MUSTAFA BARGHOUTHI ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000693

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG PBTS IS KPAL KDEM
SUBJECT: MUSTAFA BARGHOUTHI ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During a February 14 meeting in Ramallah
with the Consul General, Palestinian Legislative Council
(PLC)-elect member Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi denied reports
emanating from Hamas sources that he or other individuals
from his faction, "Independent Palestine", were engaged in
negotiations over their possible inclusion in a Hamas-led
government. Barghouthi suggested that Hamas was nonetheless
determined to include Fatah and other factions in its
cabinet, adding that he would consider joining if certain
conditions were met. He cautioned that a strategy by Israel
or the international community aimed at undermining a
Hamas-led government could backfire, inflame the Palestinian
public, and actually undercut Fatah's prospects in any
follow-on elections. On the January 25 elections, Barghouthi
said that he had anticipated a stronger result for his
faction, but that intense polarization toward Hamas and Fatah
among Palestinians in the final days led to more modest
results for "Independent Palestine" and Salam Fayyad's "Third
Way". End summary.

Barghouthi Denies
Talking to Hamas
--------------


2. (C) PLC-elect member Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi February 14
denied that he or other individuals associated with his
party, "Independent Palestine", were engaged in negotiations
with Hamas over their possible inclusion in the next
Palestinian cabinet. Barghouthi described Hamas statements
to the media in this regard as "inaccurate and confusing."


3. (C) Barghouthi expected that Hamas would seek to
conclude the government formation process within the three
weeks provided under the Basic Law. He suggested that Hamas
would initially seek to form an alliance with Fatah, and that
Fatah's Old Guard leadership might consider joining a
government if it could ensure its hold on power. Hamas may
balk at the inclusion of the Fatah Old Guard, however, since
it had based its election campaign on the elimination of the
corruption brought about by the old regime. Barghouthi
indicated that his faction, "Independent Palestine", might
consider joining a National Unity Government if the
government platform advocated a clear political and social
agenda suitable to Barghouthi's faction. Barghouthi added
that his faction's position had thus far been to remain
independent of Fatah and Hamas. (Comment: Barghouthi's
penchant for political opportunism increases the likelihood
that he would jump at the chance to take a prominent role in
the next cabinet. End comment.) If a unity government with
Fatah couldn't be agreed on, Barghouthi thought Hamas would
try to form a technocratic government, but one that was under
its control.

Abu Mazen Staying
The Course
--------------


4. (C) Barghouthi acknowledged that Abu Mazen would face a
tough road ahead with a Hamas-led government. It was
therefore incumbent on Abu Mazen to elevate the influence and
stature of the PLO as much as possible and simultaneously
incorporate as many Palestinian factions as possible within
its governing structures. Despite the challenges ahead,
Barghouthi said that Abu Mazen had shown greater
determination and decisiveness in recent weeks, and noted
that Abu Mazen would need to consolidate his authority in the
shortest time possible.

Barghouthi: "Don't Count
on Hamas Failure"
--------------


5. (C) Barghouthi said that some elements in Fatah were
advocating a strategy of isolating Hamas once the next
government is formed, in the belief that it would quickly
fail and Abu Mazen would then call for new legislative
elections. He labeled this strategy "dangerous," because it
would not ensure a Fatah victory. The Palestinian public
could also perceive such a Fatah strategy as a
U.S./Israeli-backed plot to undermine a popularly-supported
Hamas government and lead to even greater public sympathy for
Hamas. Barghouthi said that Hamas was already responding to
this possible scenario by reaching out to the Europeans and
Russians and Arab countries in an effort stave off
international isolation. Barghouthi argued that an
alternative to isolating Hamas would be to strengthen the
democratic opposition forces inside the PLC, but he admitted
that such a strategy would take time to develop.

Barghouthi Surprised by
Election Results
--------------


6. (C) Barghouthi said that final election results from
the January 25 PLC elections were not reflective of the
pre-election polling, which had suggested that "Independent
Palestine" would receive between eight to 10 seats in the PLC
(Note: It received two seats in the upcoming PLC, including
the one for Barghouthi. End note.) He suggested that the
discrepancy between the pre-election polling and the actual
results stemmed from a severe polarization which occurred in
the final days before the elections that pushed voters toward
Fatah and Hamas at the expense of Barghouthi's party and
Salam Fayyad's "Third Way". Barghouthi suggested that fewer
people would have voted for Hamas if they had known the
result would be so favorable to Hamas. (Comment: Barghouthi
failed to mention the negative impact of independent Fatah
candidates on the voting results in the district races.
While Fatah won the popular vote in half of the 16 districts,
in only three of the districts did Fatah win the most
legislative seats, due to the dilution in voting strength
caused by the high number of Fatah-affiliated candidates.
End comment.) Barghouthi added that Hamas ran a superior
campaign compared to Fatah and attributed the Hamas victory
on Election Day to the failure of the peace process and the
inability of Fatah to deliver to Palestinians.

WALLES