PRT/PAKTIKA PAKTITA FOUR DISTRICTS IN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002687 SIPDIS SENSITIVE, SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND OSD FOR BREZINSKI CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD REL NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF E.O. 12958 N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF SUBJECT: PRT/PAKTIKA PAKTITA FOUR DISTRICTS IN PAKTIKA AN EARLY JUNE ASSESSMEN KABUL 00002687 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: An early June journey to and assessment of four districts in western Paktika ka revealed districts with generally little infrastructure and little support from the central government. Despite certain similarities, these districts differ in their support for the government and their ability to stand up to insurgent activities. The one thing they all have in common is a need for more security from the Afghan government. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) In the first week of June, PRT Sharana conducted a four day overland trip to four of Paktikas 23 districts. The PRTs Project team, Information Officer, Operations Officer, PRT Engineer, and DOS representative visited the western districts of Khair Kot, Shaklabad, Jani Khel, and Bak Khel, where they met with local leaders, assessed the security situation and viewed ongoing projects. The districts clustered on or near the western border of Paktika Province were all relatively poor and remote. The security situation and perception of the Afghan government in the districts varied from very poor in some districts to o relatively good in others. Khair Khot District ¶3. (SBU) Khair Khot is one of Paktikas westernmost districts and borders insurgent troubled districts of Ghazni province. The district has 25 police, 19 AK 47 rifles, 45 to 60 rounds of ammunition per weapon, no radios, one Thuraya phone, and only one police vehicle, a Toyota pickup. Despite these police equipment shortages, Khair Kots district commissioner, Mohammad Hashim Qani, reported that there were few security problems in the district. The people are apparently happy with projects under construction in Khair Khot. The Afghan Stabilization Program (ASP) is completing a government district center building and has already finished a district communications building which will bring telephone and internet service into the district. The Coalition has funded a cobblestone road and USAID is finishing the reconstruction of a primary health care clinic in the district center. Through these projects ASP, USAID, and the military y have employed large numbers of local people. (Comment: The projects and the employment related to them likely have had a positive effect on security and the local peoples attitude toward the present Afghan government. The recent stationing of a large (approximately battalion sized) Afghan National Army (ANA) presence at Khair Khot castle has also likely significantly contributed to the positive perception of security in Khair Khot. End Comment) Shaklabad District ¶4. (SBU) Shaklabad district center, approximately a one hour drive southeast of Khair Khot over unimproved dirt roads, has few selling points. It KABUL 00002687 002.2 OF 004 is a very small crossroads mud building village of perhaps 200 people. Located on a desiccated treeless plain with little or no agriculture other than animal herding, Shaklabad appears to be one of Paktikas poorest districts. The chief of police, Mohammad Khan, stated that unemployment was very high and that nearly all disposable income was s generated by local men working in Pakistan or Iran. The district has 15 police, 15 Hungarian AK 47 rifles, 15 to 20 rounds of ammunition per weapon, no radios, one Thuraya phone, and no vehicles for the police or district commissioner. The police chief and district commissioner are the only Afghan government officials in the district. The police chief reported few security problems but admitted his range of influence was limited to the immediate vicinity of the district center due to a lack of vehicles. With only two projects in the district, a small Coalition-funded police building in the district center and an eight room USAID school outside the town, Shaklabad has little infrastructure. The reach of the Afghan government and its security forces in Shaklabad is very limited. (Comment: It is likely that Shaklabads real security situation in relationship to anti- government forces is unknown to the police. The general population of Shaklabad at this point seems relatively unaffected by the Afghan government. However, it also does not appear to be overly influenced by anti-government elements. End Comment) Jani Khel ¶5. (SBU) Jani Khel, located due south of Khair Khot and bordering Ghazni province on the west and Shaklabad district on the east, is a district gripped by fear of the Taliban. Remote from Afghan or coalition forces and close to Ghaznis troubled southeastern districts, Jani Khel presents a real challenge to the Afghan government and its security forces. The district had 15 police until five quit