PAPUAN POLITICAL ROUND-UP, JULY 2006

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 009161

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ID
SUBJECT: PAPUAN POLITICAL ROUND-UP, JULY 2006

REF: A. JAKARTA 4407 (VOTE COUNTS FINAL)


B. JAKARTA 8249 (INDONESIA EXPELS TWO AMCITS FROM
PAPUA)

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Classified By: Daniel E. Turnbull, Acting Political Counselor. Reason:
1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Introduction and summary. This messages provides a
survey of recent developments in Papuan politics. During a
July 10 - 15 visit to Jayapura, POLOFF found the Papuan scene
in a holding pattern. Barnabas "Bas" Suebu, the winner of
the March 10 direct elections for governor, had still not
been sworn in due to Papuan political infighting and central
government dithering; on July 21, it was finally announced
that Suebu would be sworn in on Tuesday, July 25 (See Part I
below). Papuans are also awaiting President Yudhoyono's
visit to the province on July 26 - 28, during which he is
expected to announce a "New Deal" policy for Papua, which is
already being circulated in the form of a draft Presidential
Instruction (Inpres) (Part II). A senior Home Affairs
Ministry official continues to preside as Acting Governor,
and with the agreement of the provincial legislature, has
signed off on a controversial and highly irregular budget
(Part III). The Papuan Traditional Council (Dewan Adat
Papua),an important umbrella organization of indigenous
groups, held its fourth annual Congress in Jayapura on June
26 - July 1, but this seems to have generated little
excitement (Part IV). Papuan church leaders have been angered
by statements from senior central government officials to the
effect that foreign and Papuan churches are fomenting
separatism. (Part V) End summary.

--------------
I: Waiting For Pak Bas
--------------


2. (SBU) The swearing-in of Bas Suebu and Alex Hesegem, who
were elected on March 10 on the PDI-P ticket as the next
governor and vice-governor of Papua, was blocked during June
and July by maneuvers on the part of John Ibo, speaker of the
Provincial Parliament (DPRP),and dithering on the part of
the Home Affairs Ministry in Jakarta. Ibo was also a
defeated candidate for the governorship, having headed the
Golkar ticket.


3. (SBU) According to the relevant electoral law, the
swearing-in of the new governor takes place when the DPRP
requests the Home Affairs Ministry to issue a letter from the
President appointing the winning candidates as governor and
vice governor. The way should have been clear for this step
on May 23, when the Supreme Court rejected the appeal of
defeated candidate Lukas Enembe, who had alleged voting
irregularities in remote regencies (reftel A). On June 6,
Komarudin Watabun, Deputy Speaker of the DPRP, wrote the Home
Affairs Ministry requesting that the President authorize
Suebu's swearing-in. The following day, Speaker John Ibo
wrote the Ministry to overrule Watabun's request, arguing
that the DPRP was in the process of investigating charges
that Suebu had falsified his secondary school diploma, and
that Suebu should not be sworn in until this matter had been
resolved. Home Affairs Minister Mohammad Ma'aruf responded
to these contradictory requests by demanding that the DRPP
leaders clarify the situati
on. This merely touched off another round of conflicting
letters from Ibo, Suebu, and Watabun, who also traveled to
Jakarta to lobby central government officials. In the
meantime, the late June date originally envisioned for the
inauguration came and went. Caretaker Governor Sodjuangon
Situmorang, a senior Home Affairs bureaucrat, continued in
office in Jayapura.


4. (C) There were indications during poloff's visit that the
stalemate was near resolution. On July 11, Acting Governor
Situmorang announced that he had formed an inauguration
committee. On June 15, Watabun and Pastor Phil Erari, both
members of the Suebu camp, told POLOFF that they had been
reliably informed that Ibo's objections would soon be
overruled by Home Affairs on the basis that the Supreme
Court's May 23 ruling had confirmed Suebu's victory, and that
the only question would be the actual date of the
swearing-in. On July 17, Home Affairs Minister Ma'aruf
publicly confirmed that President Yudhoyono had instructed
him to resolve the matter before his July 28 visit to Papua.
On July 21, the Governor's protocol office confirmed that
Suebu would be sworn in on Tuesday, July 25. His counterpart
in West Irian Jaya, Bram Atururi, will be sworn in on July
24, and both new governors will participate in the

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President's visit to Papua July 26 - 28..


