SCENESETTER: SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S VISIT TO JAKARTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 JAKARTA 006493 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD FROM AMBASSADOR PASCOE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR ID SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S VISIT TO JAKARTA Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Mr. Secretary: Your strong support for the Administration's decision to move quickly in November to normalize military-to-military ties with Indonesia has given a new, more cooperative quality to bilateral relations across the range of our interests. You will have the opportunity to engage Indonesian leaders to encourage them to join us in a "strategic partnership" in which Indonesia takes regional and global responsibilities commensurate with its standing as the world's third-largest democracy and largest Muslim-majority country. ¶2. (C) We want Indonesia to continue its political transformation by building lasting democratic institutions firmly rooted in the values of tolerance and moderation in this Muslim-majority country. We want it to engage with us and other partners in the war on terror, and to act regionally and globally in a manner befitting a responsible democracy without the instinctive non-aligned responses inherited from by-gone eras. ¶3. (C) DoD's extraordinary achievements in the aftermath of the devastating December 2004 Aceh earthquakes and tsunami, in which the American military played a major role in saving lives, made clear that America remained a dependable partner for Indonesia. This engagement helped kick off the events that led to normalized military-to-military relations, and helped recast our bilateral relations as a partnership. End Summary. Objectives for Your Visit -------------- ¶4. (C) We view your visit as an opportunity to affirm the Indonesian model and pledge continued support. Building on the positive Indonesian reaction to normalized bilateral military relations, you could pursue the following, a) Confirm DoD commitment to engage in a mix of high-value activities, recognizing that Indonesia's military (TNI) has limited absorptive capacity and that we need to focus engagement in areas with the highest return; b) Emphasize the value the U.S. places on building a lasting partnership with Indonesia to address regional security issues and concerns; c) Encourage GOI and TNI to redefine Indonesia's place in the world and to assume responsibilities attendant on the world's third largest democracy; d) Convince TNI and the civilian leadership that the U.S. can assist Indonesian efforts to transform TNI into a modern, professional, properly managed defense force that emphasizes external defense; e) Underline your support for an Article 98 agreement and explain that such an agreement would benefit both sides and assist during discussions with and within Congress this year on military relations with Indonesia; f) Affirm our desire to help Indonesia succeed. We see Indonesia as a fellow democracy with shared values of tolerance and pluralism, as a nation of crucial importance to the region and the world, and ONE with which we want to work closely. g) State that the U.S. expects Indonesia to address past human rights concerns in a way appropriate for a responsible democracy -- doing so will set the right tone for Indonesia's developing democracy and bolster TNI reform. We see the outcome of the Indonesia-East Timor Commission on Truth and Friendship as important. Ensuring Democracy and Moderate Islam Prevail -------------- ¶5. (C) We have a stake in helping consolidate democracy in Indonesia, the world's third-most populous and largest Muslim-majority country. Indonesia's emerging success as a democracy has profound implications for our bilateral objectives, and for our broader goals in Asia and throughout the developing world, most notably among other JAKARTA 00006493 002 OF 007 Muslim-majority countries. Within Indonesia, democracy has created opportunities for a U.S.-Indonesia partnership that supports mutual objectives in key areas such as combating extremism and terrorism, promoting human rights, security cooperation, economic development and investment. Indonesia provides a strong example for countries that lag in political freedom and as proof of Islam's compatibility with freedom and modernity. ¶6. (C) Indonesia has established new foundations for democracy over the past seven years. The amended Constitution provides more effective checks and balances among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. The country now has a freely-elected legislature with a chamber representing different regions; security forces no longer have unelected seats in the House of Representatives (DPR). The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) resoundingly defeated attempts by Islamist parties to inject Shari'a law into the Constitution. The free and fair 2004 national elections demonstrated Indonesia's new electoral framework with vibrant multi-party system. The country's first direct presidential election defeated an incumbent President and brought reform-minded Yudhoyono into office. Indonesia carried out a huge decentralization effort to shift much authority from central to local officials. A free, open, and often obstreperous press has replaced a tightly controlled and censored media. Our aid programs and diplomatic efforts support these developments. ¶7. (C) Democratic progress has made Indonesia a player in the ongoing struggle between democratic modernization and militant retrograde Islam. While a diverse multi-religious and multi-ethnic