be turned over. Instead, Gul was eventually sent to Bagram for further processing and possible interrogation. On July 22, the Coalition transferred Gul to a NDS representative in Kabul, where he remains in custody. Baghlan NDS Director Wali told PRToff, however, that Gul still apparently has access to his cell phone (he has called his family),which is not standard procedure for someone held under these circumstances. ¶6. (C) There remain concerns that Gul could use his political connections in Kabul to escape prosecution for his alleged crimes. Almost immediately after the operation, the US Special Forces detachment in Kunduz heard through its chain of command that high-level officials in Kabul, including President Karzai himself, sought Gul's release. Though Karzai subsequently changed his mind based on evidence provided by the coalition and provincial officials, local elders with connections to Gul reportedly continue to press the President and those around him to release this notorious warlord. Gul and Karzai apparently know each other well. During his June 27 visit to Baghlan (ironically, the same day as the suicide car bomb attack in Kunduz),Karzai was photographed warmly embracing Gul and riding a horse that Gul had just given him. Baghlan NDS Director Wali fears that Gul will escape accountability because of his service near the end of the war with the Taliban, when he suddenly switched sides to help the Northern Alliance. Wali reports that Gul has close, ongoing relationships with at least two former Northern Alliance generals. ¶7. (C) If Gul does manage to be released without charge, Wali thought he could cause some "big headaches" in Baghlan. He thought Gul would be emboldened to carry out even more criminal and anti-regime activities than before. This time, however, he felt Gul would be more careful about operational security and hiding his ammunition and weapons. Since Gul has some 12 different houses in Baghlan, it would be easy for him to move things around and evade authorities. ¶8. (C) Meanwhile, Gul's supporters in Baghlan have been stirring up trouble. The ANA base in Pol-e Khomri (Karkar) was mortared July 21, presumably in retaliation for Gul's arrest and detention. There were also reports that someone called the office of the Baghlan governor, threatening him with IED attacks if he did not secure Gul's release. ¶9. (C) Kabul actions: German Ambassador, US Ambassador, ISAF senior generals and CFC-A have all engaged with various senior levels of the GOA. We believe the message has gotten through. However, we will keep our concerns obvious to the GOA. NDS Director Saleh has twice assured us there will be KABUL 00003317 003 OF 003 no release of Gul based on influence. BACKGROUND ON GUL -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite having reportedly gone through the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process a couple of years ago, Gul has remained one of Baghlan's most prominent warlords. According to multiple sources, he has been involved in a number of criminal activities, including extortion, robbery and drug trafficking. Several ANP uniforms were found during the July 16 search of Gul's compound, raising the possibility that his men may have impersonated police officers in carrying out their illegal activities. Over the last couple of years, Gul has been engaged in a well-documented rivalry with his former mentor and fellow Pashtun warlord Bashir Baghlani, which has occasionally broken out in violence and may account for some of the recent IED attacks. During the jihad period, the two men were close associates, with Gul serving as Baghlani's operations officer. ¶10. (C) Later, Baghlani and Gul were both members of Hezb-e Islami and supporters of the Taliban, but they reportedly fell out at the end of the Taliban period when Gul informed the Taliban that Baghlani had several secret weapons caches that he had no intention of giving up. Baghlani was arrested by the Taliban and ended up spending time in a Kandahar prison. Despite being loyal to the Taliban almost to the end, Gul was able to rehabilitate himself fairly quickly after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, serving at one point as the commander of the highway police in Baghlan. The July 16 ANA search of Gul's compound uncovered several letters and other correspondence indicating that Gul had been actively seeking a governmental position in Baghlan, probably to facilitate his illegal activities. Just last month, he succeeded in getting Baghlan Governor Rasikh to nominate him as a provincial district administrator, but this appointment was rejected by the Ministry of Interior. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Now that Gul has been turned over to the NDS, Post will work closely with Afghan authorities to ensure that he remains in custody and that a thorough investigation is done. While there is some concern that Gul's arrest could engender transient instability by upsetting the current balance of power among rival warlords in Baghlan, the longer-term effects of taking Gul out of commission will almost certainly be positive. END COMMENT. NEUMANN