NABIL AMR ON REFERENDUM, ABU MAZEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 002509

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/LOGERFO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG KPAL KDEM IS
SUBJECT: NABIL AMR ON REFERENDUM, ABU MAZEN


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During a June 14 meeting in Ramallah with
the Consul General, presidential media advisor Nabil Amr said
that Abu Mazen was correct to proceed with the national
referendum -- despite Amr's own objections to the prisoners'
initiative -- in order to force the demise of the Hamas-led
PA. Amr predicted that Palestinians in general, and Fatah in
particular, would rally behind Abu Mazen. Amr warned that
Hamas may resort to violence, particularly in Gaza, to
scuttle the referendum. Amr said an infusion of money is
needed to build up Abu Mazen's presidential office. End
summary.

Abu Mazen
--------------


2. (C) Amr applauded Abu Mazen's efforts to force a
political change through the holding of the national
referendum. In doing so, Abu Mazen has raised Palestinian
hopes that he will brin about an end to the international
isolation of he Hamas-led PA. Despite Hamas objections and
vrbal attacks on the referendum, Palestinians are gnerally
supportive of the president, Amr said. ven Fatah officials,
who were initially skepticalof the referendum, had begun to
view it as a vehcle to end the political isolation. Amr
emphasied that importance of rallying support, especially
from Fatah, for Abu Mazen. Amr described to the Consul
General several measures that are under consideration for
promoting the referendum. As the president's media advisor,
Amr said that he planned to coordinate the media outreach and
work closely with a special committee, consisting of Fatah
and other faction representatives, to promote the risoners'
initiative.


3. (C) Amr said thatAbu Mazen's recent meetings with PM
Isma'il Haniyah and other factions are intended to reduce
neative reaction to the referendum. He did not expet Hamas
to back away from its opposition to the pisoners' initiative
and held out little hope tha the two sides would bridge
their differences. mr admitted that he hoped Hamas would
never agre to the initiative. Amr warned that ongoing
Isreli military operations in Gaza play directly into he
hands of Hamas, which Hamas would use to justfy its policies.

Referendum Violence
--------------


4. (C) Amr said Hamas could attemt to prevent the
referendum through violence. Hmas could succeed in
scuttling the vote in Gaza, but would face a more difficult
challenge in the est Bank where Hamas has less influence.
Amr arged that if Hamas violence scuttled the referendum,it
would strengthen Abu Mazen's case to press fo new
legislative elections. Once the referendum passes, Amr
thought that Abu would proceed with frming a temporary
emergency government. The govrnment would include four or
five ministers apponted by Abu Mazen. Hamas would then be
given anopportunity to accept Abu Mazen's political program,
which Hamas would refuse to do. Amr expected a political
standoff to last for several months.

Abu Mazen's Presidential Office
--------------


5. (C) Amr indicated that Abu Mazen's presidential office
is undergoing significant changes. However, the office
remains under-funded, placing constraints on Abu Mazen's
ability to operate effectively. The office needs an infusion
of funds, especially in the run-up to the referendum and if
new elections are held.

TIM Near Completion
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6. (C) The Consul General informed Amr that the Temporary
International Mechanism (TIM) for humanitarian assistance is
nearing completion. The TIM will help alleviate the
immediate economic crisis. The announcement will be
coordinated with Abu Mazen to ensure that he receives maximum
credit.

WALLES