PRT/TARIN KOWT: SUICIDE BOMB TARGET UNCLEAR; PRT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000107 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV AF SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT: SUICIDE BOMB TARGET UNCLEAR; PRT EVALUATES COURSE OF ACTION Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY TOWNSWICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Contrary to media reports, the January 5 suicide bombing in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan, did not take place in proximity to Ambassador Neumann and was probably intended as an attack on senior police officials ) although the actual motive is not yet known. A final casualty count of approximately 15 dead and 50 wounded, all Afghans, make this one of the bloodiest attacks of this kind in Afghanistan. PRT medical staff acted quickly and efficiently in treating the victims. ANA and PRT personnel, including poloff, later visited the hospital to assist the families of the wounded and talk with them about the attack. The PRT will also convene a provincial security meeting on Monday, January 9, to discuss future actions. End summary. Suicide Attack at Local Dog Fight -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On January 5, Tarin Kowt suffered its first suicide attack of the war. A suicide bomber attacked a crowd of spectators gathered to watch a traditional Thursday dog fight behind the local headquarters of the Afghan Highway Police. The bomber evidently mingled amongst the crowd before approaching the rear of the AHP HQ building where a number of senior AHP Officers (including the AHP Commander Matullah and the Tarin Kowt Municipal ANP Commander Haji Ali Ahmad) were seated on the roof to observe the dog fight. The bomber became entangled in the concertina wire surrounding the building and detonated himself at that time. It is not clear what or who was the intended target: the crowd, the AHP HQ. the AHP Commander, or even the visiting U.S. Ambassador -- the road in front of the AHP building had been used by the Ambassador,s motorcade to move to Tarin Kowt proper about a half-hour earlier. The Ambassador, who at the time was on the other side of Tarin Kowt visiting with local officials, was never in danger. After an initial assessment, he continued with his program by traveling to a meeting at the Governor,s Compound (an identified in-town safe area for the PRT). Mass Casualty Response -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Back at the PRT, a Mass Casualty (MASCAL) event was initiated as wounded from the attack were brought to the installation by local Afghans. Following a pre-arranged SOP, PRT medical personnel supported a U.S. Forward Surgical Team (FST) in triaging and caring for the wounded. The FST treated a total of 24 patients, of whom three died, nine were evacuated by air to Kandahar Air Field, eight were evacuated to Tarin Kowt Hospital, and two were treated and released. Total number of casualties and fatalities at the site of the attack and at Tarin Kowt Hospital are unclear. However, discussions with TK Hospital personnel and AHP officers indicate that 15 dead and 50 wounded are probably fair estimates. ¶4. (SBU) Poloff, Civil Affairs, and ANA visited the Tarin Kowt hospital with humanitarian assistance for the victims and their families. PRT personnel discussed medical events with hospital officials while the ANA distributed food, cooking oil, blankets, radios, and government material as well as candy and toys for the children. The ANA commander spoke with families and hospital employees imploring them to reach out within their communities to current or potential Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) members, asking them to come and talk with the government to reconcile because such attacks served no one. Failing that, the ANA officer requested that citizens give information to the GOA that could lead to the capture and arrest of ACM members. Provincial Security Meeting to be Convened -------------- ¶5. (SBU) On Monday, January 9, following the traditional three days of mourning, the PRT will convene a provincial security meeting to discuss the attack and the near- and long-term response to the attack. The PRT hopes that progress will be made in determining the origin of the attacker, his method of travel to Tarin Kowt, his contacts, and how the province will adapt to this new tactic. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) The use of a suicide attack is a disturbing escalation for the ACM in Uruzgan province. Critical to understanding the full import of this event will be determining: (1) the reaction of the local populace; and (2) whether the attacker was a local or an outsider. Thus far in Uruzgan, as well as in much of the country, the ACM have been reluctant to resort to suicide attacks. Hopefully, as the full story of this attack becomes clear - that it was not/not an attack on the U.S. but rather an assassination attempt on a local commander that killed and wounded dozens of Afghans * there will be a local backlash. Key to harnessing this potential reaction will be challenging the egregiously incorrect media reporting on this event. NEUMANN