PROGRESS ON UN 1267 SANCTIONS DELISTING REQUEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001545 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CRS, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND USUN FOR TESSLER CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016 TAGS: PTER EFIN ASEC PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: PROGRESS ON UN 1267 SANCTIONS DELISTING REQUEST REF: A) STATE 46197 B) KABUL 1341 C) KABUL 1328 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Summary: The Afghan National Security Council is preparing dossiers on the 20 individuals for whom they have requested removal from the 1267 Sanctions list. The UN Team has also requested information from CFC-A, particularly with regard to Uruzgan governor Monib, a reconciled former Taliban whom the GOA is relying on to bring order to one of Afghanistan,s unruly provinces. The Afghan side has finally come to realize the seriousness of the situation involving Monib, and is acting expeditiously (including having us fly Monib up to Kabul on April 4) to build an "ironclad" case for removal. Some information has been shared with the Monitoring Team but most is expected to be forwarded electronically within the next few days. Embassy will continue to facilitate the compilation of supporting documents and work with all parties to help bring about a positive outcome. Most importantly, the USG and the GOA cannot afford to let this case derail Monib,s vital work in Uruzgan. End summary. ¶2. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Members of the 1267 Sanctions UN Monitoring Team have spent over a week in Kabul working with the Afghan National Security Council and other key players regarding the delisting request for 20 former senior Taliban officials. Although the last member of the team departed Kabul April 4, the Afghan NSC has not yet completed its file review. It intends to send additional supporting information to the Monitoring Team electronically in a few days. Documents Promised by NSC -------------- ¶3. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) National Security Council official Daud Yakub told poloff that the NSC is preparing the following package to support its delisting request: - A cover letter from National Security Advisor Rassoul describing the reconciliation process (Program-e Tahkim-e Solh, PTS). - Detailed information for 15 of the 20 persons for whom the NSC has requested delisting. (For five individuals, extant files are insufficient.) The information will include copies of the individual,s loyalty oath, statements of acceptance from the provincial and central government and the PTS commission, and any other relevant background information gleaned from public and/or official sources. (Note: These are the documents requested in ref a. End note.) - Dr. Rassoul,s letter will request that all information remain confidential and not be shared outside the UN Security Council. ¶4. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Subsequently, within the next two weeks, the NSC also intends to submit a KABUL 00001545 002 OF 004 database with any updated information they have for the 142 Taliban 1267 listees, including their present place of residence and occupation as well as any dealings they have had with the GOA. ¶5. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) The delay in providing documentation has stemmed primarily from two reasons: 1) Nineteen of the 20 individuals in question were reconciled with the GOA before the start of the PTS program. For that reason, the PTS Commission does not have the relevant signed documents on file, so they have had to be recovered in other ways; and 2) the background files include attestations of support from named witnesses, who could be put at risk if the information becomes public. Realizing the political importance of providing as much material as possible, NSC officials are carefully redacting the files to remove only the most sensitive witness names and identifying information for their protection. UN Monitoring Team Requests -------------- ¶6. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Separately, Monitoring Team member Joseph Smith told poloff that they have found their visit frustrating but hope it will ultimately reach its goal of collecting the information needed for the UNSC to make a determination regarding the delisting request. He said the Team is hoping to get the following information for its report: - NSC materials as described above. - A non-paper from Coalition Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) assessing the security situation in Uruzgan province and the performance of Governor Monib since his arrival on March 18 (see para 8 below). (Note: Embassy and CFC-A have agreed that the fully-cleared paper would go directly to the Monitoring Team as a Coalition assessment but would also be transmitted to Washington and USUN via email.) - Any releasable information regarding Bagram Detention Facility Administrative Review Board decisions for any of the individuals who were held at Bagram, e.g. Abdul Wakil Mutawakil. (Note: Smith remarked that while Coalition detention would be considered a negative factor, a statement by the Coalition that the individual was released outright or through PTS, especially with accompanying documentary support, would turn it into a positive factor. CJTF-76 assesses than any release of information would require approval from OSD. End note.) - Embassy coordination with the National Directorate of Security (NDS) for the release of additional information. (Comment: Smith said the team met with the head of NDS, Amarullah Saleh, and was told that NDS would not contribute information to the case files. This may be a reflection of bureaucratic tension between NSC and NDS. End comment.) ¶7. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Smith noted that not all KABUL 00001545 003 OF 004 the information the Team has collected will necessarily help the individuals, cases. He said the Monitoring Team has the obligation to gather as much information as it can, and leaves it to the UNSC to evaluate the results. Documentation Regarding Governor Monib -------------- ¶8. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) As noted ref b, all participants are paying particular attention to developing documentation regarding Uruzgan Governor Abdul Hakim Monib. Smith explained the legal decision rendered by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, which was contained in a letter to UNAMA dated March ¶24. According to Smith, UNOLA determined that the UN must cease all assistance to the province of Uruzgan, with the exception of specific humanitarian projects provided through protected channels, a carve-out that is designed to be extremely limited. UN lawyers also interpret the sanctions as requiring that the provincial government should not receive any military or other assistance, advice, training, equipment, or spare parts. (Comment: Pending resolution of the case, which we are confident will result in Monib,s delisting, we are continuing to support military and humanitarian projects in Uruzgan without change. See below para 12. End comment.) ¶9. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Smith noted that if the team receives the CFC-A assessment in time, they will probably make it the centerpiece of their report. In particular, they appreciate CFC-A and Embassy concerns about potentially destabilizing this key province at a time when Monib is showing early signs of effective leadership - beginning a process of reversing the damage done by his predecessor Jan Mohammad, a former Uruzgan militia commander (ref c). ¶10. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Embassy has met with NSC officials at several levels to reiterate the importance of getting Monib delisted, and has urged the fullest possible compliance with the Monitoring Team,s requests. Yakub told poloff on Apr 3 that he wants the NSC case regarding Monib to be "ironclad." As part of this, National Security Advisor Rassoul summoned Monib to Kabul on April 4 to review his paperwork and insure that all the necessary documents have been properly signed and attested. (Note: Embassy assisted by arranging Monib,s flight to Kabul on PRT Air on short notice, escorted by PRToff and PRT interpreter. End note.) Yakub said that he expects the documents to be ready by the end of the week. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) The NSC has been slow to respond to repeated requests for information in part because it sees the UN request as an infringement on the ability of the Afghan government to make sovereign decisions regarding the best use of the pool of leadership available to it. There is also lingering resentment that the 1267 list singles out Taliban KABUL 00001545 004 OF 004 while leaving untouched former communists and others who have made life in Afghanistan miserable. Certainly President Karzai and his senior advisors are confident that the individuals on the delisting request are genuine supporters of the Afghan government and its democratic political process. Still, having finally realized the importance of this issue internationally, they are doing their best to comply, given their limited resources and capacity. Both the Afghans and the UN team, however, recognize that political elements at play make this more than a simple request for documentation. Not only does this action put pressure on the already wobbly Dutch and give an excuse for Russian posturing in New York, it also shows the weakness of Afghan institutions: for example, the NSA,s request for all information to be sent directly to the UNSC and held in confidence there stems in large part from a lack of confidence in the willingness - for political reasons - of Afghanistan,s own UN Mission to support the action. Thus, parties supporting the delisting request will need to tread carefully to bring this to a successful conclusion. ¶12. (C/NF) Comment cont,d: Regarding Monib, we pressed for many months for the removal of his predecessor, including discussions by Secretary Rice and NSC Hadley with President Karzai. Karzai worked for nine months to find the person he considered the right leader to bring Uruzgan under control. Uruzgan is one of Afghanistan,s most unruly provinces, the former home of Mullah Omar and still a Taliban stronghold. Monib,s predecessor Jan Mohammad had long been one of Afghanistan,s worst governors. Keeping Monib on the job and reversing Uruzgan,s rot is one of our highest priorities and we cannot afford to have the 1267 delisting process in New York bog down, block, or delay USG work in Uruzgan while we wait for formal delisting, which we think is fully merited. Our work on the ground is simply too important. We will therefore continue to support the new governor in winning a war. End comment. Neumann