Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JERUSALEM581
2006-02-08 14:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:  

ABU MAZEN'S OFFICE STRATEGIZING FOR HAMAS-LED

Tags:  ASEC IS KDEM KPAL KWBG PBTS PGOV PREL 
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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0232
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6227
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0425
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3121
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2890
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0928
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0054
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000581 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: ASEC IS KDEM KPAL KWBG PBTS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: ABU MAZEN'S OFFICE STRATEGIZING FOR HAMAS-LED
GOVERNMENT


C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000581 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 TAGS: ASEC IS KDEM KPAL KWBG PBTS PGOV PREL SUBJECT: ABU MAZEN'S OFFICE STRATEGIZING FOR HAMAS-LED GOVERNMENT ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential Advisor Ghaith al-Omari told Consul General February 7 that his office is working to formulate a response to HAMAS's victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. Al-Omari said the PA is considering a number of ideas to strengthen presidential control over security and other governmental functions and preparing a major speech by Abu Mazen to the PLC that will address key post election issues. Al-Omari argued that "too quick" a collapse of the HAMAS-led government would give the movement political cover for its failings, empower hardline elements within HAMAS and deny Fatah needed time to rebuild in preparation for new elections. Al-Omari said better advanced coordination is needed before the next high-level visit by USG officials and that Abu Mazen will seek specifics on how the USG plans to support him. END SUMMARY -------------- Abu Mazen Speech will Address Key Post-Election Issues -------------- ¶2. (C) Al-Omari reported that Abu Mazen's office is preparing a major policy address to the new PLC. While some people in the President's office are pushing for a "nothing speech," he -- along with PLO Executive Committee member Yasir 'Abd Rabbo -- is advocating for a strong speech that would reaffirm the necessity of continued compliance to international commitments, delineate presidential and legislative powers, and set Abu Mazen's political agenda in line with what was "clearly a vote for change." The Consul General responded that the international community and the USG, as well as the Palestinian people, would be looking for a strong message from Abu Mazen and signs that he intends to show decisive leadership in the wake of the elections. -------------- PASF Control -------------- ¶3. (C) Al-Omari said that the Fatah leadership is looking into ways to strengthen the President's office, but that Abu Mazen could not afford to do anything that contradicted the PA Basic Law. That said, al-Omari opined that Abu Mazen needed to exercise direct control over all the security forces. Al-Omari noted that the responsibilities of the Civil Police were essentially limited to "directing traffic" and the National Security Force (NSF) was overstaffed and "basica
lly worthless anyhow." Abu Mazen should concentrate his efforts on making sure the "strong people" report directly to him. (NOTE: The future of the Preventive Security Organization (PSO) is a key issue to be resolved. END NOTE) ¶4. (C) In regard to the Palestinian National Security Council (NSC),al-Omari said the President should appoint security chiefs to the NSC to balance the influence of the ministerial members who are likely to be affiliated with HAMAS. (NOTE: The presidential decree establishing the NSC specifies that the Prime Minister, Interior Minister and Finance Minister are all NSC members. END NOTE) Al-Omari said a NSC with the right composition could function as a parallel Interior Ministry, ensure the PASF serve the interests of the President, and bring HAMAS into security decision-making but in a minority role. He dismissed rumors that Abu Mazen had decided to appoint Interior Minister Nasir Yusif as an empowered Presidential Security Chief commenting, "Nasir Yusif is pushing Nasir Yusif." Al-Omari cautioned that Abu Mazen's decision on this issue would likely depend heavily on the USG view. ¶5. (C) Al-Omari added that Abu Mazen is considering other measures to strengthen the role of President's office, such as creating departments to oversee programming and implementation of the President's orders within each of the ministries. The departments would have oversight functions rather than deliver actual services. He added that it was difficult to get Abu Mazen to make a decision on any of these issues because of the "dysfunctional" authority relationships in the President's office saying, "Every day there is a new special advisor of some sort." -------------- The One-Year Plan -------------- ¶6. (C) Al-Omari urged caution on USG efforts to isolate the HAMAS-led government, arguing that if HAMAS failed too rapidly it would strengthen the most extreme elements in the movement and give HAMAS a political excuse for its failure. Furthermore, Fatah needs time to rebuild and prepare for new elections. For these reasons, he said thinking in Abu Mazen's office on a timeframe for HAMAS failure leaned more to the "one year range." ¶7. (C) Consul General asked where Abu Mazen's office expected funding to come from. Al-Omari appeared perplexed by the issue, saying "perhaps the Arab states," adding that the Europeans were "eager to find a way to continue funding" the PA. Consul General replied that any European funding for the HAMAS-led government would have negative repercussions because it implied European recognition of HAMAS. Consul General urged a more realistic look at the PA's dire financial straits, saying funding to the PA will dry up the moment the USG "stops picking up the phone" to rally support for the PA. Consul General commented that al-Omari's suggested timeframe put the international community in the politically awkward position of finding a way to "bankroll the bad guys, without recognizing them, until the good guys are ready for elections." -------------- Better Preparation Needed for Next High-level Visit -------------- ¶8. (C) Al-Omari described Abu Mazen as frustrated after his last meeting with A/S Welch and DAPNSA Abrams saying better advanced coordination is needed before the next high-level meeting. He suggested a working-level meeting with Abu Mazen's representatives at the start of the next visit, so the President's office has more time to prepare substantive responses to USG areas of concern. Al-Omari suggested the USG needs to have a clear message on what type of support it is prepared to give Abu Mazen, rather than merely providing "free advice." WALLES

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