in the last week of May after being threatened by local mullahs. Mullahs in Jani Khel are actively preaching that the police are helping the coalition and that the coalition and the Karzai government are anti-Islamic. With only 10 policemen, 20 AK 47 rifles, 20 to 30 rounds of ammunition per weapon, no radios, one Thuraya phone, and no operational vehicles, Police Chief Mohammad Talib admits that he is overwhelmed. The Governor has told him to hire more police but he claims no one from the district will join the police force. The district commissioner was recently transferred and has not been replaced. This leaves the chief of police as the sole representative of the Afghan government in the district. Talib stated that he believed around 80 percent of the people in the district did not support the government. This is not because the people dislike the government but rather that they do not believe the government is strong enough to protect them. The people know that the police are unable to protect them from the Taliban so they cooperate with the Taliban out of fear of being harmed. Twenty two of 23 schools in the district are reported to have closed in the last week due to KABUL 00002687 003.2 OF 004 Taliban threats against teachers and students. The police chief pointed out that the district elders have made only one request of him - additional security. They want more police and they want ANA stationed in the district. There is basically no government infrastructure in Jani Khel. There is only one project in the district, a cobblestone road funded by the U.S. military, and even this is contentious. However, work has continued on the road, likely because it employs many local men. Bak Khel ¶6. (SBU) Bak Khel, located approximately one hour due east of Khair Khot over very difficult unimproved roads, is one of four unofficial districts in Paktika. As such it does not have a district commissioner. The district has 17 police, 17 Hungarian AK 47 rifles, 45 to 60 rounds of ammunition per weapon, 1 Thuraya phone, no operational vehicles and the police have not been paid in five months. Bak Khel also has no government infrastructure other than a recently renovated small mud building housing a primary care clinic and an eight room primary school, both USAID projects. The police chief, Haji Nasurla, stated that security was good, that the people were cooperating and keeping the peace. Haji Nasurla and all of his police are from Bak Khel and all are from the Kasir Khel tribe. Haji Nasurla is a tribal elder as well as police chief and this unity, along with the fact that Bak Khel district is predominately populated by people from the Kasir Khel tribe, may account for the lack of security problems and lack of Taliban influence in the district. The people were very interested in seeing Coalition troops and the police chief said that it had been quite a long time since any Coalition forces had visited Bak Khel. The people of the area were happy about the new school and were extremely interested in educating their children. The contractor reported having no difficulties with security and the school will likely be finished as scheduled. (Comment: The strong natural leadership evident in Haji Nasurla and the tribal unity of the people of Bak Khel appear to explain why Bak Khel has maintained security despite the lack of government investment, security forces, and attention. End Comment) ¶7. (SBU) Comment: These districts have one thing in common: they all need security so they can begin the development process, and so they can begin to appreciate their new government. In Khair Khot, Afghan government influence is relatively high due to a large government investment in troops and projects. In Shaklabad there is little government influence but also little overt evidence of insurgent presence. Remote, poor, and with a widely scattered population, Shaklabad likely serves as a transit area for anti-government elements but nothing more. Jani Khel is home to an insurgent population and will remain so until they are displaced by another stronger element - either coalition or Afghan government. Baki Khel is an example of an older style area, where security is maintained by the unity of the people and the KABUL 00002687 004.2 OF 004 traditional tribal structures of this district populated largely by a single tribe. Insurgents likely do not use the area, as outsiders are obvious to and are not tolerated by the traditional forces now re-branded as Afghan National Police. Paktika is a poor, large, remote, and undeveloped province. The extreme poverty of the districts is unfortunately also reflected in most of the district government and police forces. In the nearly five years since the Taliban were removed from power in Afghanistan, almost nothing has been done for the people in many parts of Paktika. If the government is to counter Taliban influence they must improve security and with it the lives of the people of Paktika. Until security is gained on the governments terms there will be little development, education, or advancement of any kind in Paktika. NEUMANN