PRT/HELMAND - HELMAND ERADICATION WRAP UP

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002008

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO (AMB MQUINN),SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB,
S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KRDP AF
SUBJECT: PRT/HELMAND - HELMAND ERADICATION WRAP UP

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(SBU) SUMMARY: The Helmand poppy eradication
campaign is essentially finished. The campaign
represents an improvement over last year's in
absolute numbers if not percentage of hectares (ha)
cultivated. Pending verification, it appears that a
relatively modest amount of the estimated 40,000 ha
cultivated will have been eradicated - less than ten
percent. The effort may also have provided some
temporary security enhancement in specific areas.
However, this may have been counterbalanced as
significant numbers of police deserted their posts
to work as day laborers in the poppy fields.
Eradication appeared selective, often focusing on
poor farmers. There are reports of widespread
corruption, including payoffs to district officials
and deals struck among farmers, suspected Taliban,
government officials, and eradication forces.
Central Helmand, where about 70 percent of Helmand's
poppy is cultivated, was largely ignored. The
effort did extend the reach of the government, but
not always in a positive manner. Cash for Work
(CFW) efforts suffered from a labor shortage because
day wages for poppy harvesting far exceeded CFW
wages. END SUMMARY.

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MORE ERADICATION COMPARED TO 2005
--------------


2. (SBU) On the plus side, the 2006 campaign
represented a stronger effort compared to 2005.
According to United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) data, 1,031 ha were eradicated in

2005. This year, there were two eradication forces:
The Governor's Eradication Force (GEF) and the
central government's Afghan Eradication Force (AEF).
The AEF received considerable support from the
Department of State's Bureau of International and
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The campaign began
on March 8 and officially ended on April 30. As of
April 28, according to UNODC, the GEF reported
eradicating 6,019 ha. The AEF eradicated 1,917 ha,
according to AEF figures. While 2006 cultivation
figures are only estimates, at least 40,000 ha is
widely accepted, representing about a 50 percent
increase over 2005. If taken at face value, total
eradication up to April 28 was about 7,936 ha or
about 20 percent of the estimated cultivation.


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BEHIND THE NUMBERS
--------------


3. (SBU) UNODC is officially quite skeptical of
the GEF's numbers. UNODC's April 28 eradication
report stated that, "The GEF's figure is considered
to be a gross over estimate of the true area
eradicated." UNODC's report stated that final
verification will be done mainly through satellite
imagery due to security considerations. AEF
figures, due in part to the monitoring and advisory
presence of expatriate civilians, are likely more
accurate.

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ERADICATION QUALITY QUESTIONED
--------------


4. (SBU) Eradication quality appears to have been
uneven. The UNODC report stated that, "The quality
of (GEF) eradication is often very poor, with
tractors making a small number of passes throughout
poppy fields and eradicating a low percentage of the
poppy plants." The UNODC report included photos of
partially eradicated fields in Dishu district. One
U.S. military advisor reported that, in some cases,
the GEF eradicated only a portion of a poppy field
but reported the entire field as eradicated, thus
overinflating the eradication figures.


5. (SBU) We received anecdotal field reports from
U.S. military and AEF that eradication in some cases
was linked to various arrangements among farmers,
district officials, and the eradication forces.
Taliban forces also may have made arrangements with
the local officials. One report noted that
eradication appeared to focus on poorer farmers,
while skipping fields that belonged to government
officials or better connected landowners. One
farmer complained to a U.S. military advisor that,
despite paying a bribe, his poppy plants were
nevertheless eradicated. AEF officials reported
that government officials led eradicators past many
cultivated fields in a seemingly arbitrary manner.
In one case, AEF officials said that government
officials led the AEF forces past several
unharvested fields to one already harvested. (Note:
Poppy fields can be harvested four to five times,
depending upon the quality of the plants. End
Note).


6. (SBU) The eradication forces apparently paid
minimal attention to the "poppy belt" in central
Helmand, where most poppy is cultivated. This is
the area where it is more likely that powerful
tribal leaders and officials have significant
interests and influence.

