PRT/TARIN KOWT - SECURITY PROGRAMS GETTING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001669 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PTER MARR AF SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT - SECURITY PROGRAMS GETTING TRACTION IN URUZGAN PROVINCE REF: A) KABUL 1211 B) KABUL 1328 KABUL 00001669 001.10 OF 004 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Establishing GOA authority, particularly police authority, in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province is very much a work in progress. The province's two police forces are semi-reformed militias allied to rival warlords. The PRT and coalition forces are making some progress in training and mentoring them, and it appears that the March 18 arrival of a new governor (reftels) will also contribute to their professionalization. The police forces require significant reforms to regularize their status, combat corruption in the ranks, and develop effective policing tactics and coordinated strategies. One of the greatest threats to Uruzgan's security is the poppy economy, which infects all aspects of public life. As part of our effort to establish a secure environment, we must leverage available tools against poppy cultivation. We look forward to the PEP program's playing an important role in the GOA and coalition security strategy. END SUMMARY. AHP - ALLIED WITH FORMER GOVERNOR JAN MOHAMMED -------------- - ¶2. (SBU) The Afghan Highway Police (AHP) and Afghan National Police (ANP) constitute the civilian security forces in Uruzgan province (there are also two battalions of Afghan National Army forces here). The AHP are slated to have 201 personnel in Uruzgan and are charged with maintaining security along the province's major roads. The AHP are commanded by Col. Matiollah, the hard-edged cousin of former Governor Jan Mohammed Khan. Like Jan Mohammed, Matiollah is a semi-literate former militia commander and among the leaders of the Pashtun- Populzai tribe here (Uruzgan's strongest). His impulse is to deploy his men to support his tribe's interests and/or kill Taliban rather than having any strategic approach to highway security. The AHP's leadership is heavily Populzai (including about three dozen of Matiollah's kin) but lower ranks include members of several different tribes, excepting the Noorzai, who are fierce Populzai rivals here. Credible accounts indicate that Matiollah operates protection rackets, skims from the AHP's payroll, and is involved in the illegal narcotics trade. Matiollah is particularly adept as a Taliban fighter and has generally cooperated well with the PRT, regularly sending his men for Military Police Advisory Training (MPAT) and deploying them for missions in collaboration with coalition forces. For this reason we may need to support his retention as AHP Chief for the short term, in the interest of stability, but he will need to be replaced once the political situation in Uruzgan has become more stable. ANP - ROZI KHAN'S FORCE IS A COUNTERBALANCE -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Uruzgan's ANP are also a semi-laundered former militia. They are led by Rozi Khan, leader of the province's Barakzai tribe and rival to Jan KABUL 00001669 002.8 OF 004 Mohammed, Matiollah and the Populzai. Placing Rozi Khan at the head of the ANP created an effective counterweight to Jan Mohammed's autocratic tendencies, but it also ensured that the AHP and ANP could not cooperate at the senior level. Like Jan Mohammed and Matiollah, Rozi Khan is a semi-literate former Mujahadeen fighter reported to be involved in illicit money-making activities. The ANP are authorized to have 361 men in Uruzgan, but in the past Jan Mohammed maintained de facto control over nearly half of the force, at the expense of Rozi Khan's authority. With the departure of Jan Mohammed, Rozi Khan has allied himself with Governor Monib and has even begun to outline plans to reform the ANP. However, we understand that Rozi Khan will be replaced by the central government as part of upcoming police reforms - a move that we support. NECESSARY REFORMS AND THE PRT'S ROLE -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The problems of the AHP and ANP are systemic and severe: the payroll and operational budgets are uncertain and skimmed by senior officers; most men are untrained and without uniforms or equipment, the rolls are inaccurate and clogged with non-existent men, while many men who are actually working are maintained off the books -- all of which creates real confusion on the street about who is and is not a police officer. Meanwhile illiteracy, tribal loyalties, and lack of training and strategic vision at all levels prevent the forces from developing professional esprit and carrying out civilian policing activities. ¶5. (SBU) The PRT has several activities aimed at strengthening the AHP and ANP: -- MPAT. Three US Military Police (MPs) attached to the PRT provide MPAT Training to the AHP and ANP. The training is an 8-hour module for 20 students for one week covering ethics, first aid, search and arrest of