5. (C) This bickering has, however, strengthened the central
government's hold over Papuan affairs, which was already
enhanced by the appointment of a civil servant caretaker
governor following the sudden death of Governor Jaap Solossa
last December. The Home Affairs Ministry could have
intervened more decisively to resolve the swearing-in dispute
early last month, as it had done in a similar case in North
Sumatra province, and its failure to do so aroused suspicions
that the central government was content to see Papua's
democratic process bog down. By kicking the issue back to
Papuan politicians, Home Affairs exacerbated and prolonged a
situation that soured Papuans' first experience in direct
election of their governor.


6. (C) Civil society leaders also worry that the feud between
Ibo and Suebu will hamper the incoming governor's
administration. The two men, both from the same village in
the Sentani area near Jayapura, are longstanding rivals. Ibo
is bitter over recent career setbacks, many observers note.
Last year, he made a bid to head Papua's historically
powerful Golkar network, but lost out when Vice President
Kalla instead gave the nod to then-governor Solossa. After
Solossa's death last December 19, Ibo was allowed to stand as
the Golkar candidate for governor, but Kalla again undercut
his position in the party by appointing Suebu - who was
running as a member of the PDIP ticket - as a member of
Golkar's advisory board, a move which seemed to be a
crypto-endorsement. Contacts also accuse Ibo of abusing his
control of the DPRP in the affair. The DPRP, they say, has
no authority to investigate Suebu's educational credentials.
This, they say, is a matter for the Provincial Election
Commission or, if violations of
the law appear to have taken place, the police.


7. (C) Despite this rocky start, many of our contacts
expressed guarded optimism about the incoming Governor based
on his early outreach to NGOs and civil society. According
to Septer Manufandu, director of a coalition of NGOs, Suebu
had wanted to hold a round table with all international
agencies and NGOs active in Papua in early July, but had to
cancel this because of the dispute over his swearing-in.
Pastor Phil Erari told us that Suebu is tentatively planning
to co-host a conference August 4-5 which will include
representatives of civil society, the DPRP, the Papua
Traditional Council (Dewan Adat Papua, DAP),religious
leaders, and representatives of the provincial government of
West Irian Jaya province. The purpose of this conference,
Erari said, will be to lay the foundation for "a new dialogue
with Jakarta" about the future of Papua. Frederika Korain,
Program Manager for the Catholic Diocese's Peace and Justice
Secretariat, said that Suebu was making all the right noises,

SIPDIS
but she was concerned he would be stymied by the province's
ineffective, corrupt, and change-resistant bureaucracy.
(Incidentally, all contacts complained bitterly that the lack
of legitimate political oversight since last year had
aggravated the provincial bureaucracy's already
over-developed propensities for unresponsiveness and
absenteeism.)

--------------
II: SBY's "New Deal" For Papua
--------------


8. (SBU) President Yudhoyono plans to travel to Papua on July
27 - 28. The trip was originally slated for June, but was
rescheduled because of the Jogjakarta earthquake. On the
27th, he will meet with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister
Michael Somare. The two heads of government will inaugurate
a new border checkpoint near Skouw Sae, just east of
Jayapura. Yudhoyono will then proceed to Yahukimo regency,
in Papua's mountainous interior, where he will officially
dedicate 17 electrical power plants and, as he did during his
trip last March to Merauke, will preside over a harvest
celebration. This is to signify that the Yahukimo area has
put last year's crop failure, which resulted in an outbreak
of malnutrition, behind it.


9. (SBU) During the trip, Yudhoyono is expected to announce
a "New Deal" to accelerate the development of Papua. This
"New Deal" (the policy uses this English term) has already
been widely circulated in the form of a draft Presidential
Instruction (Inpres) that has been coordinated among
Cabinet-level ministries, including Health, Agriculture,
Social Welfare, Finance, Forestry and Commerce. The version
of the Inpres that we have seen does not appear to contain

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new initiatives or new funding. Instead, it appears to
systematize and accelerate existing programs by various
ministries. It contains a host of sweeping but vague
directives to individual ministries and agencies. For
example, the Ministry for National Development Board is
directed to "create a Grand Strategy for the Development of
the Land of Papua in accordance with its respective cultural
and ecological areas." It also explicitly endorses
"Affirmative Action" (another English term) to promote
representation of indigenous Papuans in government. Whether
the "New Deal" succeeds in its stated goal of accelerating
development in Papua depends entirely on whether the 29
central government bodies to which it is addressed follow
through on a coordinated and sustained basis. One version of
the draft mandates for creation of a senior working group to
monitor implementation of the "New Deal."


