Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JERUSALEM820
2006-02-28 08:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:  

AKRAM HANIYYAH: HAMAS GOVERNMENT IS TEST CASE FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPAL IS 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJM #0820 0590831
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 280831Z FEB 06
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0592
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000820 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS
SUBJECT: AKRAM HANIYYAH: HAMAS GOVERNMENT IS TEST CASE FOR
MIDDLE EAST


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000820 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS SUBJECT: AKRAM HANIYYAH: HAMAS GOVERNMENT IS TEST CASE FOR MIDDLE EAST Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: Akram Haniyyeh, a key adviser to President Abbas and the publisher of Palestinian daily "Al Ayyam," told visiting NEA A/S Welch that Hamas, takeover of the Palestinian Authority would mark the first time a Sunni Islamist movement assumed the reins of government; its success or failure would have consequences beyond Palestine. Haniyyeh predicted Hamas would fail, due to lack of experience and funds. The U.S. should tailor its policies to ensure that Palestinians don't blame the U.S. for Hamas' failure. USG officials should emphasize continuing U.S. desire to support the Palestinian people, then explain why engaging a Hamas-controlled PA is not possible. On government formation, Haniyyeh said Hamas would probably wait until after the March 28 Israeli elections to announce a new PA cabinet; it would use this time to develop a response to President Abbas, letter, to court Fatah and independents, and to soften international resistance to engaging with a Hamas-led PA. End summary. ¶2. (C) Hanniyeh met with A/S Welch, the Consul General, USSC Gen. Dayton, NEA Special Adviser Helal, and DPO in his "Al Ayyam" office in Ramallah February 25. ¶3. (C) Characterizing Hamas as part of a broader Sunni Islamist movement, Haniyyeh said that this would be the first time such a movement took over the reins of government. The Holy Land would thus become the battleground between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand, and the forces of liberalism and secularism represented locally by Fatah on the other. The outcome would have consequences for not only Palestine, but also for the region and beyond. He predicted that Hamas would not announce a cabinet until after the Israeli elections scheduled for March 28. It would use the time to develop a response to President Abbas, February 18 letter (tasking Isma,il Haniyyeh -- no relation to Akram -- with forming a government),court Fatah and independents to join the cabinet (Hamas, PLC bloc leader, Mahmud Zahar, was conducting these talks, not Hanniyeh),and seek to soften the international/Quartet position on engaging a Hamas-led PA. Fatah would be unlikely to join, because its stipulated conditions -- i.e., support Abbas, line on a two-state solution and non-violence -- would be unacceptable to Hamas. Still, there were voices among civil society leaders and businessmen calling on Fatah to join a unity cabinet. Haniyyeh surmised they feared a purely Hamas-run PA, and sought Fatah,s inclusion as a "buffer." ¶4. (C) Haniyyeh expressed confidence that Hamas would fail at running the PA, due to lack of funds and experience in running a government. He added, however, that this process could take 6-12 months to play out. The public had high expectations, yet the Hamas ideology -- "Islam is the solution" -- had yet to be tested and would be found to be wanting. Hamas would face severe challenges on the budget and in dealing with its unemployed and armed militias. Its leaders would be corrupted by power; already, Palestinian journalists were joking about a "peaceful transition of Mercedes Benz" cars from the old PLC speaker to the new one, and Hamas leader Mahmud Zahar had reportedly developed an unpuritanical taste for 5-star hotels in Amman. Another weakening factor: Hamas was internally divided over policy issues, between its internal and external leadership, and between Gazans and West Bankers. ¶5. (C) It should be clear to Palestinians that Hamas, failure is of its own making, and not the result of a U.S.-Israeli or U.S.-Fatah effort to undermine a democratically selected government. "Let Hamas fail on its own agenda; don,t let it play the victim." USG officials in public statements should therefore underscore that the U.S. applauds the Palestinian elections, respects the choice of the people, will continue to support the people, and, then, explain why it cannot engage with a PA led by Hamas. This message would be understood by the public, he said, adding that the Secretary,s recent statement (during a congressional hearing) that she would seek to re-direct U.S. assistance to UNRWA was very favorably viewed among Palestinians. Haniyyeh also advised the U.S. to support President Abbas and his office, as well as pro-reform elements in Fatah. Fatah would soon embark on a serious reform effort; the Revolutionary Council would meet March 4. ¶6. (C) A/S Welch cleared this cable. WALLES

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