society, Indonesia as the world's largest Muslim-majority country also suffers the same radical, hate-filled strains of thought that afflict the rest of the Islamic world. Islam in Indonesia -- especially its syncretic Javanese version -- has a long history of moderation, combining Islamic beliefs with modernization and outreach to the rest of the world. This has led most Indonesians to find democracy and Islam compatible. We have worked with civic organizations -- dominated by Islamic groups -- to make the point that democracy, modernization, and Islam can work together; Indonesians have adopted this view and created ONE of the world's largest democracies. We must show that we can forge close, long-term mutually beneficial ties with this fourteen percent of the Islamic world (more Muslims live here -- nearly 200 million -- than in all the Middle East). Encouraging Engagement in Region and Globally -------------- ¶8. (C) SBY's focus on repairing Indonesia's image, and on building an international leadership position befitting Indonesia's size, gives the foreign policy apparatus an opportunity to change Indonesia's role in international fora. We need Indonesia to take the side of democracy in world debates and to act as a moderating influence on more radical regimes in the Middle East. Indonesia's historical non-aligned orientation and jealous safeguarding of national sovereignty have made it cautious in entering into bilateral agreements and reluctant to single out wrongdoers in multilateral fora. Indonesia's decision to abstain in the IAEA vote February 2 to refer the Iran proliferation case to the UNSC and its overly solicitous reception of Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad in early May demonstrated its continued difficulties when facing issues in which it must take a responsible public stand. Indonesia has begun to reassert its leadership role in ASEAN and made tentative attempts to press for democratic norms in ASEAN's nascent political community. ASEAN members made helpful statements in Kuala Lumpur about the lack of progress in Burma, and agreed to send Malaysian FM Hamid to Rangoon. With our encouragement, SBY carried a strong message of reform to the Burmese junta during his visit there late last February. ¶9. (C) Indonesia has worked with Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the International Maritime Organization to improve maritime security in the strategic Strait of Malacca, but needs more effective measures in this and other areas. Indonesia should increase engagement in international security efforts, including maritime security and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Indonesia professes strong support for non-proliferation, but has not endorsed JAKARTA 00006493 003 OF 007 the PSI Statement of Principles. We want it to see PSI as a way to enhance cooperation as part of our mil-mil relations and an area in which it should tQe greater internaQonal responsibility. TNI's Long Road to Reform -------------- ¶10. (C) SBY, a retired General, has continued the reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) begun after the fall of Suharto. His Defense Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, a strong-willed civilian military expert, also served as Minister of Defense in Gus Dur's cabinet. Juwono's Department has begun implementation the TNI law enacted in September 2004, which brings TNI under the Minister of Defense for management and procurement issues, reinforces TNI's disengagement from politics and mandates the end of TNI's private business involvement. The Department of Defense has prepared legislation to bring TNI fully under its control and to establish an effective NSC-type body in the executive; it recently conducted a one-week seminar with APCSS to build interagency support for its efforts. Under former TNI Chief of Staff Sutarto, TNI professionalism and respect for human rights improved; TNI has stayed out of politics and submitted to increased civilian control; it has observed legal restrictions on domestic CT involvement, allowing the Indonesian National Police to take the lead; and has fulfilled its obligations under the GOI-Free Aceh Movement (GAM) MOU ending three decades of conflict in Aceh. Although making progress, the GOI has not yet ended TNI's business activities or provided TNI a realistic budget -- perhaps half of TNI's budget comes from "self-financing." ¶11. (C) While TNI respect for human rights and punishment of rights abusers has increased, accountability has remained scant with respect to 1999 East Timor and other abuses. Indonesia and East Timor have established a bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC) to achieve accountability for crimes committed in East Timor in 1999, but we must work to assure the TFC performs credibly by insuring the transparency of its work, by naming names of perpetrators, by including international participation, and by holding public hearings. The top military leadership understands the need for improved discipline and respect for human rights and has taken steps to improve TNI's record. Although image at home and abroad remain underlying motivators, the new TNI commander and the Service Chiefs consider discipline and the proper treatment of civilians as critical to molding a professional military. Headquarters has taken a three-pronged approach to reduce human rights abuses in the field: education and training; revision of regulations; and increased transparency of the disciplinary process. Progress on human rights remains key to consolidating democracy and has implications for sustaining mil-mil normalization. TNI's New "Panglima" Djoko Suyanto -------------- ¶12. (C) The President's selection in February of Marshal Djoko Suyanto as TNI's commander bodes well for further reform. For the first time an Air Force officer holds the top post, in keeping with the spirit of the TNI Law of October 2004, which advocated rotating the "Panglima" position among the three services. An academy classmate of the president, Suyanto has a clean record and acted as an early promoter of TNI reform, collaborating with the late LTG Agus Wirahadikusumah in publishing a book outlining the way forward for TNI during the uncertain times after the fall of Suharto. The U.S.