Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA617
2006-01-17 14:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

INDONESIA SOFT ON REPORTING IRAN TO THE UNSC

Tags:  KNNP PARM PREL IR EU AORC ID 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000617 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL IR EU AORC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA SOFT ON REPORTING IRAN TO THE UNSC

REF: STATE 6236

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000617 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016 TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL IR EU AORC ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA SOFT ON REPORTING IRAN TO THE UNSC REF: STATE 6236 Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. Summary: On January 16, the Ambassador followed up the Secretary's telephone call to Foreign Minister Wirajuda SIPDIS seeking Indonesian support for referral of Iran to the UN Security Council by the IAEA Board of Governors. The Ambassador called for Indonesia to serve as a strong voice in support in keeping with its own policies on non-proliferation. Wirajuda affirmed that Indonesia has told Iran that it should follow IAEA rules but suggested that a mechanism be found for continued negotiations, not unlike the Six Party Talks in response to DPRK actions. The Ambassador rejoined that the talks with the EU-3 had been such a mechanism, but now had been discarded by Tehran. The Minister questioned whether the right time has arrived for a referral, saying it might increase Iranian militancy. The Ambassador rejoined that Iran's statements were already militant, and that it should not be allowed to act without consequence. If steps were not taken, Iran would hide its actions behind countries such as Indonesia. While Wirajuda said he promised the Secretary that he would look at the issue closely, and would discuss it with President Yudhoyono, he provided the usual list of reasons to justify Indonesian inaction. The Ambassador will follow-up with the Presidential Palace in order to try to stiffen Indonesian resolve. End Summary ¶2. (C) In a late January 16 meeting before Minister Wirajuda departed on a trip to Europe, the Ambassador followed up Secretary Rice's telephone call and sought Indonesian support SIPDIS to refer Iran to the UN Security Council due to its breach of commitments to the EU-3 and to its IAEA safeguard obligations. The Ambassador argued that given consistent Jakarta's support for non-proliferation goals, and Indonesia's importance as the fourth largest country in the world, it could be a powerful voice on this issue. Given our agreement on non-proliferation goals, we would like to see Indonesia help push for their implementation. ¶3. (C) Wirajuda replied that they follow the issue closely and have consulted with the EU-3. Iran had sent a special envoy on the topic a few months ago, and had planned another visit, but recently canceled the trip. Indonesia has emphasized to Iran that they should meet all their obligations including transparency and safeguards. The Minister said he promised the Secretary that he would look at the issue, and would discuss it with President Yudhoyono. He said there was a hopeful sign that Iran had shown a willingness to follow all the rules since it had acceded to the Second Additional Protocol. ¶4. (C) Wirajuda questioned whether this is in fact the time whether Iran should be brought before the UNSC. He argued that Iran had not yet stopped fully cooperating and that the Indonesian view is that Iran and the EU-3 should maximize their talks. Comparing the situation to the DPRK, which abrogated its treaty commitments and declared it had nuclear weapons, Wirajuda said a mechanism had been found, the Six Party Talks, to deal with the situation. Should there not be a mechanism for Iran as well? ¶5. (C) The Ambassador responded that there already had been a mechanism for several years, the talks with the EU-3, which Iran has now pushed aside. The U.S. had supported that mechanism, to the point that there is domestic criticism within the United States about it. The Iranians had thrown the mechanism away, and it is now time to take action on the issue. The Minister would surely not want Iran to hide behind countries such as Indonesia as Tehran intentionally destroyed the mechanism available to it. If this is not the time, then when would it be? ¶6. (C) The Minister asked rhetorically what the consequences might be of isolating Iran. It might become even more militant, and successfully uses the nuclear issue as a rallying point. Wirajuda added that he has more questions than answers on this issue. The Ambassador replied that Iran should not be allowed to acquire the sense that there would be no consequences for its actions, and should not be allowed to ignore its agreements. Threatening the world with higher oil prices is rhetoric not heard anywhere else. We hope that Indonesia would stand up to such tactics, and doing so would be an important step. ¶7. (C) Comment: Foreign Minister Wirajuda provided all the usual reasons for Indonesia to avoid action. The Ambassador will follow up with the Presidential Palace in order to try to stiffen his backbone on this issue. PASCOE

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