WEST JAVA: A SNAPSHOT OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 009043 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM ID SUBJECT: WEST JAVA: A SNAPSHOT OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN A CRUCIAL INDONESIAN PROVINCE REF: JAKARTA 16709 (PKS VICTORY IN DEPOK MAYORAL RACE) JAKARTA 00009043 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Officer Eric W. Kneedler, reason 1.4(d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) With the second most registered voters and the largest population of any Indonesian province, West Java will figure prominently in the political calculus of each of the major parties as they begin to position themselves for the 2009 legislative and presidential election. West Java,s national political significance is further enhanced by the fact that it will hold provincial legislative elections (DPRD) and its first-ever directly elected governor,s race in 2008, making it in effect the last significant election before 2009 and an extremely important testing ground for all of the major contending parties. In a July 11-12 visit to West Java,s provincial capital of Bandung, we met with the chairmen of four of the largest parties, as well as other political luminaries to discuss party performance goals and the national significance of West Java,s 2008 provincial elections. End Summary. WEST JAVA, A VOTE-RICH PROVINCE -------------- ¶2. (U) According to the Indonesian Electoral Commission,s 2004 statistics, West Java has 25.1 million registered voters, out of a nationwide total of 153 million. Only East Java, with 26 million voters, has more. In the 2004 parliamentary elections (DPR),the voting distribution among the major parties was as follows: Golkar..... 5.8 million (21.5 percent) PDI-P...... 3.6 million (13.3 percent) PKS........ 2.4 million (8.9 percent) PPP........ 2.2 million (8.1 percent) PD......... 1.6 million (5.9 percent) PAN........ 1.1 million (4.1 percent) PKB........ 1.1 million (4.1 percent) Both Golkar and, collectively, parties with Islamist platforms attracted above-average turnouts in West Java; Golkar received roughly one quarter of all its nationwide votes from the province. On the opposite end of the spectrum, President Yudhoyono,s Democratic Party (PD) received a smaller percentage of the votes in West Java than it did nationally. DEEP IN THE HEART OF GOLKAR COUNTRY -------------- ¶3. (C) We met with West Java,s Golkar Party Chair, Mr. Uuk Rukmana, as well as four other high-ranking Golkar party functionaries, and reviewed Golkar,s credentials as West Java,s unquestioned heavyweight. Not only does Golkar control the Governor,s mansion (Danny Setiawan, currently embroiled in a corruption scandal),but of the 100 seats in the provincial legislative assembly (DPRD),Golkar controls ¶28. In addition, the Chairman of the DPRD is from Golkar, and the party continues to reap dividends from its Soeharto-era status as the only political show in town. Many West Javanese still pull the Golkar lever almost reflexively, and organizationally speaking, Golkar is still peerless. ¶4. (C) Chairman Uuk shared with us an internal Golkar document with a detailed analysis of its performance in West Java during the 2004 legislative and presidential elections, as well a planning document with the party,s strategy for 2004-2009. The time, effort, and financing required to conduct such extensive research and analysis speaks to Golkar,s deep pockets and its seriousness of purpose. One finds it hard to imagine any of the other parties duplicating such an effort. The documents themselves reveal a party preoccupied with maintaining its primacy in West Java and setting the table for the national elections in 2009, complete with local performance goals and thorough review of how to sell its nationalist message to a West Javanese audience. ¶5. (C) Chairman Uuk told us he believes Golkar will retain its status as West Java,s strongest party in 2008 and 2009, despite the fact that he anticipates its share of the vote JAKARTA 00009043 002.2 OF 003 will decline. Uuk specifically fears a surging wave of interest in the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) will manifest itself at the ballot box, a development he believes would damage Golkar. Uuk further admitted that in his mind, the only significant advantage Golkar currently enjoys over PKS in West Java is financial, and that sooner or later PKS will erode this advantage and be able to mount an even more assertive challenge to Golkar. PKS ON THE RISE -------------- ¶6. (C) In a relatively short period of time, PKS has established itself as the third strongest party in West Java, following only the Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P),and Golkar. With fourteen of West Java,s DPRD seats, an impressive showing in the 2004 national parliamentary race (recording nearly 9% of the vote),and a recent victory in the West Javanese city of Depok,s mayoral election (reftel),PKS has demonstrated that it will be a force to be reckoned with in West Java for the foreseeable future. ¶7. (C) On July 12 we met with West Java,s PKS Chair, Muhammad Taufiq Ridlo, and General Secretary Yudi Widiana in Chairman Taufiq,s well appointed office in the PKS West Java headquarters. Taufiq was relaxed, confident, and eager to share his party,s ambitious plans for West Java. Noting the recent PKS victory in Depok and the party,s commanding position in the Jakarta suburb, Taufiq claimed internal PKS polling showed PKS gaining strength in West Java. When pressed to articulate