EREKAT URGING ABU MAZEN TO TAKE TOUGH STAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000795 SIPDIS SIPDIS OPS CENTER - PASS TO S PARTY, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG PBTS IS KPAL KDEM SUBJECT: EREKAT URGING ABU MAZEN TO TAKE TOUGH STAND TOWARDS HAMAS Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. During a February 22 meeting with NEA DAS Dibble and the Consul General, PLO Chief Negotiator Dr. Sa'eb Erekat said that he had urged Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to stand firm against Hamas. Erekat, who speculated that Hamas could announce the formation of the government as early as the week of February 27, said that he would also advise Abu Mazen to "fire" Hanniyah without delay if Hamas failed to live up to the terms outlined in Abu Mazen's February 18 PLC speech. Erekat feared an emasculated PA presidency, with Abu Mazen undermined simultaneously by an empowered Hamas and Israeli determination to proceed with "unilateral" measures. Regarding the status of the USG request for the return of the USD 50 million of U.S. assistance, Erekat said that he understood the importance of the issue and had conveyed those sentiments to Abu Mazen. Erekat agreed that Abu Mazen needed to explain his intentions during the upcoming visit of the NEA Assistant Secretary. End summary. Erekat Urging Tough Stand by Abu Mazen -------------- ¶2. (C) PLO Chief Negotiator Dr. Sa'eb Erekat described to DAS Dibble and the Consul General the contents of the February 21 letter Abu Mazen delivered to Hamas PM-designate Isma'il Hanniyah: -- Recognition of a two-state solution. -- Agreement with the terms of the Quartet Roadmap. -- Acceptance of "one gun, one authority." Erekat said that the letter requested that Hanniyah form the next Palestinian Government on the basis of these terms. While Hanniyah reportedly told Abu Mazen that Hamas would study the contents of the letter, Erekat thought that Hamas would likely offer an alternative program to the one outlined by Abu Mazen. ¶3. (C) Erekat speculated that Hamas would require less than three weeks to form the cabinet, and suggested that an announcement on the formation of the government could come as soon as the week of February 27. Forming the cabinet would not be difficult, Erekat said, asserting that reports of Hamas interest in establishing a National Unity Government were a public relations ploy rather than an indicator of Hamas intentions. Erekat stated that Fatah would refuse to join a Hamas-led government, but noted the possibility of some individual defections within the faction. Salam Fayyad would not join the government, but Mustafa Barghouthi might. Erekat said that independents like Gaza PLC member Ziad Abu Amr, who won a PLC seat with support from Hamas, were likely selections for the next cabinet. While downplaying prospects of Fatah participation, Erekat noted that the head of the Fatah bloc in the PLC, Azzam al-Ahmad, was meeting with Hamas officials in Gaza to discuss the possibility of forming a joint Hamas-Fatah cabinet. Erekat said that he told al-Ahmad to request from Hamas a written document outlining its political program. (Note: Al-Ahmad met Gaza Hamas leader Mahmud al-Zahar on February 22. According to Palestinian media reports, al-Ahmad said that Fatah would consider joining a coalition government provided that Hamas agreed to the political principles of Fatah and the PLO. Al-Ahmad indicated that a final decision to join the government would be made by the Fatah leadership. End note.) ¶4. (C) Erekat said the West should consider Hamas part of the larger context of Islamic movements in the region. He said that he would advise Abu Mazen to maintain a firm stand, and if necessary, immediately "fire" Hanniyah, on the basis of Article 45 of the Palestinian Basic Law if Hamas failed to adhere to Abu Mazen's political program. (Note: Article 45 states that "the President shall have the right to remove him (the Prime Minister),and to accept his resignation." The Law does not specify justifications for the PM's removal from office. End note.) Erekat suggested that an immediate showdown with Hamas was preferable to a drawn-out situation that would only weaken Abu Mazen further. Israel, Hamas Tying Abu Mazen's Hands -------------- ¶5. (C) Erekat said that Israel's predilection toward "unilateral" steps while maintaining limited contact with the PA would ultimately play into Hamas' hands. While there is some contact with the Israelis on economic and security issues, Erekat said that there were no active political talks between the PA and the senior Israeli leadership. Erekat reported that he was unsuccessful in arranging a meeting between Abu Mazen and Shimon Peres in Amman. He surmised that Israel was in search of a Palestinian "non-partner," who would accept Israeli unilateral measures. Hamas would also prefer this situation as it placed minimal pressure on the movement to recognize Israel and required limited contact with Israel on quality-of-life issues such as Palestinian access to basic services, including water and electricity. Hamas had also shown its capacity to overcome prior challenges and would likely display adeptness in circumventing roadblocks put in place by Israel and the West. Erekat labeled the future relationship between Israel and Hamas as a "marriage of convenience," noting that recent IDF operations in the northern West Bank and Gaza focused primarily on Fatah militants. Meanwhile, Hamas had generally remained silent in the wake of these Israeli measures. ¶6. (C) Erekat said that the current situation had deflated Abu Mazen's spirits. Nevertheless, Abu Mazen was not considering resigning from the PA presidency, partly to avoid a political vacuum that would place Hamas PLC Speaker Abdul Aziz Dweik as interim President for up to 60 days until new elections were held. Instead, Abu Mazen was banking on the resumption of permanent status negotiations with Israel to avoid political isolation. Erekat said that he had tried to dampen Abu Mazen's hopes for the resumption of these talks, especially as there appeared little interest from Israel. Erekat opined that Abu Mazen's challenge in the coming period would be to maintain credibility; otherwise, he faced the prospects of the PA presidency becoming more of a figure-head position. Erekat: "Abu Mazen Seeking Reassurance From USG" -------------- ¶7. (C) The Consul General noted that Abu Mazen was facing a problem with the USG for failing to respond expeditiously to the requested return of USD 50 million in U.S. assistance. Negotiations with PA presidential advisor Muhammad Mustafa had faltered due to Mustafa's seeming attempts to drag out the process. Erekat agreed that the issue was serious and indicated that he had conveyed those sentiments to Abu Mazen. Despite this problem, Erekat said that the USG should carefully consider the sort of message it wanted to convey to Abu Mazen during the upcoming visit of the NEA Assistant Secretary. Abu Mazen felt abandoned, said Erekat, not only SIPDIS by Israel, but also by the U.S. and his Fatah colleagues. The Consul General responded that Abu Mazen must provide a clear description of what he intends to do on the political, economic, and security front once a new Hamas-led government comes to power. DAS Dibble noted that Abu Mazen would have to tell us where he is going if he wants us to support him. Erekat agreed to pass the message to Abu Mazen. WALLES