GOA PROPOSES AUXILIARY POLICE, REQUESTS USG FUNDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001133 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016 TAGS: MARR SNAR PREL EFIN AF SUBJECT: GOA PROPOSES AUXILIARY POLICE, REQUESTS USG FUNDING REF: KABUL 1089 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Afghan Ministry of Interior has developed a plan for 9,210 &auxiliary police8 to supplement the 62,000 policemen authorized for the Afghan National Police force. It is looking for U.S. funding to support the plan, at a cost of at least USD 25 million for the first year. The Afghans argue that such a plan is necessary to face the security threat in parts of the country, and that fielding this force would avoid the formation of local militias outside the control of the central government. The request is not linked to specific concepts for employing or commanding the force nor is it coordinated with the new, and we think sounder concept, of creating regional reserve forces. We think the auxiliary policemen would be essentially untrained and open to corruption and that a financial diversion of this size would seriously damage other programs. We have already recently accelerated elements of our existing program, including the fielding of weapons and other equipment, and will see what more can be done. We will also ask the GOA for a more coordinated planning effort to meet immediate security needs. But we will say also that we have no funding for the new proposal and that we do not agree to divert the existing program in this way. The issue is likely to arise during the Strategic Partnership Talks next week. Washington needs to respond clearly along the lines above. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Embassy and CFC-A representatives attended a March 15 meeting at the NSC chaired by National Security Advisor Rasool, with Minister of Finance Ahady and Minister of Interior Zarar Moqbil attending. We had anticipated a completely different subject. The ministers briefed a plan for the creation of an &auxiliary police force8 for 84 border and vulnerable districts. The plan would recruit 9,210 contracted police, over and above the 62,000 included in the internationally agreed upon Afghan National Police (ANP) fielding plan. These auxiliary police would be locally recruited, go through 15 days of in-province training by MoI trainers, and be on a one-year contract. They would wear ANP uniforms and be paid ANP salaries (post- reform level of 5,000 afghanis per month for salary and benefits, approximately USD 100). The contract would be renewed yearly for as long as the security situation warranted. The Afghan side called the meeting in order to obtain USG agreement to pay salaries and supply vehicles (2 per district), uniforms, and possibly AK-47s (if not available through DIAG) to the auxiliary police, on an urgent basis. They estimated the total cost at USD 25 million for the first year, with sustainment costs (primarily salaries) thereafter. (Note: OSC-A has reviewed the figures and has determined that other costs associated with the program would could raise the cost to USD 31 million. End note.) We said we would take the proposal back for review and discussion. ¶3. (C) The purpose of the force as presented in this meeting would be to fill security gaps in areas where there are insufficient police, either because the ANP fielding plan is not yet complete and/or because the 62,000 figure is insufficient for Afghanistan. In particular, the GOA side cited a deterioration in security over the two years since the 62,000 figure was agreed, and said these conditions require an increased number of policemen nationwide. The intent is to keep police forces under MoI control, thus avoiding reliance on tribal militias. In response to questions about using regular ANP instead of the auxiliary police, they said the fielding plan was too slow to meet the immediate need in many areas and they were concerned about losing the support of the people in many of these districts due to a lack of government presence. They said that as more regular ANP complete their training and receive equipment, the auxiliary force could be stood down. (Comment: The 62,000 figure may be worth reviewing (see next para). However in many areas ANP presence is insufficient not because of the fielding plan but because &ghost8 personnel remain on the books as a way for corrupt police chiefs to line their own pockets. Ongoing MoI reform is intended to clean up this abuse and increase the number of policemen actually present in the districts. Adding temporary policemen hired directly by police chiefs is not the right way to solve it. End comment.) ¶4. (C) In discussing the 62,000-person ANP force, the GOA reps noted that this was the ceiling agreed upon by the donor nations and included in the recent Afghanistan Compact security annex. Minister Ahadi said he would much prefer it if the ceiling on the regular ANP were lifted, so that the police could be funded out of the regular budget, but that since that seems not to be possible, this is a &creative way8 of meeting the pressing security need. (Comment: It might be worthwhile revisiting the 62,000 ceiling, but the present fielding plan for the ANP needs to be completed before any additional assessment of security needs be undertaking. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Although poloff raised the current plan and ongoing efforts for the establishment of regional police commands and rapid reaction forces (reftel) to fill the ANP security gaps rather than raising an auxiliary police., The GOA side did not focus on the question. They appeared to hold the position that this auxiliary force is the only way to meet their short-term security need. ¶6. (C) Dr Rassoul said that the international community ) particularly the Germans - had not yet been briefed on the plan, but that such a briefing, perhaps led by President Karzai, would be the next step once the funding mechanism had been worked out. Minister Ahadi stressed the importance of improving security and suggested that some U.S. funds should be shifted from other objectives to cover this cost. Acknowledging that the U.S. might not be able (or willing) to meet the request, he implied that the GOA might look at its own budget to see if it could support the plan by reallocating GOA resources. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) While we appreciate the Afghan government,s urgency regarding security, there appears to be an element of panic in this proposal. We are investing massive resources into rapidly training and equipping the ANP, and as noted reftel we have developed a new plan to help counter the immediate security situation. We have also significantly accelerated the timeline for equipping the ANP. We will take another look at our planning to see if there is more we can do in this regard and whether we can further speed up what we are doing. ¶8. (C) What we should not do is divert resources from the well-designed program for the ANP by offering to pay and equip over 9,000 poorly trained, minimally accountable auxiliary policemen. Under the MoI proposal, these auxiliary police would be hired by provincial police chiefs, many of whom are tainted with corruption, and they would not have the kind of training or background needed to provide real protection against insurgents, narco- traffickers, or organized crime. Indeed, it is likely these efforts would hamper ongoing police reform initiatives. If there were money to undertake both the long term training and temporary fielding of tribal auxiliaries there might be merit in doing both. But such funds do not exist. Moreover, delivery timelines for weapons, vehicle, and communications have already been accelerated and there is no additional equipment in the pipeline that could be distributed on short notice. We also believe that in order for any police reform to succeed, leadership changes must be implemented first. Thus, it is far more important to continue focusing our efforts at reforming the Ministry of Interior and fielding and properly equipping relatively well-trained professional border and uniformed policemen than to be distracted into supporting an essentially untrained auxiliary force. ¶9. (C) We anticipate that this issue will be raised during the Strategic Partnership Talks scheduled for March 20-21. We urge Washington to make clear that the USG does not have funds available for this purpose and that a better approach is to work harder on replacing corrupt and ineffective police chiefs and speeding the creation of better trained forces under the current program. End Comment. NEUMANN