-trained Air Marshal, open-mindedQith eQellent English, welcomes opportunities to interact with the international community. He appreciates U.S. training opportunities and we expect him to seek every opportunity to engage with American forces. Although his Air Force background will limit his informal influence, senior army officers have voiced support for Djoko and appear ready to work with him in furthering reform and professionalism of TNI. Normalized Mil-Mil Relationship -------------- ¶13. (C) The Administration's decision to waive Congressional restrictions on FY06 bilateral military assistance and normalize mil-mil relations enhances our ability to support GOI efforts to develop democratic institutions and reform and JAKARTA 00006493 004 OF 007 professionalize TNI. Congress and we remain keenly interested that TNI reform continues, and the form Congressional conditions take in FY07 could depend on GOI performance this year. In close consultation with OSD, we have proposed to focus efforts on priority areas: (1) maritime security/regional stability/counterterrorism; (2) professionalization and modernization of TNI, including civilian control; and (3) TNI ability to respond to domestic humanitarian crises, overseas peacekeeping operations and disaster assistance. Near-Term Military Assistance -------------- ¶14. (SBU) We expect to provide the following bilateral assistance in FY 06 and 07: FMF/FMS/DCS -------------- FMF: FY 06 $990K (for TNI-Navy); FY 07 $8 million requested (for TNI-Navy for maritime security and TNI-Air Force for C-130 complementary support); DSCA recently cleared an additional $8 million from Indonesia's holding account (from old FMF cases). Section 1206: FY 06 $19.7 million potentially available (for TNI-Navy to construct and equip 10 Maritime Surveillance Stations on the Malacca Strait, improve command and control and ship communications). FMS: December 2005 Indonesia transferred money to open $15 million case for C-130 parts; further $13 million available from old FMS cases for future FMS transactions. DCS: Significant GOI interest in C-130 parts and Rolls-Royce engines; radios; Bell 210 helicopters. IMET and CTFP Training -------------- IMET/E-IMET: FY 06 $792,000 available; FY 07 $1.3 million requested (following certification by State Department in February 2005 full IMET available; emphasis of courses remains on professionalization programs, civ-mil programs, and maritime security). Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP): FY 06 $700,000 available; FY 07 $525,000 planned. Bilateral Security Discussions -------------- ¶15. (C) The fourth Indonesia-United States Security Dialogue, which DUSD Lawless hosted in Washington April 26-27, provided a frank and effective exchange on the regional security interests of the two countries and affirmed our mutual commitment to the continued growth of our incipient strategic partnership. Indonesia expressed its intention to participate in a Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS) and a National Guard State Partnership Program. The DRMS program could increase our ability to engage TNI and Defense Ministry to urge reform and modernize management and procurement. The attentiveness, responsiveness, and enthusiasm of Indonesian counterparts during the talks signaled increased intention to strengthen cooperation and improve the quality of our bilateral relations. Indonesia's Defense Priorities and Procurement Issues -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) GOI officials have told us that Indonesia's procurement of weapons should accord with the political directive that TNI develop the "minimum essential force" needed to address threats. TNI and GOI officials have told us that bringing the F-16 fleet to mission capable status comprises a key aspect of achieving minimum essential force, but procurement of additional big-ticket items would occur over the longer-term, reflecting budgetary constraints. Despite the lifting of U.S. restrictions, Indonesia will continue diversifying procurement sources, including development of its own defense industries. The Department of Defense (DEPHAN) will likely continue to centralize procurement, thereby increasing transparency and reducing JAKARTA 00006493 005 OF 007 opportunity for corruption; the DRMS program will give these efforts a significant boost. DEPHAN over the last year has managed to take control of export credit purchases, but the services still procure expendable items. The Benefits of Bilateral Cooperation -------------- ¶17. (C) PACOM will review its "Theater Cooperation Plan" activities with TNI during the annual "Bilateral Defense Dialogue" June 12-14. PACOM's superb response to the tsunami and earthquakes in 2004 demonstrated to the Indonesian public and TNI, as no other U.S. effort could, the benefits of bilateral military cooperation. The USNS Mercy will reprise its extremely beneficial assistance effort during the tsunami and Nias earthquakes in 2005 by returning for a several-week visit to Indonesia this summer. PACOM's