KARNI CROSSING ATTACK: INTRA-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT?

S E C R E T JERUSALEM 001704 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/LOGERFO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2026 TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG SUBJECT: KARNI CROSSING ATTACK: INTRA-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT? REF: A. USDAO TEL AVIV IS 261608Z APR 06 IIR 6 849 0340 06/MID-DAY KARNI CROSSING ATTACK ¶B. JERUSALEM 1622 Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) The April 26 attack on the Karni crossing (details ref (a)) appears to have been the work of the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC),according to PA security sources and an April 26 conversation between Consul General and Fatah PLC member Mohammed Dahlan. The PRC has officially denied any involvement. Unlike the attacks the same day against the MFO in the Sinai, the Karni attack was apparently not a suicide mission, and the attackers reportedly intended to detonate the explosives in the vehicle by remote means once the bombs were in the proper position. There were three Preventive Security Organization (PSO) officers injured in the attack, but no fatalities among the attackers or on the Israeli side of the crossing. The attackers are currently in PSO custody. ¶2. (S) Ref (a) and other sources indicate that the Preventive Security Organization (PSO),which continues to man the Gaza-Israel crossings, was instrumental in preventing the attackers from doing serious damage. The Hamas government has been rebuffed by President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) in its efforts to take control of the lucrative border crossings, as well as an attempt to install PRC leader Jamal Abu Samhadaneh in a senior Interior Ministry post. Abu Samhadaneh's appointment was seen by many Palestinians as a reaction to the elevation by Abu Mazen of Gaza PSO chief Rashid Abu Shubak to the internal security chief position within the MOI (ref (b)),and tension has been mounting in recent weeks between the PRC and PSO/Fatah elements in Gaza. ¶3. (C) Karni crossing did not open on April 27. On the morning of April 27, according to Palestinian contacts, both Israeli and Palestinian crossing personnel began taking up their positions, thus suggesting that the crossing would be open for the day. However, the Palestinian security personnel were slow to arrive, reportedly due to a lack of progress on efforts to secure additional reinforcements/security enhancements following the April 26 attack. By the time Palestinian security took their positions, the Israeli personnel declined to open the crossing and departed the area. ¶4. (S) Comments: The April 26 attack appears to confirm Israeli threat reporting about Karni, a chain which predates the coming to power of the Hamas government. The attack also could be related to intra-Palestinian tension; a move against a PSO-controlled border post by the PRC, leading to damage or Karni's closure, could be part of an effort by the PRC (and perhaps Hamas) to undermine the status of Abu Shubak. Finally, the PSO performed well, but the attack will complicate efforts to keep the crossing open. WALLES