Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL2424
2006-05-29 12:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/TARIN KOWT - URUZGAN'S DEVELOPING INSTITUTIONS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0345
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #2424/01 1491242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291242Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0494
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0243
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2727
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2576
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5998
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1398
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002424 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO (DAS JGASTRIGHT),SA/A, S/CR, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT - URUZGAN'S DEVELOPING INSTITUTIONS
- LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR GOVERNABILITY

REF: KABUL 2178

KABUL 00002424 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: DCM RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002424

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO (DAS JGASTRIGHT),SA/A, S/CR, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT - URUZGAN'S DEVELOPING INSTITUTIONS
- LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR GOVERNABILITY

REF: KABUL 2178

KABUL 00002424 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: DCM RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Governor Monib, of Uruzgan Province in
southern Afghanistan, has been on the job for two months and
is still working to build up functioning institutions from
the administrative rubble left behind by his incompetent and
corrupt predecessor. Visits to Tarin Kowt in recent days by
CSTC-A MG Durbin, CJTF-76 MG Freakley, and Canadian BG Fraser
reinforced the messages that the international community
stands ready to support him on security, reconstruction and
reform, but expects him to strengthen his planning and
decision-making processes in a number of ways. Monib got the
message; he held the first Provincial Development Council
meeting on May 22 and is also trying to improve the elected
Provincial Council (PC). We expect the imminent arrival of a
new Afghan National Police (ANP) unit - replacing the
dysfunctional unit that recently dissolved in place - to
improve the security picture and lead to the creation of a
coordination center for security forces. In the meantime,
former Governor Jan Mohammed Khan has returned again to
Uruzgan and is actively working to undermine Monib. Monib is
doing what he can, pushing hard on many fronts to gain
legitimacy and drive back the insurgents, and he recognizes
that an improved governing apparatus is a worthwhile
investment. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) GENERALS DELIVER THE MESSAGE: After two months on
the job, Abdul Hakim Monib is still striving to get traction
as Governor of Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province in the face of
manifold security challenges and limited resources (reftel).
Last week MG Durbin, Commander of Combined Security

Transition Command-Afghanistan, visited Tarin Kowt PRT,
briefing on upcoming police reforms and pledging to support
Uruzgan's under-manned and under-equipped security forces
once they are reformed. PRT officials told him that the ANP
force in Uruzgan has dissolved and its commander, Rozi Khan,
is believed to be actively working against the GoA and
Coalition Forces (CF). Durbin stated that a new ANP
commander had been selected for Uruzgan and we have since
learned that the new commander, Colonel Qassam, will arrive
around May 23 bringing 100 new ANP police. (Note: As of May
26, Qassam and his 100 men remained in Kandahar, waiting for
a secure way to travel to Uruzgan. End Note.) The unit's
arrival is timely and will provide Governor Monib some
much-needed reinforcements in securing, first Tarin Kowt town
and then expanding his authority out into the districts. Per
MG Durbin's request, the PRT will work closely with Monib and
Col. Qassam to get a picture of Uruzgan's existing police
infrastructure and equipment, and from that produce a
forward-looking plan for ANP operations, including in lawless
Gizab District, which was annexed to Uruzgan in early May.
We are hearing rumors that Nesh District on Uruzgan's
southern border may be annexed from Kandahar in early July to
become Uruzgan's seventh district, further straining Monib's
resources.


3. (C) Monib has advised us that in one of the province's
hottest spots - the Chenartu region of Chora District - he is
setting up a militia ("auxiliary police") unit of 100 men to
fill the security vacuum. Currently there are no GoA
security forces in the rugged Mirabad Valley-Chenartu area,

KABUL 00002424 002.3 OF 003


and cargo and passenger vehicles are at grave risk of Taliban
attacks and IED strikes. The militia is drawn primarily from
tribal fighters in the area and Monib is financing them with
funds he brought back from Kabul on May 12. While the
militia is far from an ideal development, it is hard to
dispute Monib's view that it is a better short-term solution
to Chenartu's security crisis than leaving the Taliban in
charge. Once the new ANP police unit is capable of securing
Chenartu, we will work with Monib to demobilize the militia.


4. (C) On May 18, MG Freakley, Commander of Combined Joint
Task Force 76, and Canadian BG Fraser, Commander of Regional
Command South, met with Governor Monib in Tarin Kowt. The
Governor laid out his security priorities (Tarin Kowt town;
checkpoints along the Kandahar-Tarin Kowt road; checkpoints
around district centers; vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and
communications for police) and his reconstruction priorities
(road access to all the district capitals, a power grid in
Tarin Kowt). MG Freakley pledged to work with Monib on his
reconstruction requests as long as they were channeled
through and coordinated by Uruzgan's nascent Provincial
Development Council (PDC). Separately, Monib plans to set up
a Provincial Coordinating Council (PCC) for security affairs,
but must wait for the new ANP chief to arrive before he can
make that happen.