cooperation with Indonesia can provide the high-value activities to help us achieve our security objectives in Indonesia and the region -- from maritime security and interoperability to facilitating reform of the TNI. In addition to conferences and SMEE's addressing CT, doctrine development, logistics, intelligence, and disaster relief, we look forward to increased JCETS and bilateral exercises among services, transitioning to an increased multilateral and joint engagement program. Humanitarian Civil Action programs, such as our recent effort in Nias where U.S. forces built a school and two bridges, put a positive face on our joint efforts. These activities build on and reinforce the good will won during the tsunami relief effort. Future avenues to enhance our interoperability and understanding of U.S. forces by Indonesia could include: initiatives to expand intelligence sharing; U.S. participation in Indonesian senior staff colleges; Marines resuming the RECONEX, expanding Marines in CARAT; Naval/Air Force Encounter exercises and Unit exchange programs; increased counter-drug training missions via JIATF-West. Significant Progress on Terrorism; Problems Remain -------------- -------------- ¶18. (C) The October 1 suicide attacks in Bali left no doubt that terrorism remains a significant threat, particularly from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) the most active terror group in Indonesia and ONE of the world's deadliest. Despite the arrests of hundreds of JI-linked terrorists in the region that have eroded the original JI organizational structure and its capabilities, JI has conducted dozens of bombings since 2000 that have killed hundreds of people. JI co-founder Abu Bakar Ba'asyir -- due for release from an Indonesian prison in June -- and other JI leaders and sympathizers operate schools, recruit and train members, and maintain links with other radical organizations throughout the region. JI has a political presence through the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI),generally regarded by terrorism experts as a political arm of the JI. ¶19. (C) Led by the JI Taskforce ("Team Bomb") and the U.S.-trained Detachment 88, the National Police (INP) retains the lead in CT. President Yudhoyono included the military in his October 2005 call for a more robust interagency CT response, prompting TNI to redirect assets toward CT intelligence operations. The Army instituted counter-terror desks at all levels of its territorial apparatus to facilitate information flow, manage CT assets, and coordinate with other agencies. Though the Army assures us the focus of its territorial system remains intelligence gathering, passed to the INP for action, institutional barriers and distrust make effective interagency coordination and information sharing problematic. The Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) Unit 81 has had no role in recent counter-terrorist activities. ¶20. (C) The CT strategy meeting Embassy Jakarta held in January for Ambassadors in the region, and attended by PACOM, SOCOM, and SOCPAC leaders, made several policy recommendations with strong military components focused on the Sulawesi Sea tri-border area. ONE of the key recommendations called for a multi-country interagency security exercise, or series of exercises, in the tri-border region that would include military, immigration, and law enforcement agencies. We are working to encourage the countries of this region to embrace this concept. Ambassadors agreed to the overall shared goal to deny terrorists physical and ideological safehaven by increasing JAKARTA 00006493 006 OF 007 operational capacities of host nations, and assisting them in employing a range of "soft" methods to counter terrorist ideology. We remain engaged with PACOM on ways to do this. Economic Reform -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Although Indonesia's record on counterterrorism and military reform receive the bulk of attention in the U.S., President Yudhoyono's domestic political future will rise or fall on the success of his economic reform program. Indonesia, ONE of the "Asian Tigers" before the 1997-98 financial crisis, enjoyed annual GDP growth of almost seven percent from 1990-96. The crisis triggered the collapse of Indonesia's state-centered, cronyist development model, and the country has since made halting progress toward a more open, private sector economic system. Yudhoyono came into office with a ringing pledge to implement a "pro-growth, pro-poor, and pro-jobs" economic policy that, for the first time, explicitly recognized the private sector as a key partner in development. He set the ambitious target of raising Indonesia's average GDP growth from 2006-09 to 6.6 from its current 5.5 percent level, and halving the poverty and unemployment rates. The Indonesian and foreign business communities responded warmly to Yudhoyono's agenda, and continue to support him strongly. ¶22. (SBU) Aside from the tsunami disaster, the defining moment of Yudhoyono's first year in office proved his bold decision to raise subsidized fuel prices by an average of 126 percent on October 1, 2005. Fuel subsidy cuts open the door to the most significant expansion of GOI social and development spending in a decade; Indonesia's FY 2006 budget shows a 28 percent increase in non-interest, non-subsidy spending. The subsidy cuts, however, caused hardship to millions of low-income Indonesians accustomed to decades of cheap gasoline and kerosene, led to a surge in inflation and took some steam out of the economy. In order to raise growth, SBY's highly regarded Coordinating Minister for Economics, Dr. Boediono, has begun developing