LONDON CONFERENCE SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000329 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A NSC FOR THARRIMAN, KAMEND LONDON FOR S CONTROL TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN COMMERCE FOR AADLER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OVIP PREL ECON EAID SNAR AF SUBJECT: LONDON CONFERENCE SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE -------------- Compact with Afghanistan -------------- ¶1. (SBU) President Karzai arrives in London for the January 31 ) Feb 1 Afghanistan Conference with a two-fold agenda: -- To present to the world the face of a reborn and newly confident Afghanistan that, with the seating of its first parliament in 32 years, has successfully fulfilled the last major task set out in the 2001 Bonn Agreement; and -- To present to you and to the broader international donor community a post-Bonn vision of integrated political, economic and social development so compelling that we will commit to provide Afghanistan the support needed to see it through the next five years. An Afghanistan Compact that lays out these accomplishments and this vision is the centerpiece of the London Conference and will be endorsed there by over 60 national delegations. The Compact is a political commitment on the part of both Afghanistan and the international community to work towards a series of five-year benchmarks measuring performance in security; governance, rule of law and human rights; economic and social development; and counter-narcotics. ¶2. (SBU) In your October meeting with President Karzai in Kabul, and in subsequent visits by Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, we delivered the message that the United States is here to stay as long as needed, dispelling persistent Afghan fears that increased following our December announcement of reductions in U.S. troop numbers. President Karzai hopes to hear you make this same commitment clearly and publicly during your London Conference remarks. Privately, President Karzai also needs to hear from you that decisive actions on counter-narcotics and good governance are essential to his country's continued progress. ¶3. (SBU) We have invested major resources and have made significant progress in rebuilding Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. But failure to maintain forward momentum risks losing all that we have attained. Despite the seating of a new parliament in December, government institutions in Afghanistan are still extremely fragile, riddled with corruption, and unhealthily dependent on the ability of just one man -- President Karzai -- to maintain a balance of ethnic and tribal power. Most Afghans still live in conditions not far removed from the Middle Ages, creating tensions that the Taliban insurgency has been increasingly able to exploit. The United States cannot afford failure in Afghanistan and so we must sustain our effort on Afghan reconstruction and support the Karzai administration,s efforts to govern effectively. Your presence at the London Conference reaffirms our political and financial commitment to this effort. -------------- -- Public and Private Messages to Convey in London -------------- -- ¶4. (SBU) The most important message you can convey to President Karzai in London is that our commitment to Afghanistan remains unwavering. Regardless of the planned transition from Coalition to ISAF forces in the coming months, the United States-Afghanistan strategic partnership will continue to move forward. We will keep on working with and mentoring Afghan military and police forces in order to combat the lingering insurgency and to provide the security needed for Afghanistan to move forward to become a secure, economically sustainable nation. ¶5. (SBU) The Afghanistan Compact: The key principle of the Compact is Afghan leadership of - and accountability for - its reconstruction and development process. It identifies three interdependent areas: Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Sustainable Economic and Social Development; plus a crosscutting counter-narcotics agenda that need to be tackled over the next five years. The Compact sets out over 90 high-level benchmarks to measure progress and creates a UN and GoA-led monitoring and coordination board to ensure appropriate GoA and international community engagement. The GoA has pushed hard over the past months to give the Compact the flavor of a binding commitment on the part of the international community to provide Afghanistan adequate resources. Instead, major donors, including the U.S., Germany and Japan, have insisted that the Compact text be worded to document a political rather than a legal commitment to support GoA security, political, and economic development efforts. The GoA has taken ownership of this document, with the text approved by the full cabinet. ¶6. (SBU) The Afghan Economy: In the four years since the Taliban's defeat, post-conflict Afghanistan has achieved a remarkable degree of macro-economic stability that is laying a foundation for economic growth, development and job creation. Yet progress is fragile and, with an average longevity of only 47 years, life for millions of Afghans has not advanced much beyond the Middle Ages. Sustaining a viable Afghan nation will require the GoA to continue structural reforms encouraging private sector development; work hard to enhance customs and tax revenue generation; target its limited budget resources at pro-poor spending and productive investment; and contain wage costs. Until that point -- perhaps a decade down the road -- when the GoA can generate sufficient domestic customs and tax