IMPLICATIONS OF JAMAL ABU SAMHADANEH SELECTION AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001622

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/LOGERFO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL PTER
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF JAMAL ABU SAMHADANEH SELECTION AS
MOI IG

REF: JERUSALEM 1448

Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles: Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) The April 20 announcement of PRC head Jamal Abu
Samhadaneh as Inspector General for the MOI is widely seen as
a reaction to Abu Mazen's recent appointment of Rashid Abu
Shubak as internal security chief and has set up a
confrontation between the Hamas cabinet and Abu Mazen. The
President met April 21 with the PLO Executive Committee and
subsequently issued a decree effectively canceling both the
appointment of Abu Samhadaneh and the MOI's announcement of a
new volunteer security force. Hamas has yet to react to the
move by Abu Mazen and the PLO, but the situation demonstrates
ongoing tensions regarding the security forces and command
relationships.

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Hamas Decision
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2. (C) The April 20 appointment of Popular Resistance
Committee (PRC) head Jamal Abu Samhadaneh as Inspector
General for the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) by Hamas
Interior Minister Said Siyyam is a reflection of the
worsening security situation in Gaza and the struggle between
President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Hamas regarding
security force organization. Abu Samhadaneh's appointment
is seen by many as a Hamas reaction to Abu Mazen's recent
promotion of Fatah stalwart Rashid Abu Shubak as internal
security chief within the MOI (reftel). There is no clearly
understood job description for either inspector general or
internal security chief, which may itself lead to tensions if
both men attempt to assert overall command of those security
forces under the MOI (PSO, Civil Police, Civil Defense). Abu
Samhadaneh is also a bitter rival of ex-Preventive Security
Organization Chief Mohammad Dahlan, and the appointment is
likely to worsen a already tense security situation in Gaza,
which has been marked by armed conflicts between PSO officers
and various militant groups


3. (C) Abu Samhadaneh has a bloody history in Gaza dating
back to the first intifada. He was responsible for many
attacks on Israelis and murders of alleged Palestinian
collaborators. In the second intifada he left the security
forces to lead a segment of the PRC in southern Gaza. The
PRC is believed to be responsible for the October 2003
killings of three U.S. DynCorp contractors in Gaza. In
recent years, the Abu Samhadaneh segment of the PRC has
worked closely with Hamas. Abu Samhadaneh's influence in
Gaza is such that Fatah reached out to him in the fall of
2005, offering him the position of military intelligence
chief in Gaza, which became vacant upon the killing of Musa
Arafat in September 2005. The offer - which he declined -
was seen as an attempt to co-opt Abu Samhadaneh and the
militias which report to him, estimated to number several
thousand.


4. (C) In addition to making Abu Samhadaneh Inspector
General, Interior Minister Siyyam simultaneously announced
that the MOI would form a force composed of volunteers from
existing security forces and members of various armed
factions; Siyyam claimed that the force would work to support
PA security forces but not to replace them. Presidential
Spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeinah took issue with the Hamas
announcement, saying the decision was illegal and not
provided for in PA laws or regulations.

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Abu Mazen/PLO Reaction
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5. (C) On April 21, after a PLO Executive Committee meeting,
Abu Mazen issued a decree canceling the decisions of Minister
Siyyam, which would vitiate Abu Samhadaneh's appointment and
the creation of a new force. While the decision was made in a
PLO meeting, Abu Mazen issued the decree in his capacity as
chairman of the PLO and President of the PA. The decree will
be sent to the Prime Minister and the Interior Minister, and
the PLO Executive Committee will release a statement that
actions such as those recently taken by Siyyam are
unconstitutional.


6. (C) There is no reaction from Hamas as yet. The decisions
by Siyyam and Abu Mazen may simply presage further

constitutional conflicts between Abu Mazen and the Hamas
government.

WALLES