10. (C) While we have not seen the Inpres in its final form,
it has already been greeted with skepticism by some
observers. One foreign Papua-watcher noted that it resembles
a number of grand-sounding initiatives SBY announced for Aceh
during his tenure as Coordinating Minister for Political and
Security Affairs under President Megawati. These plans were
announced with great fanfare, but never amounted to much in
the end.


11. (C) Agus Sumule, an academic based at the University of
Papua in Manokwari, has already circulated a sharp critique
of the New Deal, seeing it as just another made-in-Jakarta
approach, devoid of input from Papuans. Sumule argues also
that by failing to specify its relationship to the existing
Special Autonomy Law, the New Deal is a tacit admission by
the central government that Special Autonomy has failed. He
notes also that the new policy ignores such longstanding
grievances as human rights violations by the security forces.
Certain specific points, such as an agenda item which seems
to encourage transmigration as a way to develop agriculture
in Papua, are premised on faulty Suharto-era assumptions and
would replicate that regime's mistakes, according to Sumule.

--------------
III: Budget Brouhaha
--------------


12. (SBU) During the July trip, NGOs and civil society
contacts expressed outrage at the findings of a recent study
of the 4 trillion rupiah provincial budget passed last May.
The study's authors were a group of respected academics who
analyzed the budget at the request of the Papuan People's
Assembly (MRP),whose mandate includes oversight of the
Special Autonomy law. 2.9 trillion rupiah of the 2006 budget
derives from Special Autonomy funds, which are by law
supposed to be used for the province's special development
needs.


13. (SBU) The study confirms skeptics' worst suspicions.
The researchers found that only 28.55 percent of the overall
budget was broken down into detailed line-item expenditures;
the rest consisted simply of lump sums allocated to various
government agencies. This is a recipe for corruption and
mismanagement. With regard to the Special Autonomy funds,
the researchers found that almost half were being used to
cover routine expenditures, such as administration and
salaries, which should actually be paid by that portion of
the province's revenue derived from central government
allocations, taxes, and other incomes generated within the
province.


14. (SBU) Only a small portion of the Special Autonomy funds,
the researchers found, was being applied towards the purposes
specified by law. For example, the Special Autonomy law
specifies that 30 percent of the Special Autonomy funds
should be used for education; the study found that only 12.2
percent was so allocated in the 2006 budget. Likewise, only
9.74 of 2006 Special Autonomy funds were applied towards
health, whereas the law specifies that this should be 15
percent.


15. (C) Many contacts expressed consternation at
irresponsibility of the acting governor, speaker of the
provincial parliament, and the parliament itself. They noted
that only 39 of the DPRP's 55 members attended the May 24
session that passed the budget. Certain specific
expenditures attracted unfavorable notice as well, such as
525 million rupiah per month allocated for maintenance of the
governor's official vehicle and 1.2 million in daily per diem
for the governor.

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16. (C) Predictably, Acting Governor Situmorang was satisfied
with the budget and in a July 11 meeting said he had had
worked well with the DPRP to pass it. He said that he was
particularly pleased with its focus on "poverty reduction,"
but admitted that the good uses to which the Special Autonomy
funds are put have been badly publicized. As a case in
point, he said that Special Autonomy monies had purchased
eight new multi-purpose ferries that now connect Biak, Yapen,
and other islands to the Papuan mainland. He noted that the
MRP had tried to insert itself illegally into the
budget-making process, but had been rebuffed.

-------------- --------------
VI: Papuan Traditional Council Holds Fourth Congress
-------------- --------------


17. (SBU) The Papuan Traditional Council (Dewan Adat Papua,
DAP),Papua's most important indigenous rights group, held
its fourth annual Congress in Jayapura on June 26 - July 1.
Delegations from seven regions attended. In its final
statements, the DAP reaffirmed last year's "rejection" of
Special Autonomy and its demand for a new dialogue between
indigenous Papuans and the Indonesian central government,
mediated by a third party such as the United Nations. The
DAP welcomed the first direct elections for governor, but
deplored the delay in inaugurating the winner. The DAP also
rejected creation of West Irian Jaya Province as evidence of
bad faith of the part of the central governments, and warned
against any plans to further subdivide the province. The DAP
called for an investigation into the 2006 provincial budget
(see above),and called for the ongoing trial of those
accused of involvement in the March 16 Abepura riots to
reveal the truth about the underlying causes of the
disturbance. The DAP noted that HIV/AIDS had reached the
level of a humanitarian disaster in Papua, and affirmed its
commitment to fighting the problem. Finally, the DAP
deplored the deportation of Amcits Brian Keane and Casey Box
(reftel B),who had been invited to attend the Congress. The
DAP's statement said that the incident was proof that Papua
was "a closed territory."


