Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JERUSALEM820
2006-02-28 08:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:  

AKRAM HANIYYAH: HAMAS GOVERNMENT IS TEST CASE FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPAL IS 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJM #0820 0590831
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 280831Z FEB 06
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0592
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000820 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS
SUBJECT: AKRAM HANIYYAH: HAMAS GOVERNMENT IS TEST CASE FOR
MIDDLE EAST


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000820

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS
SUBJECT: AKRAM HANIYYAH: HAMAS GOVERNMENT IS TEST CASE FOR
MIDDLE EAST


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Summary: Akram Haniyyeh, a key adviser to President
Abbas and the publisher of Palestinian daily "Al Ayyam," told
visiting NEA A/S Welch that Hamas, takeover of the
Palestinian Authority would mark the first time a Sunni
Islamist movement assumed the reins of government; its
success or failure would have consequences beyond Palestine.
Haniyyeh predicted Hamas would fail, due to lack of
experience and funds. The U.S. should tailor its policies to
ensure that Palestinians don't blame the U.S. for Hamas'
failure. USG officials should emphasize continuing U.S.
desire to support the Palestinian people, then explain why
engaging a Hamas-controlled PA is not possible. On
government formation, Haniyyeh said Hamas would probably wait
until after the March 28 Israeli elections to announce a new
PA cabinet; it would use this time to develop a response to
President Abbas, letter, to court Fatah and independents,
and to soften international resistance to engaging with a
Hamas-led PA. End summary.


2. (C) Hanniyeh met with A/S Welch, the Consul General, USSC
Gen. Dayton, NEA Special Adviser Helal, and DPO in his "Al
Ayyam" office in Ramallah February 25.


3. (C) Characterizing Hamas as part of a broader Sunni
Islamist movement, Haniyyeh said that this would be the first
time such a movement took over the reins of government. The
Holy Land would thus become the battleground between Hamas
and the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand, and the forces of
liberalism and secularism represented locally by Fatah on the
other. The outcome would have consequences for not only
Palestine, but also for the region and beyond. He predicted
that Hamas would not announce a cabinet until after the
Israeli elections scheduled for March 28. It would use the
time to develop a response to President Abbas, February 18
letter (tasking Isma,il Haniyyeh -- no relation to Akram --
with forming a government),court Fatah and independents to
join the cabinet (Hamas, PLC bloc leader, Mahmud Zahar, was
conducting these talks, not Hanniyeh),and seek to soften the
international/Quartet position on engaging a Hamas-led PA.
Fatah would be unlikely to join, because its stipulated
conditions -- i.e., support Abbas, line on a two-state
solution and non-violence -- would be unacceptable to Hamas.
Still, there were voices among civil society leaders and
businessmen calling on Fatah to join a unity cabinet.
Haniyyeh surmised they feared a purely Hamas-run PA, and
sought Fatah,s inclusion as a "buffer."


4. (C) Haniyyeh expressed confidence that Hamas would fail at
running the PA, due to lack of funds and experience in
running a government. He added, however, that this process
could take 6-12 months to play out. The public had high
expectations, yet the Hamas ideology -- "Islam is the
solution" -- had yet to be tested and would be found to be
wanting. Hamas would face severe challenges on the budget
and in dealing with its unemployed and armed militias. Its
leaders would be corrupted by power; already, Palestinian
journalists were joking about a "peaceful transition of
Mercedes Benz" cars from the old PLC speaker to the new one,
and Hamas leader Mahmud Zahar had reportedly developed an
unpuritanical taste for 5-star hotels in Amman. Another
weakening factor: Hamas was internally divided over policy
issues, between its internal and external leadership, and
between Gazans and West Bankers.


5. (C) It should be clear to Palestinians that Hamas,
failure is of its own making, and not the result of a
U.S.-Israeli or U.S.-Fatah effort to undermine a
democratically selected government. "Let Hamas fail on its
own agenda; don,t let it play the victim." USG officials in
public statements should therefore underscore that the U.S.
applauds the Palestinian elections, respects the choice of
the people, will continue to support the people, and, then,
explain why it cannot engage with a PA led by Hamas. This
message would be understood by the public, he said, adding
that the Secretary,s recent statement (during a
congressional hearing) that she would seek to re-direct U.S.
assistance to UNRWA was very favorably viewed among
Palestinians. Haniyyeh also advised the U.S. to support
President Abbas and his office, as well as pro-reform
elements in Fatah. Fatah would soon embark on a serious
reform effort; the Revolutionary Council would meet March 4.


6. (C) A/S Welch cleared this cable.

WALLES