GOI EFFORTS STOKE OPTIMISM FOR POSO PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 009160 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016 TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS KPAO KVPR CVIS ID SUBJECT: GOI EFFORTS STOKE OPTIMISM FOR POSO PEACE REF: A. A. 05 JAKARTA 07558 INVESTIGATION INTO POSO BOMBING ¶B. B. 05 JAKARTA 07862 TENTENA BOMBING (SURABAYA) ¶C. C. 05 JAKARTA 14513 CHILDRENS' BEHEADINGS (SURABAYA) ¶D. D. 05 JAKARTA 14783 POSO VIOLENCE CONTINUES (SURABAYA) Classified By: Classified by David R. Willis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary. GOI initiatives spearheaded by the Indonesian National Police (INP) are moving conflict-ridden Central Sulawesi toward peace, according to top INP investigators focused on the area. The arrest of the terrorists behind many of the violent attacks since the 2001 Malino peace agreement--including last year's Tentena bombing and schoolgirl beheadings--are key to their optimism that a new peace agreement between the area's Christian and Muslim populations is in reach. The previously shaky relationship between the INP and the Armed Forces (TNI) was repaired at a June meeting where they reached agreement on a broader INP-led strategy to rebuild public support for peace. Renewed INP attention and recent progress are reason for optimism; however, GOI attention must remain focused on the area long enough to smooth over communal tensions before extremists can launch fresh attacks. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Recently successful efforts in Central Sulawesi led by the Indonesian National Police (INP) suggest momentum for peace is building in an area plagued by over six years of interreligious communal violence. Embassy contacts in early July, including INP investigators, point to the May 2006 arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked terrorists responsible for recent attacks, improved local INP-Armed Forces (TNI) cooperation, and renewed public support for peace as reasons for optimism. The INP's Deputy Investigations Chief and top CT investigator, Major General Gories Mere, is particularly confident that recent developments will end the violence and signal a new beginning for the troubled area. ¶3. (C) The 2001 Malino peace agreement brokered by now Vice President Jusuf Kalla ended the larger scale clashes that killed over 1,000 people from 1999-2001, but sporadic attacks have continued. The worst attack since the agreement was signed occurred in May 2005 when a bomb killed 23 people and injured over 100 in a marketplace in Tentena, Central 
Sulawesi (Ref A and B). Moved by the late October 2005 beheadings of three school girls near Poso (Ref C) and frustrated by slow progress on several other near-by cases, INP Chief General Sutanto ordered INP CT Taskforce ("Team Bomb") investigators to Sulawesi in late 2005 to take over the investigations. In January, the INP stood up the Central Sulawesi Security Operation Command (KOOPSKAM),a temporary investigative team led by Inspector General Paulos Purwoko, a seasoned INP investigator with a good reputation and a strong friendship with Mere. Confessions Link JI to Poso Violence -------------- ¶4. (C) The KOOPSKAM and Team Bomb investigative combo has been a one-two punch to cracking unsolved cases. At least three of the JI-linked terrorists arrested in May confessed to a string of heinous attacks, including last year's schoolgirl beheadings and Tentena market bombing. Embassy contacts have identified the main suspects as Hasanudin (aka Hamza),Lilik Purwanto (aka Haris),and Irwanto Irano (aka Irwan). The INP reportedly transferred the suspects to Jakarta in early July and announced that they expected the trial process to begin shortly. ¶5. (C) The INP released portions of the suspects' videotaped confessions to the local MEDIA in May, and we later obtained a copy from Nasir Abas, a reformed ex-JI Mantiqi III head who now works side-by-side with INP CT investigators. In the video, each suspect separately described in detail his involvement in several of the attacks, uniformly citing revenge for Christian attacks on Muslims and government inaction as their driving motivation. According to local JI expert Sidney Jones, who has extensively researched militant networks in Sulawesi, the three suspects are listed as JI members in documents uncovered by the INP during the 2003 arrest of Achmad Roihan (aka Sa'ad, Mat Ucang, et al),deputy of Mantiqi II under Abdullah Anshori (aka Abu Fatih). Confirming their JI ties, Abas told us he knew them from his JAKARTA 00009160 002 OF 003 days at JI camps in the Southern Philippines, and later as a mantiqi leader. Under INP direction, Abas met with the three suspects separately for several hours after their arrest and convinced them to cooperate with authorities, leading to the taped confessions. ¶6. (C) We have pieced together the following information on the suspects from MEDIA reports and Embassy contacts: -- Hasanudin (aka Hamzah) was arrested May 8 in Poso. Since October 2002, he headed JI's Poso wakalah. Hasanudin previously had spent several years in the Southern Philippines at JI's Camp Hudaibiyah. He is married to the daughter of Adnan Arsal (also seen as Arsel or Arsol),a well known Sulawesi Muslim radical with ties to the violence there. The INP interrogation of Ustadz Sahal (also Sa'al),a teacher at Arsal's pesantran, Al Amanah, led the INP to Hasanudin. As demonstrated in his taped confession, Hasanudin is well spoken and fluent in jihadist rhetoric. He is suspected of being the mastermind behind at least most of the attacks. -- Lilik Purwanto (aka Haris) was arrested May 5 in Tolitoli. He is one of the operational planners in the JI Poso wakalah. He is a suspect in the May 2004 assassination of GOI CT prosecutor Feri Silalahi, the July, 2004 assassination of Reverend Susianti Tinulele, and the November 2004 beheading of a Christian village chief suspected of having been a police informant and embezzling government refugee assistance. He also may have participated in the murder of Iwayan Sumaryasa with Ipung and Mhd Yusuf, both of whom were sentenced to nine years in early July. He is originally from Sulawesi, and his confession suggests he has been deeply and personally affected by large-scale Christian-Muslim communal violence in the past. -- Irwanto Irano (aka Irwan) was arrested May 5 with Haris in Tolitoli. He is a suspect in the 2004 Susianti assassination, the 2005 Tentena bombing, and the 2005 schoolgirl beheadings. Like Haris, Irwan is also from Sulawesi