what this rise in popularity meant in practical terms, Taufiq shared his party,s belief that PKS would capture 25 of the DPRD seats in West Java,s 2008 provincial elections, a net increase of 11. In addition, Taufiq said PKS had already been approached by Golkar representatives in West Java about the possibility of joining forces in the 2008 gubernatorial race, a very revealing development considering Golkar controls the office now. ¶8. (C) Asked to explain PKS, ascendancy in West Java, Taufiq said the party,s anti-corruption message resonated in a province in which both the Governor and Vice Governor were being investigated on corruption charges. When we inquired whether there were any specific examples of PKS activities that have enhanced the party,s profile locally, Taufiq noted that PKS had taken the lead in criticizing the Mayor of Bandung (a Golkar member) for his inability to keep the streets clean and dispose of the city,s waste, a development that received heavy press coverage nationally and eventually mobilized the Mayor into action (Note: The issue of waste disposal in Bandung was in fact covered extensively in the domestic and, to a lesser extent, international media. End Note). Taufiq noted that while he was in constant communication with the national PKS party headquarters on party goals and planning, he suspected the party,s future would be driven by local political issues. This, he explained, was why the party had not been helped or hindered in West Java by the PKS coalition with SBY at the national level. PDI-P SOUNDS THE RADICAL ISLAM ALARM -------------- ¶9. (C) In a July 12 meeting with PDI-P West Java Party Chair Rudi Harsa Tanaya and Party Secretary Edi Susianto, the conversation quickly gravitated towards the threat to PDI-P (and, implicitly, Indonesia) posed by parties with Islamist agendas. Chairman Rudi started the meeting by stating that PDI-P expected to become the number one party in West Java in 2008, then quickly deviated from his optimistic talking points and acknowledged that PKS was hot on PDI-P,s heals. When we noted that PDI-P has 21 seats in the DPRD and enjoys a solid 7 seat advantage over PKS, Chairman Rudi waved off the significance of this advantage and spoke about the increasing influence of radicals in the politics of West Java. Rudi trumpeted PDI-P,s secular credentials, and warned that only a party with a nationalist agenda like PDI-P could keep a diverse, multi-cultural Indonesia from fragmenting in the face of radical forces. DEMOCRATIC PARTY TRYING TO ESTABLISH A FOOTHOLD -------------- -- JAKARTA 00009043 003.2 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Newly elected Democratic Party (PD) West Java Chairwoman Ratna Suminar received us in PD headquarters on July 11, along with nearly a dozen other PD officials and DPRD legislators. Ratna clearly relished the USG interest in PD,s West Java operations, and lost little time trumpeting her party,s relevance. She claimed, somewhat implausibly, that PD was now the third largest party in West Java, and argued that its status as only the fifth largest party in the DPRD (9 seats) was not representative of its current strength. She talked about PD,s progressive credentials and noted that a good portion of the party,s local leadership structure was comprised of academics. As evidence of this progressive bent, one of her lieutenants proudly boasted that Ratna was the only Chairwoman of a major political party in any of Indonesia,s 32 provinces (Note: We could not independently verify this. End Note). ¶10. (C) When we asked Ratna about SBY,s role as PD,s Chairman of the Board of Patrons, Ratna mirrored the official party line in saying SBY,s focus had always been on his job as the President of Indonesia and not as a leader of PD. She argued that as the &ruling party,8 PD was in an excellent position to harness the President,s popularity and expand its presence in West Java. She added that the party would benefit tremendously from unspecified &assistance8 from the United States, and asked whether the USG could find ways to support PD. When we told her that the USG had no preference for one political party over another, she expressed a hope the USG would be able to find creative ways to &help a party that shares American values.8 COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) West Java,s size, recent history of mirroring national results on the local level, and commercial strength all point to the importance of West Java,s 2008 provincial elections as a test run for the 2009 national elections. Our contacts believe the major parties will invest significant resources in West Java in 2008, and will use the elections to preview strategies and slogans with an eye to their utility in 2009. A quick look at the numbers from the 2004 presidential runoff helps explain why the contending parties may treat West Java as a dry rehearsal for 2009 and an opportunity to develop a winning blueprint. Nationally, in 2004, President Yudhoyono captured 61% of the vote, compared with former President Megawati,s 39%; West Java was an almost perfect microcosm of the national results, with 62.5% of West Javanese supporting SBY, and 37.5% voting for former President Megawati. Regardless of whether or not the similarity in results from 2004 is statistically significant, or a reliable indicator of West Java,s potential to serve as a bellwether for 2009, it is clear to us the major political parties view the 2008 elections in West Java as a critical opportunity to develop momentum heading into 2009. PASCOE