suspects, and checkpoint and vehicle searches. While the training is basic, it is often the only formal training the participants have ever had. It also presents us with an opportunity to record basic biodata and to photograph each participant. To date, roughly half of the AHP and ANP police have taken the course. This course could usefully be expanded to two weeks, though more fundamental training is constrained by participants' low literacy levels. -- POLICE MENTORS. Beginning in late 2005, INL contracted two (expanded to four in March 2006) Dyncorps police mentors to provide guidance to the forces' senior leadership. These mentors are police officers from the U.S. who undergo 10 days training in the U.S. and 10 days in Kabul before deploying to the field. Hampered by logistical glitches (their radios and bodyguards only arrived in Uruzgan in March 2006, some five months late, their vehicles were redirected in order to meet security needs elsewhere and arrived only recently, and they are still without their own KABUL 00001669 003.8 OF 004 housing, meals, computers and interpreters),the mentors have been slow off the mark and have yet to become fully effective. However, the mentors have been able to provide informal support to the PRT's MPAT training program and, in the absence of their own vehicles, have taken advantage of PRT visits throughout the province to observe and engage with the AHP and ANP. The PRT has also redirected some of its planned missions to support the mentors' activities in order to make them minimally effective. As their administrative issues are resolved, the mentors will be able to provide critical high-level advice to the police and provincial leadership and -- with buy-in from a new governor and police chiefs -- guide them toward much-needed reforms. -- COORDINATION. Beyond the MPAT and mentoring programs, the PRT seeks to strengthen Uruzgan's security forces by developing a more strategic view of their operations. We facilitate regular meetings to exchange information and develop operational plans among the AHP, ANP, ANA, NDS, the coalition forces, and the governor. Governor Monib has used these efforts as a launching point to develop a coordination center that brings together the various forces and to set up checkpoints around Tarin Kowt, essentially the provincial capital's first effort at a sustained physical security presence. In order to both strengthen Afghan forces and to ensure that they are the face of operations, the PRT and coalition forces include a contingent of local forces in every operation, whether it be MED/VETCAP (revolving medical and veterinary clinics),visits to USAID reconstruction projects, or kinetic operations against insurgents. POPPY EFFORTS KEY TO LONG-TERM SUCCESS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The poppy economy in Uruzgan is ubiquitous: it infects all aspects of public life here, corrupting public officials, distracting farmers from food crops, fueling violence, and drawing significant portions of the province out of the government's sphere of authority. Thus a key element in strengthening the security sector here is to conduct effective campaigns against poppy cultivation. With GOA eradication efforts this year focused on neighboring Kandahar and Helmand provinces, we need to work closely with the governor and local actors to leverage available means -- such as PEP -- to address the burgeoning poppy threat. ¶7. (SBU) Until recently, the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) here was plagued by the same logistical glitches as the police mentor program. Miscommunication and uneven coordination with the PRT regarding housing, equipment, and security delayed the program's rollout. However, with the arrival of a new embassy PEP Advisor in March 2006, the program has gotten firmly back on track and should soon be showing results. A constructive dialogue among the PRT, the PEP Advisor, and the KABUL 00001669 004.8 OF 004 Governor has now been established, so that we can work through logistical challenges and get the PEP presence, both in downtown Tarin Kowt and their secure living quarters at the PRT, up and running. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Uruzgan is a challenging environment that teaches hard lessons. As our MPAT, police mentor, and other security programs get traction, it is imperative that they be dovetailed to provide maximum results. The timing could not be better, because a new governor and impending changes of other provincial leaders offer a clear opportunity to institute reforms and make progress across the board on issues such as registering the ANP and AHP, cleaning up their personnel and payrolls, and cultivating a closer relationship between all of Uruzgan's forces. We also look forward to the resolution of administrative problems related to the mentoring program in order to take advantage of this window of opportunity. Uruzgan needs a lot of work and a lot of help, but the alternative is a descent into greater instability that would threaten US and coalition interests here. Norland