and implementing reform packages for investment, infrastructure and the financial sector. As Indonesia's second largest non-oil and gas export market and the leading investor in the energy sector, we have an interest in Boediono's success. Economic growth will prove slower in the first half of the year, hopefully picking up in the second half as inflation gradually comes down. U.S. Assistance Programs -------------- ¶23. (SBU) For more than 40 years, the U.S. has had an active bilateral assistance program in education, public health, support for democracy, and economic growth including infrastructure development. In FY05 the bilateral USAID program came in at more than $135 million (appropriated dollars and food aid combined) and we actively work with Indonesian partners in areas Indonesia has identified as of highest priority. The USAID program in Indonesia aims to "Help Indonesia Succeed." The USAID country-wide assistance program works with GOI, local governments and private partners, including civil society, to improve basic education; better delivery of essential public services at the community level, including HEALTH services and clean water; create a positive business, trade and investment environment to support economic growth that generates new and better jobs; promote more accountable and transparent governance at the national and local levels; and promote biodiversity and environmental protection. ¶24. (SBU) These programs help lay the foundation for a better future for Indonesia, while responding to immediate requirements as varied as response to the tsunami disaster; implementation of the Aceh peace accord; avian influenza and polio outbreaks; and a potential HIV/AIDS epidemic. Anti-corruption support, including focus on "governance" issues, and specific institutional support for justice sector reform, addresses ONE of the most difficult development issues faced by Indonesia, and ONE of SBY's top priorities. With our assistance, continued progress in fighting corruption and better delivery of basic services will help Indonesia qualify for full support from the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Indonesia has received MCC "threshold status." JAKARTA 00006493 007 OF 007 Assistance Programs for Aceh -------------- ¶25. (SBU) The U.S. has provided Indonesia tsunami recovery and reconstruction assistance totaling $400.1 million (and U.S. the private sector contributed more than $1.4 billion to the regions). USAID implemented more than $43 million for relief and transition activities in the weeks following the tsunami and earthquake. We have directed the remaining $357 SIPDIS million to U.S.-managed reconstruction activities, debt relief ($20.1 million),a contribution to the jointly-managed Government of Indonesia-World Bank Multi-donor Trust Fund ($10 million),and activities of the U.S. Trade and Development Agency ($2.5 million). The U.S. will rebuild the road from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh and other vital infrastructure, restore livelihoods, and improve essential basic services (health, education, water, sanitation, and environment) while strengthening local governance capacity to manage these services. We provide technical assistance to develop national and local disaster planning and preparedness, including early warning systems. We have programmed more than $10 million to assist the implementation of the landmark peace agreement between the GOI and GAM. Our programs promote public understanding and support of the agreement, help integrate former combatants into Acehenese society and sustain community-based development. Avian Influenza -------------- ¶26. (SBU) The U.S. Navy Medical Research Unit (NAMRU-2) located in Jakarta has led efforts to address H5N1 avian influenza (AI) outbreaks. Indonesia's size and complexity complicated its response to AI, and while we should praise Indonesia's efforts to prepare for a potential pandemic, much work remains. Of a total 44 confirmed human cases since July 2005, 34 have proven fatal, a 75 percent fatality rate. Since SBY designated Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Aburizal Bakrie, to coordinate its AI activities, the GOI has developed an initial AI preparedness framework, but must improve coordination among health, agriculture and other sectors. Since the first confirmed AI patient in July 2005, Indonesia has responded with case investigations, has proven quick to report findings and shared samples for confirmation with international laboratories. On March 13 President Yudhoyono signed a presidential regulation creating the National Committee on Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Preparedness (Komnas FBPI) in an effort to provide centralized control and response to yet another difficult health concern. The Ministry of HEALTH (MOH) has outbreak response teams to investigate reported human cases. HEALTH care throughout most of the archipelago remains limited, often the local military offer the only HEALTH care available. Military hospitals provide care to civilians and military. The military will have a prominent medical as well as security role in the event of an influenza outbreak. NAMRU has supported the HEALTH Ministry through its 24-hospital influenza surveillance system, initial laboratory testing for the AI virus in hundreds of human samples, and outbreak investigations. We have exchanged draft MOU's with the GOI to re-establish NAMRU-2's legal status but have no fixed date to negotiate the gaps between the two texts. Unfounded suspicions in parts of the GOI that NAMRU conducts activities other than research complicate reaching an agreement. PASCOE