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POSTIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACT ON SECURITY
--------------


7. (SBU) The eradication effort may have helped
improve security in certain areas on a temporary
basis. Another positive point is that, for the
first time, the Afghan National Army and Afghan
National Police undertook a joint operation. In
parts of the remote southern districts of Dishu and
Khanoshin, where there is minimal government
influence, eradication provided a government "show
of force." That said, not long after the GEF left
Khanoshin, the district center was attacked.
Conversely, security may have degraded in some
areas. The Governor informed PRToffs on April 15
that significant numbers of police deserted in order
to earn higher wages as day laborers harvesting
poppy. The eradication campaign also appears to

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have attracted more Taliban to fight in Helmand,
perhaps in an effort to protect their own financial
interest and to win favor with the local population
by "protecting" their poppy crops. The Taliban were
able to fulfill this pledge in Sangin district,
resulting in a propaganda victory

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EFFECT ON CFW PROGRAMS
--------------


8. (SBU) During the run-up to the eradication
campaign, Governor Daud requested additional
assistance in the form of Cash for Work
(CFW)programs. The Governor wanted to implement CFW
programs to provide immediate cash relief for
farmers whose fields were eradicated. Both the PRT
civil affairs unit and USAID stepped up its efforts
in this area, quickly devising a number of CFW
programs. Spot checks to USAID CFW project sites in
early April, however, revealed that there was an
apparent shortage of workers. In some cases,
contractors were using heavy machinery rather than
manual labor. Contractors reported that many
potential laborers were working in poppy fields for
USD 25 to 40 per day. Since CFW wages are USD 4-5
per day, many potential workers found it more
profitable to harvest poppy. Governor Daud told
PRToffs in early April that workers would return to
CFW sites after 2-4 weeks, as poppy harvest work
requirements diminish by mid/late May. USAID has
suspended use of heavy machinery for these
activities and agreed with the Governor to reassess
the labor situation and community support for the
activities after several weeks. Additionally, USAID
will shift its CFW strategy in Helmand away from the
eradication mitigation campaign requested by the
Governor as a safety net in areas with large-scale
eradication. Instead, USAID will continue to focus
on labor-intense CFW projects that build
infrastructure critical to the long-term economic
growth of the region.


9. (SBU) In addition to the impact on CFW, this
economic dynamic negatively impacted other projects.
PRT Civil Affairs supported work on the Helmand
Madrassa (religious school) has temporarily halted
until laborers return from the poppy harvest.
Provincial government and religious officials have
described the madrassa, a USD 325,000 project, as
high priority.

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COMMENT
--------------


10. (SBU) The overall impact of this year's
eradication campaign is difficult to judge at this
point. The government did extend its reach;
however, some of this extension may have reaffirmed
long held beliefs among Helmand's citizens of the
rampant corruption typical of the provincial and
district governments. However, it is important to
note that Governor Daud only assumed his post in

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December 2005. He was saddled with a Deputy Governor
and Police Chief, both of whom are known to be very
corrupt individuals. Daud has said to some embassy
officers that he would like to have both removed,
but this will take some time. The Ministry of
Interior informed the embassy that two weeks ago
they opened an investigation into allegations of
corruption on the part of Deputy Governor Amir
Mohammed while he led the Governor's eradication
effort. The Governor appears sincere about
addressing the poppy issue in Helmand. However, he
will need additional national and international
support for his future efforts.


11. (SBU) COMMENT (cont) Since the amount of poppy
eradicated appears relatively small compared to the
cultivation, it is an open question whether the
campaign has convinced farmers not to plant poppy
later this year. Regarding the CFW program, the
lack of available CFW laborers during the harvest
season appears to reflect the minimal economic
impact of the eradication campaign against which the
CFW projects were meant to play a supporting role.
With the Poppy Elimination Program coming online, a
much heavier UK military and civilian presence in
Helmand, and the initiation of USAID long-term
alternative agribusiness development activities,
there is a better chance to improve security,
governance, and the local economy - three key
components for tackling the poppy problem.

NEUMANN