5. (C) PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL,S FIRST MEETING: On
May 22, Governor Monib chaired Uruzgan's inaugural PDC
meeting, with several provincial representatives of national
ministries (Agriculture, Education, Public Works, RRD,
Irrigation, Health, etc.) and the PRT participating. PRT
officers and Monib described the PDC as a forum for
forward-planning, to establish short- and long-term goals and
then identify projects to meet those goals. Because this
approach is new to Uruzgan's unsophisticated administrators,
the PRT agreed to the Governor's request to hold workshops in
planning and budgeting techniques in the coming days. The
PDC will meet weekly for a while as it develops momentum and
then will shift to a biweekly schedule. Monib appears fully
engaged.


6. (C) PROVINCIAL COUNCIL ON THE MEND: The PC is Uruzgan's
only elected body, but is saddled with a president in dire
need of coaching. It met a few times last year but is now
dormant. Governor Monib told us he had tried to work with
the PC a few times, but when he caught the president, Mullah
Hamdullah, forging the Governor's signature on decrees, he
ended the relationship. Monib feels that Hamdullah is prone
to concocting unrealistic schemes, but is unwilling to do
serious canvassing of Uruzgan's population or nuts-and-bolts
project development.


7. (U) Monib is also looking to resolve a separate
problem: during the PC elections in 2005, Uruzgan elders
prevented women from running for office, so the PC's three
seats reserved for women remain unfilled. As an interim
solution, Governor Monib is searching for qualified women
whom he will appoint to sit on the PC until the next
elections. We are not certain this is strictly
constitutional, but we fully support the move as a way to
reenergize the Council and develop female leadership voices
here. Monib has offered to share the appointees' names with
us in advance and his first proposed name is a good one: Ms.

KABUL 00002424 003.3 OF 003


Hillah, an educated and serious war widow, who runs a
vocational school from her Tarin Kowt home. Once the women
are seated, the PRT will host a re-inaugural meeting of the
PC with an eye to making it an effective partner for Governor
Monib.


8. (C) JAN MOHAMMED ) THE INVISIBLE HAND: President
Karzai appointed Monib in March to replace Jan Mohammed Khan,
a corrupt warlord who governed Uruzgan for four unhappy
years. Jan Mohammed is leader of one of the province's power
tribes and, since his departure to take up a ministry job in
Kabul, he has been an incessant thorn in the side of Governor
Monib and the Coalition. We have credible reports that he is
in contact with the Taliban here and orchestrating insurgent
activities - reportedly trying to engineer his own return as
governor by demonstrating that only he can stabilize Uruzgan.
Jan Mohammed makes periodic trips to Uruzgan and Kandahar to
meet with his tribal allies and inspect his poppy fields. He
clearly feels he retains the support of President Karzai (a
fellow Populzai with whom he has a long friendship); this
week he directly challenged the Governor by walking into
Monib's compound and announcing, "I can do anything I want
here!" The Embassy continues to raise with President Karzai
our concerns about Jan Mohammed's trouble-making and our hope
that Karzai can rein him in.


9. (C) COMMENT ) MONIB PUSHING THE ROCK UP THE HILL:
Governor Monib is doing as well as can be expected. He is
operating against a determined insurgency, a devious enemy in
Jan Mohammed and a real threat of assassination, with limited
resources and allies he can count on one hand. But he pushes
on, strategizing his reforms, rebuking ministers who show up
late for meetings, taking on most problems himself and
approaching the PRT for support on the rest. He is eager to
visit the outer districts and is receptive to the PRT's
assistance projects - from Alternative Livelihood seed
distribution to opening roads and bridges over the Helmand
River and setting up radio stations in district capitals.
With the imminent arrival of a new ANP unit and the kickoff
of Operation Mountain Thrust, we are hopeful that Uruzgan can
be stabilized to the extent that assistance projects, coupled
with Monib's determination to find allies among the tribes,
can help him get some traction. He listens to advice and has
a long-term view; he sees the practical value in investing
time to create the Development Council and strengthen the PC.
Governor Monib is active, but his dearth of local allies
demonstrates that nobody here is yet picking him as the
winner. END COMMENT.


10. (C) Tarin Kowt PRT Commander has reviewed this cable.

NEUMANN