CODEL HOEKSTRA SEES POPPY PROBLEM FIRST HAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001277 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 TAGS: SNAR PREL PGOV AF SUBJECT: CODEL HOEKSTRA SEES POPPY PROBLEM FIRST HAND Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Richard M. Norland for reasons 1.4 (B ) and (D) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: INL exposed Codel Hoekstra March 23 to the challenges facing U.S. counternarcotics policy and eradication in Afghanistan firsthand. The morning discussion between the Representatives, Embassy CN officials, CFC-A and the U.K. Embassy CN experts highlighted for the congressmen the international community's efforts to reduce poppy cultivation while maintaining support for the GOA. Representative Souder argued that our current CN efforts have been failures, and that aggressive eradication is the real solution. Comments from the U.K. representative clarified that the British are not supportive of aggressive eradication, and that U.S. and U.K. CN policy is diverging on that issue. A later discussion at PRT Lashkar Gah in Helmand province elucidated the difference. The U.K. will soon be taking command of PRT Helmand, and their advance team experts indicated British opposition to aggressive eradication to avoid a backlash in the province. An afternoon helicopter flight in the surrounding area revealed hundreds of hectares of poppy, with numerous fields in full bloom. Many fields were located within or near residential compounds, which complicates eradication efforts. End Summary. ¶2. (C/NF) In a spirited discussion with U.S. and U.K. CN experts, Embassy staff, and CFC-A and OSC-A representatives, Representative Souder argued that the international community had failed in the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan. The congressman noted that Afghan King Zahir Shah had warned him in Rome more than four years before that poppy production would be a serious problem in the post-Taliban era. He posited that an Afghan narco-state would be a greater threat to regional security than Afghan terrorism alone, and pointed to a nexus between narcotics profits and terrorist operations. Souder said we have blown efforts to solve the narcotics problem for three years, and that aggressive eradication, including aerial spraying should be seriously considered. Embassy and British officers responded that the U.S. and U.K. goals are to reduce opium production while maintaining the stability of the government. The British representative indicated that the U.K. does not conduct nor support eradication to the degree that the U.S. does. Rather, the U.K.'s CN efforts are focused on targeting opium fields, and providing intelligence on their location. Eradication can then be conducted by the U.S. trained Afghan Eradication Force (AEF). ¶3. (C/NF) At PRT Lashkar Gah, the Codel was briefed on the current eradication operations in Helmand province by the PRT Commander, the OSC-A CN Joint Coordination Center and the INL/NAS eradication advisor. Also present were members of the British advance team, to prepare for the imminent British takeover in Helmand, where opium production has skyrocketed in recent years. The U.K. targeting criteria were explained: locations of fields in early stages of growth are provided to the JCC and AEF. The British expert explained that the U.K. opposes eradication at the flowering pre-harvest stage of the poppy life cycle. The rationale is to avoid destroying harvest ready fields, where farmers have already expended months in labor and resources. The British wish to avoid a backlash in the area from farmers who have lost major investments, but accept some eradication of fields with new growth before much labor has been expended. They also indicated that they want eradication efforts to end in Helmand soon, as they transition to PRT command. (Note: Due to the governor-led nature of eradication, the AEF only began working in Helmand on March 15, and the British have suggested that eradication stop by the end of March. End Note.) ¶4. (C/NF) INL arranged an overflight by Codel Hoekstra of poppy fields near Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand province. Poppy fields were truly ubiquitous. Hundreds of large fields of poppy could be seen easily from the helicopters in varying stages of growth. Many fields were in full bloom. The fields were often in closed compounds and in the immediate proximity of homesteads. Poppy cultivation was clearly widespread and open in Helmand Province, even in the immediate vicinity of the provincial capital. ¶5. (C/NF) Comment: The helicopter flight showed the seriousness of the problem to Codel Hoekstra firsthand, and let Representative Souder see how complicated aerial spraying would be in a densely populated area where fields and homes are contiguous. The Codel took particular note of the policy nuances between the U.S. and the U.K. on eradication. NORLAND