18. (C) The Congress seems to have aroused limited interest.
The political positions it articulated are stale and
predictable. The deputy speaker of the DPRP said the DAP
only exists because of the central government's inconsistent
implementation of Special Autonomy. Another civil society
observer, Bambang Sugiono of the Center for the Study of
Democracy, said that the DAP ignored some problems related to
indigenous groups where it could conceivably make a positive
difference. A case in point, he said, was the scandal
surrounding former Jawijaya Regent David Hubi, whose
corruption and incompetence resulted in a complete shutdown
of public services for months on end last year. Despite
this, Hubi enjoyed unwavering support from members of the
Dani ethnic group. Members of his clan forced a violent
confrontation with police when Hubi was finally arrested. The
DAP, Sugiono said, could have used its network of tribal
leaders to defuse this particular situation.


19. (C) Others were less critical of the Congress. Two
workers in the HIV/ADS sector, interviewed separately,
praised the DAP's initiative on the pandemic. Working
through tribal leaders, they said, the DAP could spread
information to elements of society in remote areas that were
not receptive to other parts of the reproductive health
network.


20. (C) The DAP remains an irritant to the authorities.
Governor Situmorang was openly scornful of its agenda. Fadhal
Alhamid, the organization's General Secretary, told POLOFF on
July 14 that as in past years, the DAP had notified the
police of its intention to hold the Congress; this was all it
was obliged to do under the law. Despite this, the police
informed the DAP after the fact that the event had been
illegal because the police had not actively authorized it.
Alhamid expressed surprise at this, noting that the Congress
had been attended by provincial legislators, regents, and a
few members of the national legislature.

-------------- --
V: Church Leaders Angry Over Separatist Taint
-------------- --


21. (SBU) Papuan church leaders we met with during the trip
were angry and defensive over charges leveled by senior
Indonesian officials in recent months to the effect that

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churches, whether in Papua or overseas (Defense Minister
Sudarsono and Ambassador to Australia Thayeb singled out
Australia's Uniting Church),were promoting Papuan
separatism. Other Indonesian leaders who have made this
accusation in recent months are Hasyim Muzadi, chairman of
the mass Muslim organization Nadlatul Ulama, and Lt. Gen.
Muhammad Yasin, Chairman of the National Resilience Council.
Papuan Protestants tend to believe that charges of separatist
agitation by foreign churches taints them by association,
since Papuan congregations have historically strong links to
churches in the Netherlands, Germany, Australia, the United
States, Canada, and elsewhere.


22. (C) The Reverend Herman Saud, outgoing head of Papua's
Protestant Synod, said that that while the Christian churches
in Papua were obviously not separatist as institutions, they
could not take responsibility for attitudes of a small number
of their members. The separatist canard against Christians,
Saud noted, was most often put forward by Muslim extremists,
but Papuan Muslims tended to know better because of their
first-hand experience with their Christian neighbors. It was
nonetheless an inflammatory charge when made by senior
government officials, Saud said, and Papuan religious leaders
had requested a meeting with SBY during his upcoming visit to
discuss the matter. Saud noted with some bitterness that the
same officials linking Christians with separatism were quick
to take offense when Muslims were unfairly associated with
terrorism. Reverend Saud's successor as head of the
Protestant Church, the Reverend Corinus Berotabui, charged
that those officials were apparently unable to distinguish
between Papuan separatism and Papuans demanding the rights
they were entitled to as Indonesian citizens.


23. (C) Caretaker Governor Situmorang has clearly already had
an earful on this issue, and backpedaled during a July 11
meeting. He claimed that Minister Sudarsono and Ambassador
Thayeb had been "misunderstood" and that the Papuan churches
had "overreacted." They had never meant to condemn the
churches institutionally, he said, but rather were concerned
about the agitation of a few "liberation theologians"
involved in a separatist network.
PASCOE