INDONESIA: U.S. STATEMENT ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 006911 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA: U.S. STATEMENT ON IRAN REF: STATE 87682 Classified By: Political Officer John Rath. Reason: 1.4 (D). ¶1. (C) The Ambassador delivered reftel points and our request for a public GOI statement of support to Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda on June 1 (other discussion topics reported septel). Visibly pleased by the U.S. approach on Iran, Wirajuda said he had watched the Secretary deliver her May 31 remarks on television. He recalled his discussion on Iran with the Secretary during his recent visit to Washington, and said that Indonesia strongly supported a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that preserves Iran's access to peaceful nuclear energy but prevents it from developing nuclear weapons. ¶2. (C) Wirajuda stated that he and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono used the opportunity of Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad's recent visit to Indonesia to make the following points to the Iranians: that Iran needed to demonstrate flexibility in dealing with the international community, a point that Yudhoyono had discussed with UN SYG Kofi Annan prior to the Ahmadi-Nejad visit; that the Iranian nuclear issue should be addressed through diplomatic means; that Iran needed to comply fully with the IAEA and be open, transparent, and accountable about its nuclear program; that Iran needed to halt uranium enrichment; and that the EU-3 negotiations should be expanded to include nations that have been faithful to their NPT obligations, such as South Africa and Indonesia. Wirajuda stated that Indonesia had made all of these points privately to Ahmadi-Nejad and in public, and would be happy to reiterate its public position. ¶3. (C) In a brief May 31 discussion on the margins of a post-earthquake relief visit to Yogyakarta, President Yudhoyono told the Ambassador that he had pressed Ahmadi-Nejad hard on Indonesian concerns about Iran's nuclear program as outlined by Wirajuda. Yudhoyono surmised that he did not and could not make headway with Ahmadi-Nejad due to the latter's "difficult" character and strong ideological leanings. He added that he had, at least, kept Ahmadi-Nejad from using the D-8 Bali Summit as a propaganda platform by working closely with other D-8 members. ¶4. (U) We will report any public GOI statements regarding the Secretary's remarks and Iran's nuclear program. SIPDIS PASCOE