DIAG CHAIRMAN OUTLINES NEEDED STEPS BY GOA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002827 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF SUBJECT: DIAG CHAIRMAN OUTLINES NEEDED STEPS BY GOA LEADERSHIP Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) At the June 16 DIAG Forum, Chairman Nuristani said he recognized that the DIAG process was in serious difficulty. He outlined several points on which action needed to be taken, either by the international community or, in more cases, by elements of the GOA. ¶2. (C) Nuristani started by stating his agreement with the international community view, expressed most strongly by Japanese Ambassador Okuda, that President Karzai has not up till now made DIAG a serious issue. As a result, GoA ministries have offered only token support. Nuristani said that President Karzai needs to make a strong public statement in support of DIAG, and that he should hold ministers accountable for its implementation. He said the DIAG Commission has submitted a letter to the President,s office and hope for an answer after Karzai has returned from China. (Note: Ambassador Okuda has been pressing for a Presidential statement for some time, adding that it must be made in advance of the Tokyo Conference in order for the conference to have any chance of success. End note.) ¶3. (C) Secondly, Nuristani noted that several members of Parliament have either come out against DIAG or at least expressed skepticism with the process. He noted a statement by Meshrano Jirga Speaker Mojadidi several weeks ago criticizing DIAG. He said that the GOA needs to mount an information campaign to educate MPs, and also needs to convince Mojadidi to retract his statement. ¶4. (C) Nuristani (who is also Deputy Minister of Defense) expressed his concern with Karzai,s apparent support for community police/ tribal militias, which he noted ran counter to the DIAG process and has serious command and control implications. He said that the President needs to clarify what actions have been taken in this regard and why they are necessary, in a public information campaign targeting audiences ranging from GOA ministries to the international community to the Afghan people. ¶5. (C) Finally, noting that DIAG has reached a serious deadlock in Kapisa province, with the Negotiated Compliance Phase about to expire, he said the Afghan National Security Council needs to determine a strong course of action required for the Enforced Compliance Phase. He noted that the willpower and leadership of the GOA with regard to the DIAG program are at stake. ¶6. (C) UNAMA DSRSG Alexander responded to the Chairman,s remarks saying that his honesty was most welcome. He expressed the consensus of the international representatives in saying that while DIAG is facing serious difficulties (see septel),we must continue to press ahead - while realizing that the road will be longer and harder than originally anticipated. KABUL 00002827 002 OF 002 Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) DIAG has currently lost momentum. Although Nuristani shares the concerns of the international community, it is by no means certain that he will be able to convince the President and GOA leadership to take the steps described above. It will be harder still to convince people around the country to carry out meaningful DIAG activities when there are concerns about security. The feeling of frustration becomes more palpable with each DIAG meeting. Given the lack of progress on the ground, it remains an open question whether, absent effective action on the part of the GOA, even Karzai,s scheduled participation in Tokyo will be enough to convince some donors to recommit to the program. ¶8. (C) It is also important to realize that DIAG now faces two issues. One is longstanding: GOA unwillingness to use strong political pressure to force former commanders, including senior GOA officials, to disarm. The newer element is the unease generated by the security situation in the south, the use of tribal elements for security, and the resulting pressure in the north and west of the country to keep their arms if southern Pushtuns are armed or re-armed. Getting a firm handle on the latter issue may be a prerequisite to dealing with the former. NEUMANN