revenue to cover its recurring budget expenses, Afghanistan will require a steady, reliable and well-coordinated flow of assistance from the United States and from the broad international donor community. This is Afghanistan's reality. ¶7. (SBU) Parliament: The new parliament faces a number of challenges, among them a divided and inexperienced membership, some of whom have dubious backgrounds of human rights abuses or criminal activity. Yunus Qanooni, an ethnic Tajik and a leader of a loose group of "opposition" political parties prior to the elections, was elected speaker of the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) on a second ballot. To date, parliamentary debate has concentrated almost entirely on the organization of parliament. Wolesi Jirga speaker Qanooni and Meshrano Jirga (upper house) speaker Sebghatullah Mojaddedi (a conservative mullah and a former president of Afghanistan) have shown positive signs of pragmatism in these discussions. Qanooni has publicly renounced his self-appointed position of leader of the opposition and many MP's have stressed to us the need for working together in harmony. You should take the opportunity during your remarks at the London Conference to acknowledge any parliamentary representatives in the GoA delegation and encourage this spirit of cooperation. ¶8. (SBU) Counter Narcotics: Last year President Karzai declared a jihad against drugs. Efforts following that declaration have had some impact: The UNODC estimated that poppy cultivation has dropped 21 percent since last year, while a USG-funded survey reported a 48 percent drop. (The actual numbers of hectares under cultivation were similar in both reports; the latter used a higher baseline for the previous year.) However, the most recent UN estimates show a sharp increase in poppy cultivation in some provinces, and the GoA knows that it must begin an eradication program soon. Karzai has continued to say the right things in public and private and has accepted our insistence that specific references to poppy eradication be included in Afghanistan Compact. The next few months are critical; they determine the success or failure of the program. Your message to Karzai must be direct: Opium cultivation remains the single most significant threat to his government and to Afghanistan's successful reconstruction and he must bring the full prestige of his office to bear in this effort. ¶9. (SBU) Corruption: It is time for the Afghan Government to finally fight widespread, endemic corruption at the national, provincial and regional levels. Corruption is disliked by the Afghan people, hampers counter narcotics efforts, diminishes respect for rule of law and slows the development of a viable economy due to significant diversion of government revenues. In the short term, President Karzai must remove a number of high-profile corrupt officials and individuals and appoint a tough, competent Minister of the Interior. In the longer term, a combination of civil service reform (e.g., better pay for members of a downsized police force) and prosecution of egregious cases need to be pursued. President Karzai recently got rid of two ineffective governors (of Helmand and Takhar provinces) by appointing them to the upper house of parliament. ¶10. (SBU) Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups: The disbandment, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program has disbanded over 63,000 former official combatants by offering them incentive packages and training. The next phase of the process is the disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG). This process is more politically sensitive than DDR as many of the former commanders retain significant influence within various government ministries or ethnic groups, and have nothing to gain by surrendering their weapons. Some of these commanders have been elected to parliament and need to be monitored closely and expelled if they continue in their old ways. Government officials with links to illegal armed groups also must be put on notice and sanctioned if they do not sever these ties. A recent public opinion poll put disarming commanders as the top security concern of the Afghan people. The international community is working with Afghan security ministries, but the process lacks competent afghan leadership and strong support from Karzai. Warlordism is a part of the nexus of corruption, narcotics and ineffective governance which must be urgently addressed. ¶11. (SBU) Security Situation/Staying the Course: Karzai is concerned that NATO lacks the will to fight, that we will withdraw too much too soon, and that Afghan forces will not be ready to stem greater violence. Our long-term staying power is crucial to winning the political war in Afghanistan. The security situation is evolving, with more recorded incidents of IEDs and suicide attacks in recent months. There has also been an increase in the number of targeted assassinations/ambushes. The insurgency remains resilient and not likely to go away soon. A key underlying factor of continuing engagement is the reality that Afghan security institutions are still in their infancy. It will take several years and international support for those institutions to fully take the lead in fighting terrorism, extremism and narcotics. On the regional front, you should thank Karzai for his willingness to postpone his trip to Iran. Karzai is deeply skeptical that Pakistan can be enlisted in the fight against terrorism, particularly given the recent increase in attacks in the South ) you should remind him of the importance of trying to find ways to cooperate effectively on this issue. NORLAND