and likewise personally justified his attacks as vengeance for earlier communal violence. ¶7. (C) Other suspects arrested by the INP in Sulawesi in recent months include Taufik (aka Opik) and Jendra (aka Rahmat, Asrudin). Taufik was arrested May 8 in Palu and is suspected of involvement in the July 2004 shooting of Helmi Tobiling, the wife of a TNI soldier assigned to Sulawesi, and the schoolgirl beheadings. Jendra was among those arrested May 5 in Tolitoli and is also a suspect in the Helmi murder. Abas told us that INP investigators had the names of other suspects tied to the attacks and planned more arrests in July and August. Mere privately explained to us in early June that an INP informant close to the JI-linked Sulawesi militant group Anak Tanah Runtuh (ATR) had agreed to assist the INP in arresting at least an additional five suspects involved in the schoolgirl beheadings and Tentena bombing. Mere said in mid-July that Basri, a Javanese JI member associated with ATR, topped the INP's wanted list in Central Sulawesi. Jones told us that approximately 15 out of ATR's estimated 20 active members remained at large. ¶8. (C) The renewed INP activity in Central Sulawesi since January has frightened the area's concentration of militants, according to private comments to us by top INP investigator Benny Mamoto. He said INP information suggested many jihadists in Sulawesi had recently returned to their homes elsewhere in Indonesia. Also, many of the radical ustadz with known links to JI and its Al Mukmin pesantran in Solo, had abandoned their teaching positions in Sulawesi and returned to Central Java to lie low. In further developments, Mamoto told us that Adnan Arsal, who is one of the more radical voices in that area, was publicly embarrassed by his son-in-law's publicized confession and had lost some of his charisma and grassroots influence. Despite Arsal's participation in the 2001 peace accords and his joint statements with Christian leaders condemning specific attacks, Mere told us July 14, the INP believed Arsal was involved in orchestrating much of the violence and social friction but that the INP had not been able to build a case against him. Mere compared Arsal's role in the Sulawesi conflict with the role of JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in planting the seeds of conflict. INP's Game Plan -------------- JAKARTA 00009160 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Mere, who is originally from Sulawesi, understands the need to gain public grassroots involvement and told us that the INP's current objective was to use the arrest of those responsible for the recent violence to convince local leaders that peace was in reach. The INP still felt the sting of the botched attempt in April to arrest suspected Tentena bomber Taufiq Belaga (also Bulaga),when angry villagers had chased off the police and set fire to their motorcycles, an experience the INP did not want to repeat, Mere noted. (Note: The INP told us previously that the two policemen were local police assigned to surveil the suspect, not make an arrest.) ¶10. (C) Mere took an important initial step when he reached out to soothe strained relations between INP and Indonesian military (TNI) leaders at a June 25 meeting in Poso. Mere said militant groups have previously used disinformation to pit the TNI and INP against each other. The new regional INP chief joined Mere at the meeting, as did Team Bomb Commander Surya Dharma and Nasir Abas, to brief TNI on the details and significance of the arrests. According to Abas, both TNI and INP leaders agreed to seek public grassroots commitment to peace by meeting with local officials, religious leaders, and other influential figures in the conflict area to explain the arrests and urge them to actively promote cooperation with the authorities. Once the INP is confident they have gained broader public support, a point Mere optimistically expects to reach in the coming weeks, the INP will move to arrest the additional suspects. ¶11. (C) Mamoto described to us an even more ambitious and longer term INP plan that includes a new peace agreement among the conflict area's various groups, reviving the economy, and bringing in moderate Islamic ustadz to neutralize the influence of radical and jihadist teachings, like those of JI. Reaching beyond the typical law enforcement purview, Mere told us the INP continued to seek the support of other agencies under the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law, and Security, and had made direct appeals to Vice President Yusuf Kalla. Mere said he had briefed senior GOI officials several times and received widespread agreement on the INP's recommendations, but so far had seen little to no action. ¶12. (C) Despite some intricate connections among jihadist networks involved in the conflict, lack of a unified front among the hodgepodge of radical elements there may work in the INP's favor. According to Jones, the noticeable absence of a JI chain of command beyond the wakalah in these recent JI-linked cases supports the theory that the JI organization is less hierarchical than before and that at least some JI cells operate with significant autonomy. INP investigators hold similar views and told us they seek to exploit this condition to further divide and defeat the remaining extremists. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) The GOI decision not to renew the KOOPSKAM charter when it expired on July 3 was a testament to their confidence that authorities can maintain the current advantage. However, despite INP optimism, the authorities face an enduring legacy of violence, and the GOI's attention span has often been too short to resolve the underlying frictions. Although area's communities stand united against corruption, particularly that involving humanitarian aid for those displaced by the conflict, emotions on both sides run deep and potential sources of friction remain. Broad economic disparities largely mirror religious fault lines, with the less prosperous Muslim communities lagging behind. Many of the area's Muslims arrived via the GOI's transmigration program from more populated islands, like Java and Madura. A proposal to create a new province in the area, if it comes to fruition over the next year, may further raise tensions as religious groups seek to balance representation. As long as the issues remain starkly defined in Christian-versus-Muslim, Central Sulawesi likely will continue to attract the attention of radical Islamists outside of Sulawesi eager to fan the flames. PASCOE